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An Ethical Analysis of Japan’s Response to the Arab Boycott of Israel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Ruth N. Reingold  and
Paul Lansing
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Abstract:

Japan’s political, cultural, and geographic isolation, its symbiotic government-business arrangement, and its practice of practical, resources-oriented politics, trade, and diplomacy have led it to be the only major global economic power to strictly comply with the Arab boycott. A brief history and description of the boycott are presented here, along with an overview of the responses of major economic trading nations. Three issues are addressed: Japan’s global conscience, the framework appropriate to analyze the ethics of global economic boycotts, and the Japanese government’s excuse of leaving boycott decisions to business considering the historic relationship between the two. The logical conclusion of this analysis is that Japan as a nation must abandon its insularity and take a greater ethical responsibility in line with its economic power. From this comes the responsibility of the govenment to guide the business sector towards a corporate conscience, one that is grounded in global awareness.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , July 1994 , pp. 335 - 353
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1994

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References

Notes

1 Originally comprised of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans Jordan, and Yemen, the Arab League now includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine (considered an independent entity), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yemen Peoples Democratic Republic.

2 Howard N. Fenton, ‘United States Antiboycott Laws: An Assessment of Their Impact Ten Years After Adoption,’ Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 10, Winter ‘87, p. 247.

3 Ibid.

4 Arab Chamber of Commerce official, quoted in Barbara Slavin, James B., Treece, and Michael Berger,’U. S. Companies Are Back In Force In the Gulf,’ Business Week, 10/19/87, p. 79.

5 Aaron J. Sarna, Boycott and Blacklist: A History of Arab Economic Warfare Against Israel, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Litlefield, 1986, p. 55–57.

6 Ibid.

7 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, 4 International Boycotts, Business Laws Inc., 3450.4 (1980).

8 Eric H. Beversluis, ‘On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,’ Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 3, no. 2, April, 1989, p. 22.

9 Kenneth W. Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy, Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana University Press, 1980.

10 Shimizu, Manabu, ‘Japan’s Middle East Policy,’ Japan Quarterly, Oct.-Dec., 1988, p. 384.

11 David Brinn, ‘Boycotting the Arab Boycott,’ Jerusalem Post International Edition, 5/18/91.

12 ‘Resolution on the Japanese Boycott of Israel,’ American Jewish Congress, West Palm Beach, Fla., Feb 19, 1990.

13 Op. cit., David Brinn.

14 Isaiah Ben-Dasan, The Japanese and The Jews, translated from the Japanese by Richard L. Gage, New York: Weatherhill, 1972, p. 22.

15 Ibid., p. 99.

16 Thus Japan was anxious to gain support amongst the Arab and African nations.

17 This has been called “economic diplomacy,” see Shiyo Kimura, ‘Japan’s Middle East Policy-Impact of the Oil Crisis,’ American-Arab Affairs, Summer 1986, p. 66.

18 Jun Ui, ‘The Singularities of Japanese Pollution,’ Japan Quarterly, July-Sept., 1972.

19 zai: money; kai: world; zaikai leaders have regular meetings with the LDP leaders, sit on government councils, and are responsible for hosting visiting world leaders.

20 Harel van Wolf eren, The Enigma of Japanese Power, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 343.

21 Ibid.

22 Roy Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 145.

23 24 countries forming the Organization of Economics and Development

24 37% of its energy need in 1960; 71% in 1970; 76% in 1978; 66% in 1980; and 49% in 1990—Valerie, Yorke, ‘Oil, the Middle East and Japan’s Search for Security.’ In Japan’s Economic Security, edited by Nobutoshi Akao, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, pp. 45–70.

25 Michael M. Yoshitsu, Caught in the Middle East: Japan’s Diplomacy in Transition, Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1984, in Op. cit., Roy Licklider, p. 146.

26 Op. cit., Shiyo Kimura, p. 68.

27 Ibid., p. 70.

28 Ibid., p. 71.

29 Ibid., p. 78.

30 Op. cit., Roy Licklider, p. 152.

31 Anthony Barbieri, Jr., ‘Japan seeking more trade with Israel and influence in Mideast,’ Baltimore Sun, 5/28/88.

32 Jerusalem Post International Edition, 5/18/91.

33 Allison Kaplan, ‘Kuwait is to ease boycott,’ Jerusalem Post International Edition,, 5/11/91.

34 Op. cit., Howard N. Fenton, p. 217.

35 See for example: John P. Tiemstra, ‘Saving Nestle’s Soul,’ The Reformed Journal, Vol. 29, no. 12, 1979, pp. 3–4, and Op. cit. Eric H. Beversluis.

36 Beversluis uses as the source of his analogy, the concept of shunning in certain Mennonite groups, based on I Cor. 5:11, Rom. 16:17, and II Thess. 3:14. The analogy can be extended to ease the transition between religious and secular shunning by using the Jewish idea of herem which includes enemy and foreign groups.

37 See the arguments of Thomas Donaldson, The Ethics of International Business, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; Op. cit., Eric H. Beversluis; or Marshal Cohen,’Moral Skepticism and International Relations,’ in International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, ed. by Charles R. Beitz, Marshal Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 3–50.

38 Op. cit., Eric H. Beversluis.

39 Ibid.

40 Johan Galtung, ‘On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia, World Politics, Vol. 19, no. 3, April, 1967, p. 380.

41 Ibid.

42 For a thorough analysis of not doing business with South Africa on the basis that it is a systematic violator of fundamental rights, see Op. cit., Thomas Donaldson, pp. 129–144.

43 Op. Cit. Thomas Donaldson, p. 81.

44 Op. cit., Thomas Donaldson, p. 140.

45 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” The UN Convention on Genocide outlaws the destruction of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups. For details, see Op. cit., Aaron J. Sarna, p. 61.

46 A partial listing includes: the Palestine-Arab commercial agreements of 1939, the Barcelona Statute of April 20, 1921, Articles 22 and 23 of the League of Nations Covenant, the International Trade Organization proposals of the League of Nations, the 1949 Armistice Agreements, the Constantinople Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Canal of 1888, the UN Security Council Resolution of 1951, the 1964 and 1968 resolutions of the International Chamber of Commerce, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the UN Code on Restrictive Business Practices of April 1980, Article 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the General Assembly of the UN in December 1965, the constitution of the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Universal Postal Union Convention of 1947, and the Convention for the Establishment of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization of 1948. Op. cit., Aaron J. Sarna, pp. 61–66.

47 ‘Wij zijn alleen Palestijn om politieke reden,’ Trouw, Amsterdam, Holland, March 31, 1977, p. 7.-an interview with Zuhair Muhsin, head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization military department.

48 Op. cit., Howard N. Fenton, p. 217.

49 It is often more costly to carry out the threatened action than to simply find a way out. The problem is to retain the image of credibility if the less costly route is taken. See Keith Murnighan, The Dynamics of Bargaining Games, Prentice Hall, 1991.

50 See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982).

51 Note the dramatic fall of the world’s largest brokerage house, Nomura Securities Company. The New York Times, 6/22/91, p. 1.

52 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago, 1962, pp. 133–136.

53 One such theory states that production planning necessarily is tied to the culture in which it is implemented. Some cultural barriers are insurmountable. See Robert Cole, Work, Mobility and Participation: A Comparative Study of American and Japanese Industry, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.