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Managers in the Moral Dimension: What Etzioni Might Mean to Corporate Managers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Bill Shaw  and
Frances E. Zollers
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Abstract

In The Moral Dimension, Amitai Etzioni critiques the neoclassical economic paradigm (NEP), a model built upon ethical egoism and which equates rationality (the logical/empirical domain) with the maximization of preferences by self-interested economic units. Etzioni finds the NEP’s exclusion of the moral/affective domain to be a glaring failure and, because of this omission, he claims that the economic model is not capable of achieving its design functions: prediction and explanation. Etzioni introduces a socio-economic model, the I & We paradigm, in which the moral/affective encapsulates the logical/empirical. Further elaboration and testing of this model remains to be undertaken. We find it to hold more promise than its neoclassical economic rival, and we explicate its value for the modern manager.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , April 1993 , pp. 153 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1993

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References

Notes

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