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Ideological Hedging in Uncertain Times: Inconsistent Legislative Representation and Voter Enfranchisement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Antoine Yoshinaka  and
Christian R. Grose
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Abstract

Can ideological inconsistency in legislators’ voting records be explained by uncertainty about constituent preferences? Do legislators ‘hedge their bets’ ideologically when faced with constituency uncertainty? This article presents an uncertainty-based theory of ideological hedging. Legislators faced with uncertainty about their constituent preferences have an incentive to present ideologically inconsistent roll-call records. Legislators experiment with a variety of roll-call positions in order to learn the preferences of their constituents. An examination of US senators during 1961–2004 shows that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and mobilization led to higher ideological inconsistency in legislative voting records. Ideologically inconsistent behaviour by elected officials can be characterized as best responses to a changing and uncertain environment. These results have implications for representation and the stability of democracy.

Type
Research Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 41 , Issue 4 , October 2011 , pp. 765 - 794
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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12 Uncertainty due to constituency change has also been applied in the context of redistricting in the United States. For example, see: Murphy, Chad and Yoshinaka, Antoine, ‘Are Mapmakers Able to Target and Protect Congressional Incumbents? The Institutional Dynamics of Electoral Competition’, American Politics Research, 37 (2009), 955–982CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yoshinaka, Antoine and Murphy, Chad, ‘Partisan Gerrymandering and Population Instability: Completing the Redistricting Puzzle’, Political Geography, 28 (2009), 451–462CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Yoshinaka, Antoine and Murphy, Chad, ‘The Paradox of Representation: How Partisan Mapmakers Foster Competition but Disrupt Representation’, Political Research Quarterly (forthcoming)Google Scholar.

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32 While not a part of our theory, it is possible that voters may have a preference for inconsistent or ambiguous behaviour from their legislators. For example, Tomz, Michael and Van Houweling, Robert P., ‘The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity’, American Political Science Review, 103 (2009), 83–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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35 For example, Shepsle suggests that incumbents cannot be ambiguous as they have a pre-existing record; we argue that incumbent ambiguity can be achieved to some extent via inconsistency. See Shepsle, ‘The Strategy of Ambiguity’.

36 Theoretically, the new voter could be located anywhere along the dimension. In the case we examine later, senators may have surmised that newly enfranchised African-American voters were not on the far right. Of course, if a legislator surmised that black voters are located somewhere on the left side of the spectrum, then (in Figure 2) there will still be uncertainty over the location of the median compared to the scenario with no new voters, but this uncertainty space would be smaller than the more general scenario presented in the figure. Further, while the partisan preferences of black voters are generally known to legislators, there is little evidence that elected officials have in-depth knowledge of the ideological or issue preferences of these new voters.

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45 Data on changes in black electoral strength are not available nationally for this entire time period, but are available for the southern states from 1960 onwards. Southern states are identified as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

46 The average southern senator cast 596 non-unanimous roll-call votes per congress during that period.

47 We use census figures during census years and census population estimates for intervening years.

48 This measure is from Hood, Kidd and Morris, ‘Of Byrd[s] and Bumpers’.

49 This measure is ideal as it assesses both the change in the state's black voter population over a two-year time period and the relative size of the enfranchised and mobilized black population.

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58 Given the presence of interactive terms, the computation of the marginal effects of changes in black electoral strength (X 3) for a Democratic senator is based on varying all values of the relevant constitutive and interaction terms.

59 We also estimated a model that included a three-way interaction between black electoral strength, Democrat and competitiveness (and all constitutive terms and two-way interactions). The results show that the combined effect of changes in black electoral strength and competitiveness is larger for Democratic than for Republican senators. Democratic senators from competitive states cast inconsistent votes when faced with changes in black electoral strength (see online appendix at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/jps).

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63 We used this alternative measure as the dependent variable in regressions with the same independent variables as those reported earlier in the article, and the results were substantively similar.

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