The fact is of course obvious that the normal unit of organised society in the area of the Graeco-Roman civilisation was the partly autonomous town. In very early times the towns in Italy were grouped in Leagues which were based generally on racial affinities; and the same was the case with the towns in the lands outside Italy which were earliest conquered by Rome. One of the commonest features of early alliances was the allowance of what the Romans called the “ius exilii” that is to say, each of the contracting parties agreed to give a harbourage to those citizens of its ally who were driven out by internal commotions. Exile was an exceedingly common incident of public life in the early days of an ancient town. It may be said that in primitive times party politics were not carried on by strife between two sections within the city walls. Rather one of the contending parties was within the walls, while the other was outside, anxious to force an entry and eject its opponents. It is probable that the ius exilii had a very considerable effect in early days in shifting population.

The office of Marshal of the Eyre is the subject of at least two interesting cases reported in the Year Books of Edward II. As no account of this Marshalsy appears to exist it seemed worth while to bring together the following particulars, not only for their own sake, but as illustrating the history of a medieval serjeanty. These particulars fall under three heads: the origin and evolution of the office, its tenure and descent, and the functions and activities it involved.

The generally successful result of our naval wars may be ascribed largely to the advancement of experienced seamen to high office at the Admiralty. Since the period of the Dutch Wars this practice has prevailed more here than among our rivals, the outcome being the accumulation of a body of naval doctrine which has proved to be invaluable at crises such as arose in and after 1793. On the other hand the Revolution in France bore hard on her marine, leading to the emigration of most of the officers, and to the infiltration of doctrinaire views, derived from the land campaigns of 1793. Such, in brief, were the conditions amidst which the young Bonaparte came into contact with the Mediterranean campaign of that year.

The question of the publicity of State Papers obviously has two aspects. Certain transactions of diplomacy can never be made known immediately. Personal comments and attacks creep occasionally into dispatches and have to be cut out on publication. But these omissions, though interesting, are unimportant except to the historian. Certain other and more important transactions have to be concealed altogether, because a confidence would be betrayed, or too much be made of a tentative or false step in diplomatic transactions. Even in such cases, however, there is usually no objection to revealing the reasons that led to the conclusion finally adopted. So much can be done in a completed negotiation or decision. But most diplomats would agree that it is sometimes dangerous to publish details as to abortive negotiations. It is very often necessary to do so, but the announcement of the failure of a negotiation, if accompanied by clouds of papers, is not likely to produce a good impression and may sometimes prevent a remedy from being found.

The following letters (which are selected from the forthcoming Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, and supplement the documents published by Spencer Walpole) take us behind the scenes of the Melbourne Cabinet during the anxious months of 1840, when the competition of Great Britain and France for hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean enlarged the struggle of Mehemet Ali and the Sultan from a local into a European problem, and brought the two countries within sight of war. The duel between Palmerston and Thiers was watched with an anxiety which was fully shared by the colleagues of the masterful Foreign Secretary. Lord Holland led the opposition within the Cabinet, and was vigorously supported by Lord Clarendon. Lord Spencer and Lord Lansdowne were also uneasy; and their apprehensions were shared by the Prime Minister who, however, was painfully aware that the resignation of Palmerston would destroy a ministry which had long outlived its popularity.

The Indian administration of the eighth Earl of Elgin is important and interesting for two reasons. It furnishes a perfect cross-section made in the government of India at the time when the old Company methods were being rapidly superseded by those of the new régime: and it reveals the judgments passed on that government by a widely experienced administrator of the day.