Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
Presidential approval ratings are a frequently used barometer of performance and popularity. However, despite recognition of the media age in which we live, little work has examined the impact of television on presidential popularity. Using a 1980 and 1984 television content study, panel data from the 1980 National Election Study and rolling cross-sectional data from the 1984 Continuous Monitoring Study, I compare two American presidents (Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan) commonly seen as having different effectiveness on television. While media effects were not uniformly present during the two presidencies, there was some evidence that television harmed popularity, particularly when the content of news stories and commentary turned negative. I conclude by discussing the ramifications of these results for presidential strategies based on ‘going public’.
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22 To test for the possibility of racial differences in media effects, this analysis was conducted first for the overall sample and then for whites only. The results were nearly identical and the figures reported here are based on the results for the overall sample.
23 The items measuring citizen perceptions of presidential leadership in 1980 were ‘How well does strong leadership describe Carter as President?’ and in 1984 ‘How much would you say “provides strong leadership” fits your impression of Ronald Reagan: a great deal, somewhat, a little, or not at all?’ It may appear that perceptions of presidential leadership are highly colinear with approval. Therefore, to make sure that the television effects were not biased by this factor, I re-estimated the models without presidential leadership as an independent variable. The television effects were virtually the same as reported in this article.
24 Questions used in 1980 to measure views about real-world economic and foreign policy events included ‘What about the economy? Would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?’ and ‘Where would you place what the federal government is doing at the present time?’ (a seven-point scale question where I is that it is ‘important to try very hard to get along with Russia’ and 7 is that it is a ‘big mistake to try too hard to get along with Russia’). In 1984, the following terms were used: ‘Now, still talking about the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?’ and ‘During the past year, would you say that the United States’ position in the world has grown weaker, stayed about the same, or has it grown stronger?'
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