The spatial maps of parties' policy programmes published by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) for the European Consortium for Political Research reveal the following empirical patterns: that parties differentiate their policy positions from one another; that parties rarely leapfrog each other; that parties shift their positions over time but only within ‘ideologically delimited’ areas of the policy space. These findings are not well explained by existing spatial models of party competition, which typically predict policy convergence and which moreover do not examine temporal patterns of party policies. This article modifies the standard Downsian model to incorporate a concept originally developed by Chapman that, in addition to policies, voters are motivated by non-policy considerations arising from such factors as party leaders' images, social-psychological attachments rooted in class, religion, ethnicity and so on. For this ‘biased vote’ model I present illustrative arguments that vote-seeking parties are motivated to differentiate their policy positions from each other, and that over time they can be expected to vary their policy proposals but without leapfrogging – predictions that accord well with the MRG's empirical findings. I apply the biased vote model to empirical data on the distributions of voter preferences in recent British and French elections. My results support the illustrative arguments, and also suggest that these arguments apply even when the degree of voter bias in the electorate is quite low.

Joseph Schumpeter's elite conception of democracy has inspired many political scientists to use the tools of equilibrium analysis to model democracy. But Schumpeter devoted much of his career as an economist to critiquing and transcending the limitations of equilibrium models. In particular, he became convinced that the equilibrium models of neoclassical economics could not adequately capture innovation as a dynamic force at the heart of capitalism. A new use of Schumpeter's critique shows that equilibrium models of democracy are similarly limited in their ability to capture the innovative creation and deployment of democratic ideologies as a source of political dynamism.

In a previous article in this Journal entitled ‘Institutions and Environmental Performance in Seventeen Western Democracies’ (29 (1999), 1–31), I argued that neo-corporatist institutions delivered superior environmental performance during the first two decades of the modern environmental era (1970–90).For other work on the same or similar themes, see Detlef Jahn, ‘Environmental Performance and Policy Regimes: Explaining Variation in 18 OECD Countries’, Policy Sciences, 31 (1998), 107–31; Martin Jänicke and Helmut Weidner, eds, National Environmental Policies: A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1997); Markus Crepaz, ‘Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and Their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making’, Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391–414; Martin Janicke, H. Monch and M. Binder, ‘Ecological Aspects of Structural Change’, Intereconomics, July/August (1993), 159–69; Martin Jänicke, ‘Conditions for Environmental Policy Success’, in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), 71–97; and Martin Jänicke et al., ‘Structural Change and Environmental Impact’, Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24–35. This note re-examines the thesis using slightly different data from a more recent time period (19807ndash;95). It also controls for some alternative explanations for environmental performance not included in the original article. The results suggest that the beneficial effects of neo-corporatism for environmental performance are robust. In confirming the results from the earlier analysis, this Note demonstrates the effects of neo-corporatism in unexpected policy areas. The positive results for environmental protection suggest that there may be benefits of neo-corporatist institutions in areas beyond those with which they are traditionally associated.

Political scientists have debated whether citizens can use core principles in lieu of ideological orientations to deduce their policy preferences. The ‘General Use’ model of public opinion holds that everyone draws equally on core principles to determine their preferences. The ‘Expertise Interaction’ model holds that the extent to which core principles influence policy preferences is a function of political expertise. Unfortunately, research design and measurement problems in extant work preclude a resolution of this debate. Here I account for these problems, test the predictions of both models, and find empirical support for each. The results demonstrate that while there is a moderate tendency for political expertise to strengthen the relationship between core beliefs and policy preferences, virtually all citizens use core beliefs to deduce preferences.

German unification in 1989 raised the spectre of German hegemony in post-cold war Europe. In this article, I demonstrate that Germany lacks the structural power consistent with European hegemony or dominance; that there is little evidence supporting an appreciable gap between Germany's structural power and foreign policy ambitions; and that apparent symptoms of German hegemony, particularly the process of institutional emulation in Central and Eastern Europe, reflect other international processes and incentives emanating from the state system itself. This reassessment and downgrading of Germany's relative and absolute power resolve the paradox of German structural power and German reluctance identified by others. But this alternative narrative raises another more important question: why is Germany treated as a potential or even aspiring hegemon in Europe? The answer to that question is located in the interconnected legacies of Auschwitz and the occupation regime. This joint legacy constitutes an important part of the historical context within which we frame our assessments and judgements of German power; explains the frequently unwarranted exaggeration and suspicion of German power; and demonstrates how the past can function as a powerful prism though which we interpret the intentions, ambitions and capabilities of a state.

Incentive compatibility solutions to social dilemmas change individual consequences of non-co-operative and co-operative acts such that self-maximizers will rationally choose to act in ways that promote the public good, i.e. to co-operate. The traditional selfish egoism assumption of rational choice requires dilemmas to be solved by either adding some likely punishment to defection or reward to co-operation. Dilemma co-operation can also, of course, be explained by relaxing the narrow self-interest assumption. By allowing for the possibility that outcomes of interdependent interactions are subjectively evaluated by reference to the actor's own as well as others' interests, or that people get additional utility (or avoid disutility) by following certain normative codes, co-operation in finitely repeated dilemmas can be rational.For examples of evidence of subjective transformations of given payoff matrices, see James Andreoni, ‘Giving with Impure Altrusim: Applications to Charity and Recardian Equivalence’, Journal of Political Economy, 97 (1989), 447–51; and Michael D. Kuhlman and Alfred F. J. Marshello, ‘Individual Differences in Game Motivation as Moderators of Preprogrammed Strategic Effects in Prisoner's Dilemma’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32 (1975), 922–31.

Adopting a particular non-linear perspective resolves numerous paradoxes about collective political behaviour. Self-organized criticality occurs if the sensitivity of individuals or groups to each other's actions increases with the passage of time, and, therefore, sudden changes may occur as cascades. In this way scandals, betrayals, miscalculations and other seemingly insignificant actions can sometimes cause cabinet dissolutions, strikes, riots, electoral landslides, wars and a multitude of other phenomena that, until now, have seemed to have had nothing in common.

Textual analyses of party and government programmes open up exciting possibilities for the investigation of policy and operationalization of theory. This Note focuses on the validity of the resulting estimates, particularly of the massive policy time-series assembled by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) of the European Consortium. These are important not only for the policy measurements they provide for fifty post-war democracies, but also from the point of view of validating other codings of texts, especially those deriving from computerized analyses. No other validating standard is available for any but a handful of post-war elections – certainly none other that so unambiguously measures policy preferences as opposed to actual party behaviour and which itself has been so well established by extensive use. Ian Budge, David Robertson and D. J. Hearl, eds., Ideology, Strategy and Party Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Data-collection continues under the direction of H-D. Klingemann and Andrea Volkens of the Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin under the title of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and now covers fifty countries.

Rich Americans, far more likely to vote than their poorer fellow citizens, also differ in how they vote and what policies they favour. These undisputed facts lead to the widespread belief ‘that if everybody in this country voted, the Democrats would be in for the next 100 years.’ The gist of this conclusion, which seems to follow ineluctably from our opening sentence, is accepted by almost everyone except a few empirical political scientists. Their analyses of survey data show that no objectively achieved increase in turnout – including compulsory voting – would be a boon to progressive causes or Democratic candidates. Simply put, voters' preferences differ minimally from those of all citizens; outcomes would not change if everyone voted. John Kenneth Galbraith, Interview in California Monthly, February 1986, p. 11.