This paper uses the examples of three nineteenth-century cities—London, Philadelphia, and New York—to explore both what is permanent about the problem of water provision (that consumers want it clean, accessible, and free) and what is mediated by the forces of government policy and economic constraints. In some cases, municipal authorities first claimed control over water supplies before figuring out how to pay for their works. In others, they calculated that such arrangements were both too expensive and too risky to bear alone. Both approaches were complicated by the high costs of providing water to urban areas and by urban dwellers' belief that water should flow from their taps without charge. The result was, and remains, a market in which price is largely dictated by political demand, set by what the government, rather than the market, will bear.

This issue of Business History Review is devoted to financial crisis, business failure, and scandal. As readers of this journal know, white-collar fraud is not a new phenomenon. Public and private authorities have confronted the problem for a long time, looking for ways to deal with it that will not stifle economic growth.

Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously declared in 1932 that a separation of ownership and control was a hallmark of large U.S. corporations, and their characterization of matters quickly became received wisdom. A series of recent papers has called the Berle–Means orthodoxy into question. This survey of the relevant historical literature acknowledges that the pattern of ownership and control in U.S. public companies is not monolithic. Nevertheless, a separation between ownership and control remains an appropriate reference point for analysis of U.S. corporate governance.

Historical scholarship on business—environment interactions has largely sidestepped the study of corporate innovations that had both economic and environmental benefits. This issue is examined through late-nineteenth-century initiatives sponsored by the British Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, whose aim was to document and promote the creation of profitable by-products out of polluting industrial waste and emissions. A case is made that the individuals involved in this effort not only anticipated concepts and debates now at the heart of the modern sustainable development literature, but also that their work questions some fundamental premises of this discourse.

This paper offers a detailed case study of the emergence, organization, and development of research and development at E. Merck. During the 1890s, revolutionary changes in the scientific knowledge base, especially the rise of bacteriological research and the entry of dyestuff producers into the pharmaceuticals market, combined with the financial distress Merck was undergoing to force the firm to reorganize pharmaceutical research as a corporate strategy. Consequently, between 1895 and 1898, Merck restructured its in-house research, forming closer ties with universities and other outside inven- tors. Merck depended on these sources to generate new products, while relying on in-house scientists to improve productive efficiency. A spate of new products was launched between the late 1890s and 1905, but, in the following years, resource constraints restricted Merck's innovative capacity.

Shareholders in corporations face two very different types of governance problems: expropriation by controlling shareholders or managers; and expropriation by greedy rulers or, more generally, by the state. The problem is that the more successful investors are in protecting their capital from the grabbing hand of the state, the less they are able to call upon the state to protect it from the grabbing hand of corporate insiders. Conversely, the more investors are able to call upon government to restrain insiders, the more they are vulnerable to expropriation by the state. Although the terms of this tradeoff have changed over time as modern democratic polities replaced absolutist monarchies, both types of threats are still very much with us.

Since the mid-1970s, overfishing has had a considerable impact on the American seafood industry, and companies serving the American seafood market have taken steps to respond to the crisis. Following a brief survey of modern-day fishing and of the steps that have been taken to mitigate overfishing, the strategies adopted for commercial fishing in American waters, especially those in Alaska, are examined. Through their attempts to deal with the challenges posed by overfishing, fishers, seafood-processing and wholesaling companies, and retailers have fundamentally altered the industry. In conclusion, a summary of studies by historians and other scholars of fishery matters is followed by suggestions for historical research on the topic. Historians are reminded of the need to consider environmental factors when writing about business developments.

In 1950, poultry comprised 1 percent of the total meat consumed in Britain. But over the next thirty years, chicken consumption grew at the rate of 10 percent per annum, while overall meat consumption remained stagnant. By 1980, poultry made up a quarter of the total share of the market, replacing beef, mutton, and bacon in the British diet. This transformation was made possible by dramatic changes in production, dependent on technological innovations across several unrelated sectors. While the widespread distribution of cheap chicken led to its mass adoption, the transformation in meateating habits was not without its controversies. The leading retailers, in particular J. Sainsbury, acted as critical intermediaries in this contested market, reconciling consumer uncertainty by attaching their own reputations to product quality, and then by intervening in the quality standards employed in their supply chains.

In the late 1800s, Latin American modernizers faced major obstacles to economic growth. In the Dominican Republic, elites embraced concessions as a policy to attract foreign capital to infrastructure, industry, and cash-crop agriculture. In contrast to Mexico, where concessions were public and impersonal but failed to create viable firms, Dominican concessions were public, yet corrupt, formally opposed to monopoly, yet prone to convey exclusive privileges. Dominican modernizers recognized that concessions created “monopolies that are always a hateful tyranny,” yet found no better way to attract investment. Only after the United States took control of Dominican finances in 1905 were the “burdensome” contracts canceled as an “impediment to future progress.”

The failure of one of the most prominent German merchant-banking houses of the early sixteenth century, Ambrosius and Hanns, the Brothers Höchstetter, and Associates, serves as the point of departure for an exploration of why early modern merchants failed and what the consequences of failure were. This single example illuminates a variety of issues: state engagement in commerce and finance; legal development of bankruptcy procedures; economic strategies against failure and scandal. It reveals the limits of modern economic theories of economic crisis and development.

International capital flows are strongly influenced by countryspecific patterns that can be best understood in historical and comparative perspective. A long-term empirical analysis of French and German investment in Spain reveals that the core capabilities of foreign fi rms and their relations with local partners have spurred the rise and development of two national models of international investment, characterized here as “political” and “technical.” The research identifies the main actors and the ownership advantages of the two models that have proved to be so resilient over time.

In this essay, I grapple with three main questions: What effect did the nationalization of telegraphy in 1868–70 have on the structure of the news market in Britain? How did this market structure affect the pricing and supply of news? What effects did subsequent technological change have on the structure of the news market? I show that nationalization resulted in a tripartite market arrangement characterized by collusion that benefited the provincial press over the London press, but retarded the productivity of the General Post Office and the adoption of new technology.

Most scholars know little about the panic of 1792, America's first financial market crash, during which securities prices dropped nearly 25 percent in two weeks. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton adroitly intervened to stem the crisis, minimizing its effect on the nascent nation's fragile economic and political systems. U.S. policymakers soon forgot the crisis-management techniques Hamilton invented but failed to codify. Many of them were later rediscovered and became theoretical and practical standards of modern central-bank crisis management. Hamilton, for example, formulated and implemented “Bagehot's rules” for central-bank crisis management eight decades before Walter Bagehot wrote about them in Lombard Street.

Between 1890 and 1930, Argentina's manufacturers invested in imported machinery. Although they aligned with political allies to advance and protect their companies, their dependence on imported machinery, raw materials, fuel, and expensive skilled labor were obstacles to their success. Two factors slowed the progress of these entrepreneurs: their lack of technological capabilities and the absence of government policies to address the problems entailed in importing foreign machinery. Several political factions supported industry's efforts to reduce dependence on imported products and to diversify the economy. While these supporters hoped to promote industry through the passage of legislation to raise the tariff rate, their strategy represented a compromise that stifled the drive to innovate that is so necessary for long-run economic growth and industrial development.

Product innovation, a decisive factor in modern economies, is usually analyzed from one point of view–that of the producers. A more realistic approach to the subject would add at least four dimensions to a consideration of the topic: the perspective of consumers and the cultural context within which they form their views; the differences in how experts and consumers acquire knowledge about products; the increasing influence of retailers at the point of sale; and the technological options available to producers and households. Two twentieth-century German case studies–on the scientific innovation of yogurt and the preserving and canning of food–connect the often separate perspectives of business, consumers, and culture.

In July of 1826, a financial panic on Wall Street caused several companies to fail abruptly and precipitated runs on two of New York City's fifteen banks. Life and Fire Insurance became the largest of the bankruptcies. In violation of New York's banking statutes, the firm had engaged in lending on a massive scale during the speculative boom that prevailed in 1824–25. Innovative lending techniques had been developed outside the traditional banking sector—in this case, in the insurance industry. These lending practices, based on an instrument known as a post note, were initially sound, but were later extended to riskier borrowers and ultimately proved ruinous. In the credit crisis that began in late 1825, the value of the Life and Fire's assets fell dramatically, and in a desperate effort to raise cash, the directors resorted to fraud.

Successful technological change in countries outside the northern Atlantic during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended on entrepreneurial skills, not inventive expertise. In this examination of the Owens automatic glass-bottle-blowing machine in Mexico between 1905 and 1912, innovation is seen to have occurred within a broad context of incipient social and economic modernization. Although the obstacles encountered by technology importers and innovators were both substantial and stubbornly persistent, in this case, they turned out to be malleable.

The corporate history of Ford in Malaya from 1926 to 1957 reveals Ford Canada's global strategy to tap new British colonial markets. A combination of factors motivated Ford Canada to set up a subsidiary in Malaya, whose subsequent domestic sales and marketing success depended on maintaining mutually beneficial relations with the local merchant firms and Chinese entrepreneurs. After it was directed by the parent company to restructure its operations, Ford Canada imposed tight control on its own local operations to ensure that it could meet evolving consumer demands in Malaya and across the wider region. However, the company was careful to maintain its ties with these marketing and networking channels.

An expanding economy, new technologies, and changing consumer preferences provided growth opportunities for firms in interwar Australia. This period saw an increase in the number of large-scale firms in mining, manufacturing, and a wide range of service industries. Firms unable to rely solely on retained earnings to fund expansion turned to the domestic stock exchanges. A new data set of capital raisings constructed from reports of prospectuses published in the financial press forms the basis for the conclusion that many firms used substantial injections of equity finance to augment internally generated sources of funds. That they were able to do so indicates a strong increase in the capacity of local stock exchanges and a greater willingness of individuals to hold part of their wealthin transferable securities.