Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T07:47:18.040Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Foreign Policy Problems and Polarized Political Communities: Some Implications of A Simple Model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

C. R. Mitchell
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Once upon a time, during the early 1960s, all undergraduate International Relations courses in the United Kingdom were deemed incomplete if they did not contain a number of lectures on the question of the relationship between a country's foreign policy and the shape, size and other attributes of its national political community. The lectures often evolved into a discussion of the relative advantages of possessing a large population, and whether or not this was an element in a state's power (as in the case of the Soviet Union) or of a state's weakness, and hence of its inherent inability to attain a wider range of desirable foreign policy goals (as in the case of India). The debate was usually fairly inconclusive.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , April 1971 , pp. 223 - 251
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1971

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Snyder, Richard et al. , Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Free Press, 1962)Google Scholar, Rosenau, James N., ‘Moral Fervour, Systematic Analysis and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research’, Chapter 9 in Ranney, Austin, ed., Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968)Google Scholar and Frankel, Joseph, ‘Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy’, Political Studies, VII (1959), 1–108, p. 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Rosenau, James N., ‘Foreign Policy as a Issue-Area’, Chapter 2 in Rosenau, J. N., ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967).Google Scholar

3 Rosenau, James N., ‘Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’ in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).Google Scholar

4 It will be apparent that the term ‘political community’ has been pirated from Eastonian analysis, which is based upon the concept of each separate society possessing its own political system, by which is meant the set of processes by which envalued objects and roles of that society are authoritatively allocated among the society's members. The political community may be taken to be all those groups and individuals within the political system's jurisdictional space who are concerned with or affected by the process of taking decisions about the allocation of valued resources and roles for that society. (In non-behavioural terminology, it might be called the ‘national group’ or even ‘the people’.) This concept must be contrasted with the political regime (which refers to the structure of national authority roles, plus the accepted formal and informal rules for filling these roles) and the political authorities, which refers to the current incumbents of these authority roles.

5 Davis, Kingsley, ‘Social Changes Affecting International Relations’, Chapter 14 in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1961).Google Scholar

6 Sondermann, Fred A., ‘Political Implications of Population Growth in Underdeveloped Countries’, in Olsen, William C. and Sondermann, Fred A., eds., The Theory and Practice of International Relations, 2nd edn. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966).Google Scholar

7 Burton, John W., Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament (New York: Knopf, 1962).Google Scholar

8 See particularly, Galtung, Johan, ‘Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position’, Journal of Peace Research, i (1964), p. 206CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Halle, Nils H., ‘Social Position and Foreign Policy Attitudes’, Journal of Peace Research 3 (1966), p. 46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 See his article ‘A Comparison of Intra-national and International Politics’, American Political Science Review, LVII (1963), 305–530, p. 406.Google Scholar

10 Alger, , ‘A Comparison of Intra-national and International Politics’, p. 408.Google Scholar

11 Coser, Lewis A., The Functions of Social Conflict (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 80.Google Scholar

12 Banks, Arthur S. and Textor, Robert B., A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963).Google Scholar

13 The separate Greek and Turkish Cafés in the Cypriot villages are mirrored in the separate Catholic and Protestant pubs in Ulster.

14 For example, the establishment of separate Catholic trade unions.

15 1. M. Lewis has argued convincingly that, in spite of the high level of inter-group conflict and rivalry over very scarce rewards in the Somali Republic, important factors of overlapping group membership, regional loyalties and clan-family allegiances have enabled the two formerly separate halves of the country to unite successfully and even to become more closely integrated. In this example of an integrated political community, Lewis argues that there are a number of bases of alignment which tend ‘… less to split the Republic into rigid divisions than to provide a set of overlapping ties which, if they tend to exert a paralysing influence on bureaucracy, also seem to contribute towards overall stability…’ Lewis, I.M., ‘Nationalism and Particularism in Somalia, in Gulliver, P. H., ed., Tradition and Transition in East Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 339–61.Google Scholar

16 Coser notes that: ‘The degree of group consensus prior to the outbreak of the conflict seems to be the most important factor affecting cohesion. If a group is lacking in basic consensus, outside threat leads not to increased cohesion, but to general apathy, and the group is consequently threatened with disintegration…’ He later qualifies this argument by stating that ‘… The relation between outer conflict and inner cohesion does not hold true where internal cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict is so low that the group members have ceased to regard preservation of the group as worth-while, or actually see the outside threat to concern “them” rather than “us”. In such cases, disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion, will be the result of outside conflict…’ Coser, Functions of Social Conflict, p. 92-3. Coser also quotes Robin Williams' distinction on this subject: ‘Given a social group which is a “going concern”, a sensed outside threat to the group as a whole will result in heightened internal cohesion … However, [this general principle] holds true only under very specific conditions: (a) a group must be a “going concern”, i.e. there must be a minimal consensus among the constituent individuals that the aggregate is a group, and that its preservation as an entity is worthwhile; (b) there must be recognition of an outside threat which is thought to menace the group as a whole, and not just some part of it … ’ Williams, Robin M. Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions, SSRC Bulletin 57 (New York, 1947) p. 58.Google Scholar The point about polarized political communities is that there is a high probability that at least one section of the ‘group’ will fail to regard the preservation of the system as desirable, and will also see any external threat as being aimed at the other community and its leaders.

17 Coser, , Functions of Social Conflict, p. 104–8.Google Scholar

18 Good, Robert C., ‘State-Building was a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States’, Chapter 1 in Martin, Laurance W., ed., Neutralism and Non-alignment (New York: Praeger 1962), p. 12.Google Scholar

19 Good, , ‘State-Building as a Determinant’, p. 8.Google Scholar

20 See Claude, Inis L. Jr, ‘Economic Development Aid and International Political Stability’, paper present to the 7th IPSA World Congress, Brussels, 09 1967.Google Scholar

21 Rummel, Rudolph J., ‘The Relationship between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behaviour’. Chapter 6 in Singer, J. David, ed., Quantitative International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 208.Google Scholar See also, Tanter, Raymond, ‘Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour within and between Nations 1958–1960’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (1966), 1–127, P. 48.Google Scholar

22 , Ivo K. and Feirabend, Rosalind L. (with Boraviak, Darlene L.), ‘Empirical Typologies of Political Systems: Aggressive Prototypes’, paper presented to the 7th IPSA Conference Brussels, 09 1967.Google Scholar See also, Ivo K., and Feieraband, Rosalind L., ‘Aggressive Behaviours within Polities, 1948–62: A Cross-National Study’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (1966), 249–385, p. 249.Google Scholar

23 In this connection, see the model used by Ted Gurr in his investigation of the phenomenon of ‘civil strife’. Gurr, , ‘Psychological Factors in Civil Violence’, World Politics, 20 (1968), p. 245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 Kelman, H. C., ‘Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System’, Chapter 26 in Rosenau, J. N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd edn. (New York: Free Press, 1969).Google Scholar Much of what follows is also based upon ideas contained in David Easton's work on the concept of the level of support.

25 A minority community may range in size from a very small proportion to 49.9 per cent of the overall political community, but obviously the majority/minority ratio is important in helping to determine the unity and stability of the system. John Burton has suggested that instability is likely when the minority community numbers between 10 per cent and 40 per cent of the political community, though other variables, such as geographical concentration, obviously have some bearing on levels of conflict. The respective minority communities in Cyprus, Ceylon, Canada, Belgium and Ulster are (very roughly): Turks 28 %, Tamils 25 %, French-Canadians 20%, Walloons 40%, and Catholics 35%.

26 Examples are the bias in favour of providing new housing, relief or employment for the Protestant community in Ulster, and the retaining of official administrative posts for one particular community by insisting upon a single official language and demanding competence in this.

27 The exodus of British settlers in Kenya, once the colony had become independent and no longer represented the white settler community in any affective sense, illustrates the comparative weakness of a set of (possibly uncertain) instrumental rewards in retaining affiliation to any political system.

28 One short term method of ‘buying’ support from a disaffected minority community is for the political authorities to attempt to increase the level of instrumental rewards to the minority (for example, the Kenya Government's promises of increased and rapid development of the Somali-inhabited north east), though the increase cannot be too large or too public without the majority community beginning to feel frustrated and threatening to withdraw its support. The alternative is for the government to emphasize affective rewards (Kenyan emphasis on new Kenyan nationalism and independence) while continuing to ensure that the bulk of instrumental rewards go to its majority supporters. This last policy seems unlikely to work for any great length of time before the minority becomes highly dissatisfied.

29 Several observers of the Ulster scene who possess Marxist inclinations have remarked to the author that once Ulster rids itself of the medieval pre-occupation with religious bickering it may be able to get down to some ‘real’ politics — a remark which might have been received with some surprise behind the barricades in Belfast or Derry.

30 This is another important distinction. A discontented minority community may merely have external linkages to yet another minority, as in the case of the Kurdish minority in Iraq.

31 Note the similarity in these cases with Rosenau and Scott's conception of a ‘penetrated’ political system.

32 Lyon, Peter, ‘The Foreign Policy of China’, Chapter 4 in Northedge, F. S., ed., The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), pp. 133–4.Google Scholar

33 Recently, the Khartoum government of General Numiery has become convinced that the southern rebels have successfully sought a new ally, and that Israeli instructors are working alongside Catholic clergy to bring about the defeat of their forces in the south. In April 1970 the Sudanese foreign minister, Mr Awadallah, referred to ‘an imperialist Zionist plot to strengthen the rebels in the south’. In response, a spokesman of the NPG has charged that Egyptian planes and pilots are taking part in air raids against targets in southern Sudan and has expressed ‘grave concern’ at the direct involvement of other Arab countries.

34 One feature of the colonial withdrawal has been the frequent conclusion of residual military agreements whereby the former metropole promises future aid in the event of an external attack or serious internal unrest. This type of agreement was activated in 1964 when United Kingdom troops were called in by the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to deal with a wave of mutinies in the three African armies. In such cases, the external patrons for the political authorities are pre-selected.

35 These problems will arise whether the neighbouring political authorities are actively sympathetic to the minority or attempting to maintain a difficult neutrality. Recently the Ugandan Government has complained bitterly about the habits of territorial infringement developed by Sudanese troops in pursuit of Anya Nya guerrillas.

36 The ‘exile’ problem becomes particularly acute when geographical contiguity allows large numbers of the minority community to cross the border as refugees. Apart from the political implications of this movement, there is the sheer problem of housing and feeding larger numbers of exiles and the often very tricky problem of arranging for repatriation — if this ever becomes possible or desired by any large number of exiles. Relations between Uganda and the Sudan have been bedevilled by the fact that there are some 45,000 south Sudanese living in northern Uganda.

37 The rather curious agreement between Somali and West Germany on the question of self-determination can also be seen as a common response to a form of partition and a common desire for unification.