Some of the early superstitious beliefs concerning communication by means of magnets are mentioned.

Some of the suggested ‘static telegraphs’ are described, together with the reasons for their failure. An account is given of the rise of the use of the electric current in the telegraph by continental workers early in the nineteenth century, and the manner in which this method became known in England. The work of Cooke and Wheatstone is briefly outlined, and the assistance given to the English workers by Joseph Henry.

The development of the American telegraph in the hands of Morse is reviewed, and the similarity of the difficulties experienced by Morse and by Cooke. The origin of the relay is examined.

The commercial success of the telegraph was largely due to the several needs it fulfilled, and the uses of the telegraph are enumerated.

Submarine telegraphs and especially the Atlantic telegraph are described together with the mechanical and electrical difficulties associated with long distance telegraphy through cables. In this connection the work of William Thomson is very briefly reviewed.

The growth of the telephone out of the telegraph at the hands of Bell in America is described, and is shown to be achieved as a result of the synthesis of Bell's knowledge of physiology and of electricity. The paper concludes with a statement of the commercial success of Bell's telephone.

This paper examines the usefulness of the category ‘interest’ in the history of technology through a case study of the failed attempt to introduce atmospheric railway traction in Britain in the 1840s. It argues for a reflective deployment of the term in question, sensitive to contemporary usages. A schematic typology of railway ‘interests’ shows just how various these were. Financial interests, for example, were not the same as professional ones; or an investor might feel the pull of contrary interests, depending on whether she was checking her dividends or taking a train. The history of atmospheric traction demonstrates the interlocking of railway ‘interests’, and their utility in explaining the success or failure of railway technologies. As might be expected, determinism, whether technological or ‘social’, does not answer the case. ‘Interest’ relations are contingent, and so must be understood the failure of the atmospheric railway.