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The Origins of Industrial Labor Management in France: The Case of the Decazeville Ironworks during the July Monarchy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2012

Donald Reid
Donald Reid
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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Abstract

The foundries and forges of Decazeville were among the most important in France during the July Monarchy. Extensive company correspondence reveals that the nature of relations between the board of directors and the local managers, and between the firm and its clients, were important factors in shaping the tenor of labor relations at Decazeville. The interference of the board and clients limited the manager's authority over his subordinates. Once freed from this, the manager reformed the administration of labor at Decazeville. He tested the allegiance of his foremen to the company and emphasized to them the importance, when paying by piece-rate, of going beyond inspection of the completed products to supervision of the work as it was being done.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , Spring 1983 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1983

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References

1 These include Aminzade, Ronald, Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism. A Study of Mid-Nineteenth-Century Toulouse, France (Albany, 1981)Google Scholar; Bezucha, Robert, The Lyon Uprising of 1834. Social and Political Conflict in the Early July Monarchy (Cambridge, Ma., 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johnson, Christopher, Utopian Communism in France (Ithaca, 1974)Google Scholar; and Sewell, William Jr, Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848 (Cambridge, 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Gille, Bertrand, La Sidérurgie française au XIXe siècle (Geneva, 1968)Google Scholar; Vial, Jean, L'Industrialisation de la sidérurgie française 1814–1864, 2 vols. (Paris, 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Locke, Robert R., ed., Les Fonderies et forges d'Alais à l'époque des premiers chemins de fer 1829–1874 (Paris, 1978)Google Scholar; Thuillier, Guy, Aspects de l'économie nivernaise au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1966)Google Scholar; Silly, J.B., “La reprise du Creusot 1836–1848,” Revue d'histoire des mines et de lamétallurgie I (1969): 233–78Google Scholar; Lévêque, Louis, Histoire des Forges de Decazeville (Saint-Etienne, [1916]).Google Scholar One should also mention Courtheoux, Jean-Paul, “Privilèges et misères d'un métier sidérurgique au XIXe siècle: le puddleur,” Revue d'histoire économique et sociale XXXVII (1959): 161–84Google Scholar, which examines puddlers within the framework of technical changes in their profession.

3 Stearns, Peter, Paths to Authority (Urbana, 1978)Google Scholar; Murard, Lion and Zylberman, Patrick, Le petit travailleur infatigable ou le prolétaire régénéré (Fontaney-sous-Bois, 1976)Google Scholar; Huet, Bernard and Devilliers, Christian, Le Creusot (Paris, 1981).Google Scholar

4 Hardach, Gerd, Der soziale Status der Arbeiters in der Frühindustrialisierung (Berlin, 1968).Google Scholar In his article “Les problèmes de main d'ouevre à Decazeville,” Revue d'histoire de la sidérurgie VII (1967): 51–68. Hardach brings out the importance of British workers and the competition between metallurgical firms for workers.

5 Lèvy-Leboyer, Maurice, Les Banques européennes et l'industrialisation internationale dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris, 1964), 657.Google Scholar

6 Silly, “La reprise du Creusot,” 255–56.

7 Gille, Bertrand, “Les plus grandes compagnies houillères françaises vers 1840” in Charbon et Sciences humaines ed. Louis Trénard (Paris, 1966), 165.Google Scholar “Le Financement de l'industrie sidérurgique française au XIXe siècle,” Revue d'histoire de la sidérurgie II (1961): 282–85. In “Le mouvement du profit au XIX€ siècle,” Revue d'histoire de la sidérurgie VII (1966): 42, Gille discusses self-financing at Decazeville in the context of the studies of profit made by Jean Bouvier, François Furet, and Marcel Gillet.

8 Daudibertières, G., “Un centenaire industriel: la grand activité des Forges de Decazeville,” Procès-verbaux des séances de la Société des Lettres, Sciences et Arts de l'Aveyron XXXVII (1954–1958): 200–01.Google Scholar

9 There were three stages in the manufacture of rails: the production of the cast iron [fonte] in the blast furnace; the puddling of this cast iron, and the hammering, rolling and cutting of this puddled iron into rails. Inthe first step, coke, iron ore and flux were placed in the blast furnace. After the iron ore had baked for several hours, the slag floated to the top of the mixture and foundry workers directed it out of the furnace. They then carefully channelled the remaining molten metal into a bed of sand in which a pathway with a number of branches had been made. When all the molten metal had been directed into the pockets, workers used sand or water to cool it down. The resulting cast iron was then taken from the blast furnaces to the forge where it was placed in puddling ovens and heated up to a temperature approaching 1,500°C. Working in this intense heat, the puddler stirred — or more accurately, kneaded — the molten metal until it appeared to curdle. He allowed the remaining impurities to flow off or evaporate. After the puddler removed the iron from the furnace he kneaded it again. His assistant then brought the iron to the hammer-man, who operated a machine that beat the iron into bars. The bars were then taken to the rolling mills where the stokers reheated them. The rollers ran the bars through increasingly narrow cylindrical channels to make rails of the desired dimension. These rails were then brought to a mechanical saw and cut to the proper length. For a general description of the process, see Reybaud, Louis, Le Fer et la Houille (Paris, 1874), 14–22.Google Scholar

10 Thuillier, Aspects, 199. Brooke, Michael Z., Le Play: engineer and social scientist (London, 1970), 45.Google Scholar

11 Hardach, “Les problèmes de main d'oeuvre,” 54–55:

12 France. Statistique de la France (Paris, 1848) XI: 184–87. These figures require two caveats: (1) the census was very likely taken during a depression in the iron industry, and (2) skilled male workers sometimes earned more than sixfrancs per day as examples in this article reveal.

Wolff, Jacques, in his article “Decazeville: expansion et declin d'un pôle de croissance,” Revue économique XXIII (September 1972): 764Google Scholar, uses the figures drawn from the Statistique (via Gille, La Sidérurgie, pp. 158–61) to argue that Decazeville was an extraordinarily inefficient employer of labor. Whereas the value of the annual production per worker was 7,580 francs at Terrenoire, it was only 1,638 francs at Decazeville; only Le Creusot (2,727 francs) and De Wendel (2,307 francs) approached Decazeville's poor showing. Wolff uses this data to build an argument concerning the unhealthy and atypical nature of the Decazeville iron industry. Wolff's analysis is wrong because he compares firms involved solely in the manufacture of iron with firms that mined their own coal and iron ore, like Decazeville. Of the 2,258 workers Wolff attributes to Decazeville, 1,422 mined coal, 596 mined iron ore, and only 240 worked in the foundries and forges. Even taking into account the probable underestimation in the number of forge and foundry workers employed by Decazeville, Wolffs comparison of Decazeville with firms whose only business was the production and sale of iron is clearly misleading.

13 For the attitude and behavior of British workers at Decazeville, see my Ph.D. dissertation, “Labor, Management and the State in an Industrial Town: Decazeville, 1826–1914” (Stanford University, 1981), ch. 2, and Hardach, “Les problèmes de main d'oeuvre,” 56–59.

14 Cabrol to Drouillard of Alais, February 6, 1841. Private archives of Charles Huntziger. I would like to thank M. Huntziger for permission to consult his family's papers.

15 For a similar situation at Alais, see Vial, L'Industrialisation, 1:176, fn. 3, and Locke, Les Fonderies, passim.

16 The best study of the development of the joint-stock company in France deals with this issue only peripherally. Freedman, Charles E., Joint-Stock Enterprises in France 1807–1867 (Chapel Hill, 1979).Google Scholar For the contemporary debate, see the works of Louis Reybaud, especially Le Fer et la Houille. In the last decades ofthe nineteenth century, followers of Le Play honed in on the specific issue of the suitability (or unsuitability) of the joint-stock company and related forms of ownership in terms of labor management. See, for instance, Emile Cheysson [former director of the Le Creusot ironworks], “L'autorité patronale et les grèves,” La Réforme sociale series 2, vol. II (July 1, 1886): 28–29, and Ardant, Gabriel, “Le Mineur d'Anzin. La Famille de l'ouvrier et le patronage de la Compagnie.” La Réforme sociale, series 1, vol. VIII (September 1, 1884): 205–06.Google Scholar The general concensus in this debate was that the nature of the joint-stock enterprise was likely to lead workers to believe that the interests of capital and labor were antithetical, unless relations between the two were mediated by a strong, paternalist manager.

17 Archives nationales (hereafter AN) 84AQ32, Conseil d'administration (hereafter CA) to Direction to Decazeville (hereafter DD), December 14, 1832.

18 Pillet-Will, published his findings in Examen analytique de l'usine de Decazeville, département de l'Aveyron (Paris, 1832).Google Scholar

19 Two things particularly interested the board: “Each of the department heads must note in his report the observations he thinks will be useful either for better or more abundant production, or for a reduction of labor costs.” AN 84AQ32, CA to DD, June 21, 1833. Several months later the board clarified its view of these reports in a letter to Cabrol's replacement. “The board will know very well how to separate all which must remain in its domain from that which should be attributed to the manager. But it would be an error to believe that it should know only the most important facts and results. This would render its supervision and its administration impossible and its authority illusory. It is thus necessary to bring to its attention all that is worthy of interest, even when it would not result in any decision, but this should be done in a short, succinct, methodic way which renders easy all forms of communication and which puts the board in a position to appreciate the services rendered by each individual and the progress made as well as the cases of lack of foresight, the examples of remissness and the errors which lead to ruin.” AN 84AQ32, CA to DD, November 25, 1833.

20 AN 84AQI8, DD to CA, January 23, 1833.

21 Dunham, Arthur Louis, The Industrial Revolution in France 1815–1848 (New York, 1955), 142.Google Scholar Dunham refers in particular to the company policy of self-financement.

22 See, for example, AN 84AQ33, CA to DD, June 12, 1838, AN 84AQ34, CA to DD, 5 March 1839; 30 January 1840.

23 AN 84AQ18, DD to CA, February 7, 1833.

24 AN 84AQ2, Minutes of CA, June 4, 1833.

25 AN 84AQ30, DD to CA, 13 March 1840.

26 AN 84AQ34, CA to DD, October 22, 1839.

27 AN 84AQ3, Minutes of CA, January 11, 1840.

28 AN 84AQ7, Report of CA to Assemblée générale, May 20, 1845. On his return to the directorship, Cabrol took on not just responsibility for the factory, but in part for sales as well. This was exceptional in French ironworks. Vial, L'Industrialisation, 1:177, fn. 8.

29 Feligande Archives. I would like to thank Mme. Feligande for permission to consult her family's papers.

30 There may, however, have been a twist to the ordinary means of recruitment at Decazeville. According to the oral tradition preserved by descendants of Decazeville's first workers, Cabrol used his connections in the freemasonry to bring skilled workers to Decazeville. Cabrol attended masonic meetings at Decazeville assiduously and “liked to speak in a familiar and unpretentious” manner to his workers at them. Huntziger Archives. Paul Ramadier to Feligande, September 6, 1929.

31 AN 84AQ33, CA to DD, February 21, 1836; February 23, 1836.

32 AN 84AQ23, DD to CA, June 12, 1840.

33 AN 84AQ34, CA to DD, June 19, 1840.

34 AN 84AQ34, CA to DD, June 23, 1840.

35 AN 84AQ23, DD to CA, June 24. 1840; June 30, 1840.

36 AN 84AQ35, CA to DD, January 24, 1841.

37 AN 84AQ24, DD to CA, January 30, 1841.

38 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, August 17, 1837. The elimination of ballage was perhaps the greatest single labor saving innovation introduced in Decazeville during the July Monarchy and eventually allowed a reduction in the number of heaters required. AN 84AQ30, DD to CA, February 5, 1840.

39 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, November 25, 1837.

40 AN 84AQ33, CA Io DD, November 18, 1837.

41 AN 84AQ33, CA to DD, January 5, 1839. On the production and cutting of rails, see “Forges et Fonderies de l'Aveyron,” L'Illustration, VI (January 3, 1846): 281–82.

42 AN 84AQ23, DD to CA, July 3, 1840.

43 Collusion between firms eventually took not just supervision of production out of the railroads' hands, but the choice of individual suppliers as well. The major ironworks, protected by France's high tariff on iron, worked to keeprail prices high. During the hearings on the Free Trade Agreement of 1860 a director of the Midi line explained in detail how the forges cooperated to take advantage of the closed market: “Rails were needed at the same time for the Midi, the Nord, the Ouest and the Est. If the Compagnie du Midi dealt with a factory in the north, it did so at the going price in the north, augmented by the transportation costs to the Midi and then had them furnished by Decazeville which was right there. When it was a matter of rails for the Nord, they had Decazeville make the deal; they added to the price that of transportation and then had them delivered by a closer factory. They acted this way with all the companies, and when the deals were made, they divided them up among themselves. The Compagnie du Midi, for example, had negotiated for 20,000 tons and they said: Decazeville will furnish 8,000, another forge 4,000, another 3,000. As to quality, we could not discuss it — we had time limits, they had to arrive on time.” Cited by Silly, J.B., “La Sidérurgie française et le traité de 1860,” Revue d'histoire de la sidérurgie IV (1963): 18–19Google Scholar.

44 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, May 5, 1837.

45 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, May 14, 1837.

46 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, May 24, 1837; May 30, 1837; June 5, 1837.

47 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, November 10, 1837; November 16, 1837.

48 AN 84AQ18, DD to CA, February 21, 1833.

49 Archives of the Ecole des Mines (Paris), M1845/367, Henri Bochet, “Mémoire sur le Traitement du Fer à l'Usine de Decazeville” and M1854/558, Paul Lemonnier and F. Valton, “Voyage métallurgique en France, Belgique et Prusse,” 411.

50 AN 84AQ32, CA to DD, November 16, 1832. Related to this point of view was Pillet-Will's rejection of experimentation by Decazeville's engineers as a luxury which the fledgling firm could not afford. AN84AQ1, Minutes of CA, March 2, 1839.

51 Before coming to terms with the company in 1833, Davis had unsuccessfully sought a contract that gave him virtual parity with the manager, including the power “to fire any worker under his orders whose work or conduct did not suit him,” “to aid the Director and replace him if needed,” and to have any grievances with the management settled by a two or three-man arbitration committee chosen jointly by both sides. AN 84AQ32, CA to DD, June 5, 1833.

52 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, March 7, 1837: March 9, 1837; November 24, 1837.

53 AN 84AQ20, DD to CA, December 24, 1837.

54 AN 84AQ24, DD to CA, November 16, 1841.

55 See Le Play's comments on the steel-workers of Yorkshire in 1843. Brooke, Le Play, 42–43. On this whole issue see Judith Vichniac, “Industrial Relations in Comparative Perspective: A Case Study of the French and British Iron and Steel Industries,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association at New York, in September 1981. I would like to thank Ms. Vichniac for permission to read her paper.

56 AN 84AQ34, CA to DD, November 21. 1840.

57 AN 84AQ23, DD to CA, June 12, 1840.

58 AN 84AQ23, DD to CA, June 16, 1840.

59 Ibid. Hardach refers to these two letters in Der soziale Status, pp. 158–59.

60 The problem of the distribution of authority between the manager and the board emerged again at Decazeville in the final years of the firm, but not over the issue of labor management in particular. Vial, L'Industrialisation, 1:415.