This article assesses the brand-building strategies of Henry Heinz. Heinz began selling bottled horseradish to Pittsburgh residents in 1869. When he died in 1919, his company, H.J. Heinz, was one of the largest food processors in the world. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and other scholars have pointed to Heinz's ability to make use of supply-side innovations such as improved transportation and continuous canning technology. But Heinz also paid attention to economic and social changes that were altering the demand side of the economy. Between 1860 and 1920, rising incomes, population growth, and urbanization helped shape the wants and needs of consumers. Heinz understood that shifting household priorities represented an important strategic opportunity. Acting on input from consumers and his own intuitions about the demand side, he created quality products and a meaningful brand. The entrepreneur also invested in a range of organizational capabilities that would support his products and corporate identity. Heinz's success in manufacturing, branding, and distributing condiments and other foods, many of which had previously been prepared at home, helped create a mass market for additional foodstuffs and eventually other consumer products.

This article analyzes all known cases of foreign direct investment in British manufacturing prior to 1890. From 1890 onwards the bulk of foreign entrants were industrial goods producers. Before 1890, the pioneering entrants were mostly consumer goods manufacturers. The article demonstrates that, with one monumental exception, these pioneers were narrowly focused, driven entirely by a concern about enhancing access to the British market. Typically they failed. The one exception was the Singer Manufacturing Company. This investment was of an entirely different nature. Singer's commitment was large and non-reversible from almost the very beginning, and was predicated on an awareness of the possibility of using Britain as an export platform. Its consequence was the emergence of Singer as the world's first modern multinational enterprise and as one of the world's largest firms by 1900.

Business historians have illuminated how first movers in many emerging industries secure an enduring leadership position, but have devoted less attention to the processes by which industry leaders relinquish their dominance. This paper examines why rubber industry leader Firestone Tire & Rubber failed to respond effectively to new technology and foreign competition. The author argues that Firestone did not respond by doing nothing, but rather accelerated activities that had contributed to its past success. Firestone's response was constrained by managers' existing strategic frames and values, and the company's processes and long-standing relationships with customers and employees.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency, fueled largely by a deal with General Motors' international operations, opened thirty-four branch offices in Europe, the Middle East, South Africa, India, Australia, and South America. The overseas branches allowed the agency to sharpen its methods of quantitative research. They also enabled J. Walter Thompson to establish lasting understandings of European markets that proved beneficial for its long-term health.