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INDICATIONS OF INCONSISTENCY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2019

Nicholas Petrie
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Abstract

The author makes two claims in this paper. First, there appears to be an increase in indications of inconsistency (“IoIs”) across the common law world. Second, this increase is a normatively concerning turn in judicial practice. IoIs are judicial statements which, either explicitly or by implication, indicate that primary legislation is incompatible with certain protected human rights or civil liberties. They are related to, but stop short of, the formal remedies known as declarations of inconsistency (“DoIs”).

Keywords

constitutional lawhuman rightsjudicial reviewincompatibility of legislationdeclarations of incompatibilityindications of inconsistency
Type
Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 78 , Issue 3 , November 2019 , pp. 612 - 639
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2019 

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Footnotes

*

PhD Candidate, University of Cambridge.

Some embryonic thoughts that led to this article were presented at the 2018 Public Law Conference in Melbourne. Many thanks to the conference attendees for their generous feedback and to Professor Mark Elliott, Dr Stephanie Palmer, Cillian Bracken, Rachael Taylor, Stevie Martin and the anonymous C.L.J. reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

References

1 DoIs are also known by similar names, such as declarations of incompatibility (Human Rights Act 1998, s. 4); and declarations of inconsistent interpretation (Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s. 36).

2 On DoIs as “weak-form” judicial review, see Tushnet, M., Weak Courts, Strong Rights (Princeton 2008), ch. 2Google Scholar; Gardbaum, S., The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge 2013), 30Google Scholar; cf. Kavanagh, A., “What's so Weak about ‘Weak-form Review’? The Case of the UK Human Rights Act 1998” (2015) 13 ICON 1008Google Scholar.

3 See e.g. North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory (2015) 256 C.L.R. 569, 608, per Gageler J., citing Katyal, N.K. and Schmidt, T., “Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change” (2015) 128 Harv.L.R. 2109, at 2112, 2164Google Scholar. Cf. Mathen, C., Courts without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions (London 2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See e.g. A. Aust, “Advisory Opinions” (2010) 1 JIDS 123.

5 Chayes, A., “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv.L.R. 1281, at 1282CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Plaintiff S99/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 F.C.R. 17, at [458]Google Scholar, per Bromberg J.

6 Katyal, N.K., “Judges as Advicegivers” (1998) 50 Stan.L.Rev. 1709CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Duxbury, N., “Judicial Disapproval as a Constitutional Technique” (2017) 15 ICON 649Google Scholar.

7 Regarding India, see Vakil, R., “Jurisdiction” in Choudhry, S., Khosla, M. and Mehta, P. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford 2016)Google Scholar. Regarding Canada, see Mathen, Courts without Cases. See also, regarding Kenya and South Africa, Abebe, A.K. and Fombad, C.M., “The Advisory Opinion of Constitutional Courts in Sub-Sahara Africa” (2003) 46 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 55Google Scholar.

8 Aust, “Advisory Opinions”, p. 124.

9 See e.g. Harding, M. and Malkin, I., “The High Court of Australia's Obiter Dicta and Decision-making in the Lower Courts” (2012) 34 Sydney L.R. 239, at 265Google Scholar.

10 See e.g. Mathen, Courts without Cases.

11 There are historical examples of courts issuing IoIs, or something similar. An interesting example, albeit one regarding executive statement rather than legislative act, is Fitzgerald v Muldoon and Others (1976) 2 N.Z.L.R. 615 (HC), 622–23, per Wild C.J.

12 See e.g. the discussion of DoIs in New Zealand in Section IV below.

13 Even in the UK, where all DoIs have led to legal amendments or are being actively considered by the Government (see note 43 below), DoIs cannot be equated with invalidation, as Parliament always retains the right to do nothing following the DoI.

14 Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model, pp. 29–30; Duxbury, “Judicial Disapproval”, p. 650.

15 Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model, pp. 30–31.

16 D. Neuberger, “Has the Identity of the English Common Law Been Eroded by EU Laws and the European Convention On Human Rights?”, speech at the National University of Singapore, 18 August 2016, available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-160818-01.pdf>, at [47].

17 UK Human Rights Act 1998 (“UKHRA”), s. 4(6); Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s. 36(5); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s. 32(3); European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 (Ireland), s. 5(2).

18 Even the fast track procedure that enables the Executive to make amendments to legislation following a DoI under the UKHRA requires some Parliamentary oversight. See UKHRA, s. 10, Sch. 2.

19 ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, “Towards an ACT Human Rights Act: Report of the ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee” (2003) 03/0068, available at <https://acthra.anu.edu.au/documents/publications/BORCC_report.pdf>, at [3.41].

20 Dicey, A.V., The Oxford Edition of Dicey: The Law of the Constitution, vol. 1, Allison, J.W.F. (ed.) (Oxford 2013), 116, 119, 159Google Scholar; Allison, J.W.F., “Turning the Rule of Law into an English Constitutional Idea” in May, C. and Winchester, A. (eds.), Handbook on the Rule of Law (Cheltenham 2018), 175, 177Google Scholar.

21 C. Gearty, “The Human Rights Act Should Not Be Repealed”, UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 17 September 2016, available at <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/09/17/conor-gearty-the-human-rights-act-should-not-be-repealed/>.

22 Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 C.L.R. 1, 65, at [89], per French C.J., at [184]–[185], at [187], per Gummow J., at [280], per Hayne J, at [457], per Heydon J., at [584], per Crennan and Kiefel JJ., at [661], per Bell J.

23 Young, A., Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (Oxford 2017), 222–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Ngcobo, S., “South Africa's Transformative Constitution: Towards an Appropriate Doctrine of Separation of Powers” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch L.Rev. 37, at 43–45Google Scholar; Leckey, R., “The Harms of Remedial Discretion” (2016) 14 ICON 584, at 585–86Google Scholar.

25 See e.g. Attorney General v Taylor and ors (2019) 1 N.Z.L.R. 213, at [127], [134], per William Young and O'Regan JJ., discussing similar concerns regarding non-statutory DoIs.

26 See e.g. C v Minister for Social Protection & anor [2018] IESC 57, at [20]–[21], per O'Donnell J.; Simpson v Attorney-General (1994) 3 N.Z.L.R. 667.

27 Carolan, E., “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’ in Constitutional Remedies? The Implications of NHV v Minister for Justice for Inter-Branch Roles and Relationships” (2017) 40 D.U.L.J.(N.S.) 191, at 204Google Scholar; Kenny, D., “Remedial Innovation, Constitutional Culture, and the Supreme Court at a Crossroads” (2017) 40 D.U.L.J.(N.S.) 85, at 5Google Scholar.

28 The UKHRA came into force on 2 October 2000.

29 Geiringer, C., “The Constitutional Role of the Courts under the NZ Bill of Rights: Three Narratives from Attorney-General v Taylor” (2017) 48 V.U.W.L.R. 547, at 570Google Scholar; de Londras, F., “Declarations of Incompatibility under the ECHR Act 2003: A Workable Transplant?” (2014) 35 Stat.L.R. 50Google Scholar.

30 Temese v Police (1992) 9 C.R.N.Z. 425, which does not directly refer to DoIs, but considers them in light of F.M. Brookfield, “Constitutional Law” [1992] NZRL Rev. 231.

31 A. Palmer, “The Politicisation of the Judiciary”, The Times, 20 July 2004, available at <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-politicisation-of-the-judiciary-tr8btsb9280>.

32 Debeljak, J., “The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): The Preservation of Parliamentary Supremacy in the Context of Rights Protection” (2003) 9 AJHR 183, 226–27Google Scholar; cf. Kavanagh, “What's so Weak?”.

33 See e.g. G. Marshall, “Two Kinds of Compatibility: More About Section 3 of the Human Rights Act”(1999) P.L. 377, at 382.

34 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 A.C. 557, at [39], per Lord Steyn.

35 N. Phillips, “The Art of the Possible: Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights”, The First Lord Alexander of Weedon Lecture, 22 April 2010, available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_100419.pdf>, p. 44; Kavanagh, “What's so Weak?”, pp. 1022–23; Mance, J., “The Frontiers of Executive and Judicial Power: Differences in Common Law Constitutional Traditions” (2018) 26 A.P.L.R. 109, at 112Google Scholar.

36 R (F and Thompson) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 3170 (Admin); R (F and Thompson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 A.C. 331.

37 A. Travis, “David Cameron Condemns Supreme Court Ruling on Sex Offenders”, The Guardian, 16 February 2011, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/feb/16/david-cameron-condemns-court-sex-offenders>.

38 Ibid.

39 C. Draghici, “The Blanket Ban on Assisted Suicide: Between Moral Paternalism and Utilitarian Justice” [2015] E.H.R.L.R. 286, at 295; Stark, S. Wilson, “Facing Facts: Judicial Approaches to Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 631, at 654Google Scholar.

40 B. Hale, “What's the Point of Human Rights?”, Warwick Law Lecture, 28 November 2013, available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131128.pdf>, p. 17.

41 Mance, “The Frontiers”, p. 118; Wilson Stark, “Facing Facts”, p. 654.

42 Taylor (2019) 1 N.Z.L.R. 213, at [55], per Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ.

43 All DoIs issued under the UKHRA have resulted in the removal of the rights incompatibility, or in the Government promising or actively considering legislative change. See Ministry of Justice, “Written Evidence (HRA0017)” (2018) available at <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/human-rights-committee/20-years-of-the-human-rights-act/written/89723.html>, at [7]–[9]. Although note the response to some DoIs has been limited, see A. von Staden, “Minimalist Compliance in the UK Prisoner Voting Rights Cases”, ECHR Blog, 16 November 2018, available at <http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/guest-blog-minimalist-compliance-in-uk.html>. Further, this strong response rate occurs in the shadow of Strasbourg litigation: Duxbury, “Judicial Disapproval”, p. 651.

44 Taylor (2019) 1 N.Z.L.R. 213, at [56], per Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ.

45 On cost implications for both DoIs and IoIs, see ibid., at para. [57]; Attorney-General v Taylor (2017) 3 N.Z.L.R. 24, at [161].

46 Taylor (2017) 3 N.Z.L.R. 24, at [149]–[152], [164]; Moonen v Film Literature Board of Review (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, 17, per Tipping J.; Butler, A., “Judicial Indications of Inconsistency – a New Weapon in the Bill of Rights Armoury” (2000) 1 N.Z.L.Rev. 43, at 59Google Scholar.

47 Katyal, “Judges as Advicegivers”, pp. 1753, 1824.

48 Moonen (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, 17, per Tipping J.; Butler, “Judicial Indications of Inconsistency”, p. 59.

49 Quilter v Attorney-General (1998) 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 548, per Thomas J.; Butler, “Judicial Indications of Inconsistency”, pp. 59–60; P. Rishworth, “Human Rights” [1999] N.Z.L.Rev. 469. Regarding DoIs, see C. Gearty and J. Phillips, “The Human Rights Act and Business: Friend or Foe?” [2012] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 493, 497–99.

50 Temese (1992) 9 CRNZ 425, at [27], per Cooke P.

51 Under the UKHRA there are fast-track mechanisms to bring about legislative change following a DoI (see s. 10 and Sch. 2). There is also an expectation that the Executive will bring the DoI to the attention of the Parliament Joint Committee of Human Rights Ministry of Justice. See “Responding to Human Rights Judgments (2018) – Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights Cm 9728”, available at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/756346/responding-human-rights-judgments-2017-18.pdf>, p. 9; cf. the absence of formal procedures and consequences for non-statutory DoIs in New Zealand: S. Winter, “A Constitutional Call to Action”, ADLS, 16 June 2017, available at <http://www.adls.org.nz/for-the-profession/news-and-opinion/2017/6/16/a-constitutional-call-to-action/>.

52 See e.g. Chen, B., “The Principle of Legality: Issues on Rationale and Application” (2015) 41 Monash U.L.Rev. 329Google Scholar; Cardell-Oliver, F., “Parliament, the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights: The Strength of the Principle of Legality” (2017) 41 MULR 30Google Scholar.

53 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 22.

54 Huscroft, G., “Civil Remedies for Breach of the Bill of Rights” in Rishworth, P. et al. (eds.), The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford 2003), 811Google Scholar; McQuigg, R., Bills of Rights: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 2014), 110Google Scholar; Butler, A. and Butler, P., “Protecting Rights” in Morris, C., Boston, J. and Butler, P. (eds.), Reconstituting the Constitution (New York, 2011), 169Google Scholar.

55 G. Palmer, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (14 August 1990) 510, p. 3450.

56 Geddis, A. and Ferrere, M.B. Rodriguez, “Judicial Innovations under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act – Lessons for Queensland?” (2016) 35 U.Q.L.J. 251, 260–81Google Scholar.

57 Simpson (1994) 3 N.Z.L.R. 667, 718, per McKay J., 691, per Casey J.; Huscroft, “Civil Remedies”, pp. 811, 814; Geddis and Rodriguez Ferrere, “Judicial Innovations”, pp. 265–69.

58 Taylor (2019) 1 N.Z.L.R. 213.

59 Note that s. 92J of the Human Rights Act 1993 (N.Z.) confers a limited right to issue DoIs on the Human Rights Review Tribunal.

60 See e.g. R. v Poumako (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 695, at [70], [86]–[107], per Thomas J., at [68], per Henry J.; Moonen (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, at [19], per Tipping J. (note, Tipping J. was discussing IoIs, but used the terms “declare” and “indicate” interchangeably).

61 Noort v Ministry of Transport (1992) 1 N.Z.L.R. 743; Curran v Police (1991) 7 C.R.N.Z. 323; Littlejohn v Ministry of Transport [1990–92] 1 N.Z.B.O.R.R. 285 (HC); P. Rishworth, “Applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to Statutes: The Right to a Lawyer in Breath and Blood Alcohol Cases” [1991] NZRL Rev; D. Paciocco, “Remedies for Violations of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990” in Essays on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation, No. 32, 1992) 40, 64–68; Brookfield, “Constitutional Law”.

62 Curran (1991) 7 C.R.N.Z. 323; Littlejohn [1990–92] 1 N.Z.B.O.R.R. 285 (HC).

63 R. v Phillips (1991) 3 N.Z.L.R. 175; R. v Bennett (1993) 2 H.R.N.Z. 358.

64 Some rights in the NZBORA are expressed in qualified terms, leaving little need for further s. 5 analysis. For example, the right against “unreasonable search and seizure” in s. 21.

65 Rishworth, “The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1900: The First Fifteen Months” in Essays on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation, No. 32, 1992) 19–20.

66 Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curran (1992) 3 N.Z.L.R. 260.

67 Ibid., at p. 271, per Cooke P.

68 Ibid., at p. 284, per Richardson J. (McKay J. agreeing), 287, per Hardie Boys J.

69 Temese (1992) 9 CRNZ 425, 4, per Cooke P., 7–8, per Richardson, Casey, Hardie Boys and Gault JJ.

70 Quilter (1998) 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 554, per Thomas J.

71 Moonen (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, at [20]. Justice Tipping also used the word “declare” at [19], meaning the case is occasionally and incorrectly cited as approving DoIs. See e.g. Poumako (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 695, at [87]–[107], per Thomas J.; Zaoui v Attorney-General (2004) 2 N.Z.L.R. 339, at [166]; Geiringer, C., “On a Road to Nowhere: Implied Declarations of Inconsistency and the New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act” (2009) 40 V.U.W.L.R. 613, at 618Google Scholar.

72 Allan, J., “The Effect of a Statutory Bill of Rights Where Parliament Is Sovereign: The Lesson from New Zealand” in Campbell, T., Ewing, K. and Tomkins, A. (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford 2001), 384Google Scholar.

73 Hansen v The Queen (2007) 3 N.Z.L.R. 1.

74 Ibid., at paras. [57]–[62], per Blanchard J., at paras. [89]–[94], per Tipping J., at paras. [186]–[192], per McGrath J.; cf. Elias C.J., who held the s. 5 analysis could only be done after s. 6 had been considered, at paras. [6], [15]–[24].

75 Brookfield, “Constitutional Law”, p. 239; Temese (1992) 9 C.R.N.Z. 425, 427, per Cooke P.; P. Rishworth, “Reflections on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney-General” [1998] N.Z.L.Rev. 683, at 693; Poumako (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 695, at [70], [86]–[107], per Thomas J., at [43], per Richardson P., Gault and Keith JJ., at [68], per Henry J.; Moonen (2000) 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, at [19]–[20], per Tipping J.; Hopkinson v Police (2004) 3 N.Z.L.R. 704, at [83]; Zaoui (2004) 2 N.Z.L.R. 339, at [85], [108]; R. v Te Kahu (2006) 1 N.Z.L.R. 459, at [44]–[45]; Geiringer, C., “The Dead Hand of the Bill of Rights? Is the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 a Substantive Legal Constraint on Parliament's Power to Legislate?” (2007) 11 OLR 389, at 389Google Scholar.

76 Judges left open the possibility of issuing DoIs. See e.g. R. v Manawatu (2006) 23 C.R.N.Z. 83, at [13]; Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (2007) 1 N.Z.L.R. 507, at [57]–[59]; R. v Exley [2007] NZCA 393, at [21]; Hansen (2007) 3 N.Z.L.R. 1., at [253], per McGrath J., at [107], per Tipping J.; McDonnell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (2009) 8 H.R.N.Z. 770, at [123]; cf. Boscawen v Attorney-General (2009) 2 N.Z.L.R. 229, at [55], per O'Regan J.

77 Taylor (2017) 3 N.Z.L.R. 24, at [154]–[161].

78 Ibid., at paras. [43]–[77], [109].

79 Ibid., at para. [109].

80 Taylor (2019) 1 N.Z.L.R. 213, at [38], [47], [50], per Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ., at [100], [104], per Elias C.J.

81 Ibid., at paras. [53], [63], [65], per Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ., at para. [95], per Elias C.J., at para. [138], per William Young and O'Regan JJ.

82 Even the dissenting judges anticipated their future use, see ibid., at para. [125], per William Young and O'Regan JJ.

83 Re. the UKHRA, see note 51 above.

84 Taylor (2017) 3 N.Z.L.R. 24, at [163]–[174].

85 Ibid., at para. [151].

86 Taylor (2019) 1 N.Z.L.R. 213, at [55].

87 E. Willis, “Prisoner Voting Rights Measure of Democracy”, University of Auckland – News and Opinion, 18 December 2018, available at <https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/news/2018/12/18/prisoner-voting-rights-measure-democracy.html>; cf. position in the UK (see note 43 above).

88 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657.

89 Lords Sumption, Hughes, Reed and Clarke held they had jurisdiction to hear the matter, but that it would institutionally inappropriate for the court to adjudicate: ibid., at paras. [228]–[232]; cf. T v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 3181 (Admin), at [30]; Wicks, E., “The Supreme Court Judgment in Nicklinson: One Step Forward on Assisted Dying; Two Steps Back on Human Rights” (2015) 23 Med.L.Rev. 144, at 147CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; S. Martin, ”Declaratory Misgivings: Assisted Suicide in a Post-Nicklinson Context” [2018] P.L. 209.

90 Cf. Lady Hale and Lord Kerr, who held it was an appropriate case to issue a DoI.

91 Martin, “Declaratory Misgivings”.

92 Lady Hale and Lords Neuberger, Mance, Kerr and Wilson.

93 R (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657 [113], at [116], per Lord Neuberger, at [190], per Lord Mance.

94 Ibid., at paras. [115], [116], [148], per Lord Neuberger, at para. [190], per Lord Mance, at para. [197], per Lord Wilson.

95 Ibid., at para. [127], per Lord Neuberger, at paras. [201], [204], per Lord Wilson.

96 Ibid., at para. [127], per Lord Neuberger, at para. [201], per Lord Wilson.

97 Ibid., at para. [190], per Lord Mance, at para. [202], per Lord Wilson. Lord Clarke provided support on this point, at para. [293].

98 Ibid., at para. [343], per Lord Kerr, at para. [114], per Lord Neuberger, at para. [300], per Lady Hale.

99 See e.g. ibid., at para. [191], per Lord Mance.

100 Ibid., at para. [300]. For similar sentiments, see R (Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development [2018] UKSC 32, at [58]–[61], per Lord Kerr.

101 R (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [117], per Lord Neuberger.

102 Ibid., at paras. [190]–[191], per Lord Mance.

103 Ibid., at para. [202], per Lord Wilson.

104 Ibid., at para. [117], per Lord Neuberger; Kavanagh, A., “The Lure and the Limits of Dialogue” (2016) 66 U.T.L.J. 83, at 86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 R (Nicklinson) [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 A.C. 657, at [204]–[205], per Lord Wilson.

106 Mance, “The Frontiers”, p. 114.

107 Martin, ”Declaratory Misgivings”, p. 222.

108 Ibid., at pp. 214–15.

109 R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 2447, [2018] W.L.R.(D) 634, at [41]–[58].

110 Martin, ”Declaratory Misgivings”, pp. 210, 216; see also Martin, S., “Assisted Suicide and the European Convention on Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Case Law’”(2018) 21 TCLR 244Google Scholar.

111 Martin, ”Declaratory Misgivings”, pp. 216–17.

112 See e.g. Fiona Bruce M.P., Hansard, HC vol. 599, cols. 656, 11 September 2015, available at <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150911/debtext/150911-0001.htm#15091126000003>.

113 See note 43 above.

114 R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWCA Civ 1431, [2018] W.L.R.(D) 402.

115 Ibid., at paras. [134], [191].

116 R (Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice, UKSC Permission to Appeal Order, 27 November 2018, available at <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/r-on-the-application-of-conway-v-secretary-of-state-for-justice-court-order.pdf>.

117 In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27, at [117]–[121].

118 Ibid., at para. [40], per Lady Hale, at paras. [118]–[119], per Lord Mance, at paras. [296]–[299], per Lord Kerr (Lord Wilson agreeing).

119 A. Kavanagh, “Situating the Strike-down” (draft paper, 2017), available at <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/topics-comparative-constitutionalism-situating-strike-down-power-0>; Niblett, A., “Delaying Declarations of Constitutional Validity” in Fagan, F. and Levmore, S. (eds.), The Timing of Lawmaking (Cheltenham 2017)Google Scholar.

120 See e.g. C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57; Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 200.

121 NHV v Minister for Justice & Equality and ors [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 I.R. 246; NHV v Minister for Justice & Equality [2017] IESC 82.

122 Article 15.4.2. of the Irish Constitution mandates that constitutional laws “shall … be invalid”. See Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 194; Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, pp. 13–15.

123 C. O'Mahony, “Unenumerated Rights: Possible Future Directions after NHV?” (2017) 40 D.U.L.J.(N.S.) 171.

124 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [3], per MacMenamin J.; Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 192; Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, pp. 1, 9.

125 Kavanagh, “Situating the Strike-down”, p. 2.

126 Ibid.

127 R (Davis and ors) v Secretary of State for the Department [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin) [2015] W.L.R.(D) 318; HM Treasury v Ahmed and ors [2010] UKSC 5, [2010] 2 A.C. 534.

128 Chandrachud, C., Balanced Constitutionalism: Courts and Legislatures in India and the United Kingdom (Oxford 2017), ch. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

129 P.J. Yap, “New Democracies and Novel Remedies” [2017] P.L. 30.

130 R. Leckey, “Enforcing Laws That Infringe Rights” [2016] P.L. 206.

131 See e.g. Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie [2005] ZACC 19, (2006) 1 S.A. 524, at [147].

132 NHV [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 I.R. 246; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57.

133 Kavanagh, “Situating the Strike-down”, p. 2.

134 Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 191.

135 Ibid., at pp. 193–94.

136 Kavanagh, “Situating the Strike-down” p. 2.

137 Murphy v Attorney General [1982] I.R. 237, 309, per Henchy J.; see Doyle, O., The Constitution of Ireland: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford 2018), 143Google Scholar.

138 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 2.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid, at p. 1.

141 de Londras, “Declarations of Incompatibility”; de Londras, F., “In Defence of Judicial Innovation and Constitutional Evolution” in Cahillane, L., Gallen, J. and Hickey, T. (eds.), Judges, Politics and the Irish Constitution (Manchester 2017)Google Scholar.

142 de Londras, “Declarations of Incompatibility”; de Londras, “In Defence of Judicial Innovation and Constitutional Evolution”; cf. Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 21.

143 Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, pp. 197–99; Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, pp. 9–10; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [12]–[19], [27], per MacMenamin J.

144 See discussion in ibid., at paras. [37]–[64], per MacMenamin J.

145 Ibid.

146 See especially C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57.

147 Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, pp. 197–99; Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, pp. 9–10; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [12]–[19], [27], per MacMenamin J.

148 NHV [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 I.R. 246, at [2]–[4], per O'Donnell J.

149 Ibid., 307, at [4], per O'Donnell J.

150 Ibid., 316, at [18], per O'Donnell J.

151 Ibid., 317, at [22], per O'Donnell J.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.; Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 200.

154 NHV [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 I.R. 246, at [22], per O'Donnell J.; Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 9.

155 NHV [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 I.R. 246, at [22], per O'Donnell J.; Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 195.

156 NHV [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 I.R. 246, at [7], per O'Donnell J.

157 The Department of Justice and Equality, “Government Agrees Framework for Access to Work for International Protection Applicants”, 21 November 2017, available at <http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Access_To_Work_for_International_Protection_Applicants>. However, this did not happen until 6 July 2018, when the Government opted in via secondary legislation: Irish Refugee Council, “Country Report: Ireland”, 2018 update, p. 50, available at <https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_ie_2018update.pdf>.

158 NHV [2017] IESC 82.

159 Ibid., at para. [8].

160 Ibid., at para. [1].

161 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [18], per O'Donnell J., at [26], per MacMenamin J.

162 Ibid., at para. [19], per O'Donnell J.

163 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 92.

164 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [26], per MacMenamin J.

165 NHV [2017] IESC 82, at [3].

166 See e.g. PC v Minister for Social Protection and ors [2017] IESC 63, [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 369, at [69]; AB v Clinical Director of St Loman's Hospital and ors [2018] IECA 123, at [54]; Agha (a minor) & ors v Minister for Social Protection & ors [2018] IECA 155, at [70].

167 E. Carolan, “Remedial Creativity in Common Law Courts: Transgressing the Frontiers of Public Law?”, Public Law Conference, Melbourne Law School, 12 July 2018 (on file with author), p. 18.

168 PC v Minister for Social Protection [2017] IESC 63, [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 369; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57.

169 PC v Minister for Social Protection [2017] IESC 63, [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 369, at [65]; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [4], [79], per MacMenamin J.

170 Ibid.

171 PC v Minister for Social Protection [2017] IESC 63, [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 369, at [68]–[69]; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [1], per MacMenamin J.

172 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, [14], per MacMenamin J.

173 Ibid., at para. [23], per O'Donnell J.

174 Ibid., at para. [26], per O'Donnell J.

175 Ibid., at para. [48], per O'Donnell J.

176 Ibid., at para. [17], per O'Donnell J.

177 Ibid., at para. [2].

178 Ibid.

179 Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 192.

180 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, pp. 3, 5.

181 On judicial supremacy stifling political debate in Ireland, see E. Daly, “Reappraising Judicial Supremacy in the Irish Constitutional Tradition” in Cahillane et al., Judges, Politics and the Irish Constitution.

182 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [17], per O'Donnell J.

183 T. Hickey, “Direct Provision Ruling Signals New ‘Dialogue’ between Dail and the Judiciary”, The Irish Times, 8 January 2017, available at <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/direct-provision-ruling-signals-new-dialogue-between-dail-and-the-judicary-1.3110988>.

184 T. Hickey, “Judges as God's Philosophers: Re-thinking ‘Principle’ in Constitutional Adjudication” in Cahillane et al., Judges, politics and the Irish Constitution.

185 Choudhry, S. and Roach, K., “Putting the Past behind Us? Prospective Judicial and Legislative Constitutional Remedies” (2003) 21 Sup.Ct.L.Rev. 205, at 230Google Scholar; Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 191; Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 15.

186 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [19], per O'Donnell J. More generally, see Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, p. 591.

187 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 16.

188 While the Applicant had been given refugee status, others were still subject to the employment ban under s. 9(4) of the Refugee Act 1996.

189 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 16; Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, pp. 595–96.

190 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 17.

191 Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, p. 591; Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”.

192 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 18.

193 Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, p. 591.

194 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [19], per O'Donnell J.; Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, p. 593.

195 Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 3.

196 Ibid.; Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 192.

197 Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 200; Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, p. 603.

198 Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, p. 201. See generally Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, p. 597.

199 Carolan, “A ‘Dialogue-oriented Departure’”, pp. 201–02.

200 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [26], per MacMenamin J.

201 NHV [2017] IESC 82, at [4]; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [17], per O'Donnell J.

202 C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [68]–[78], per MacMenamin J.

203 Ibid., at para. [21].

204 Leckey, “The Harms of Remedial Discretion”, p. 587; Choudhry and Roach, “Putting the Past behind Us?”, p. 228; Kenny, “Remedial Innovation”, p. 4; C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] IESC 57, at [14], per O'Donnell J.

205 Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and s. 25(1) of the Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1945. But note, there are exceptions to the prohibition in line with R. v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687.

206 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27, at [73], per Lord Mance (Lord Reed, Lady Black and Lloyd-Jones agreeing).

207 Ibid., at para. [42(c)], per Lord Mance.

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid., at para. [91], per Lord Mance.

210 Mance, “The Frontiers”, p. 117.

211 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27, at [334], per Lord Reed.

212 Lord Mance with regard to abortion in cases of rape, incest and fatal foetal abnormality. Lady Black with regard to cases of fatal foetal abnormality.

213 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27, at [135], per Lord Mance.

214 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2018] UKSC 27, at [135].

215 Banks v Commissioners for HMRC [2018] UKFTT 0617 (TC).

216 Ibid., at para. [17]. For alternative arguments, see paras. [130]–[137].

217 Ibid., at para. [46].

218 Ibid., at paras. [106] and [110].

219 Ibid., at paras. [116]–[117].

220 Ibid., at paras. [127]–[128].

221 Ibid., at para. [129].