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When Do Firms Prefer Individual Action to Collective Action in The Pursuit of Corporate Political Strategy? A New Perspective on Industry Concentration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Mine Ozer  and
Seung-Hyun Lee
Mine Ozer
Affiliation:
SUNY Oneonta
Seung-Hyun Lee
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Dallas
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Abstract

In this study we advance the current research on corporate political strategy by examining how firms decide on their level of engagement in political action. This study proposes a contingency approach that identifies conditions in which firms prefer individual action to collective action in their pursuit of political strategy and introduces a framework that addresses this preference. Our results show that even in concentrated industries, a firm's preference of individual action over collective action varies when government contracts or research and development intensity are important considerations.

Keywords

political strategycollective actionindustry concentration
Type
Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , April 2009 , pp. 1 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2009 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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