The proximate cause of the 1984–85 miners' strike, the longest mass strike in British history, was a round of colliery closures announced by the National Coal Board (NCB, now British Coal) in March 1984 as part of the restructuring of the British coal mining industry. The impact of pit closures upon communities is so immediate and devastating that the effect obscured the fundamental causes. The restructuring process had accelerated since 1979 because of the economic and energy policies adopted by Conservative governments, but had its origins in the Labour government's response to the 1973 oil shock and the tripartite settlement of the 1974 strike by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The 1974 Plan for Coal established an investment programme to expand coal production by three means: developing new mines; extending the life of existing collieries; and implementing new technologies. These supply-side measures were already underway when the first Thatcher government, elected in 1979, established new limits on publicsector spending and sought to liberalize markets.

In selecting among the many statements that were made in the ‘War of Words’, it is important to choose only those that contained practical proposals for administrative reform and redirection of Government policy. Only then can we assess the extent to which they were in tune with or diverged from the plans being developed within the Board of Education. These were the ones that, because of their focused nature, draftspersons in the Board of Education might conceivably have felt constrained to take into account, and either to incorporate in, or exclude from, their own designs. In this way it is possible to be precise about what scientists wanted in 1914–17, and to estimate their degree of realism and the likely scope of their influence.

The Fellows of the Royal Society and the Chemical and Engineering societies must, Sir William Ramsay (FRS, chemist) urged in October 1914, be co-ordinated. They need, he said, to ‘work together at what for us is the supreme problem of all – how to conquer the Germans?’. The British Science Guild was to be included and the Royal Society was to ‘set the example’. Committees should be created; experts from other societies were to be added.

In March 1915 Ramsay prepared a ‘Draft Scheme for a Chemical Council of State’. It was to comprise twenty-four members, one-third technical chemists, one-third scientific investigators and one-third analytical and consulting chemists. It was to collect information on all aspects of the industry; to bring universities into contact with manufacturers; and to advise Government. Members were to be paid a small retainer. Agents were to be employed to visit factories and colleges. Eight members were to retire each year. The proposed Council was ‘to resemble to some extent a Royal Commission’. It would be appointed for ten years in the first instance. It would report annually to the Crown, but would not be attached to any Government department, although it would be associated with several. Non-political, it would be appointed by and directly responsible to the Crown. The president of the Royal Society would initially nominate two technical chemists and two scientific chemists. They, chaired by him, would choose twenty others.

Through the years there have been subtle changes in the evaluations of the work of Tycho Brahe. As one examines the tracts dealing with novae and comets in which reference is made to the nova of 1572 or the comet of 1577, it becomes quite evident that in different parts of Europe and in the Near East and at different periods of time and among men of different religious convictions different values were placed on his work. The extent of his influence should be distinguished from the measure of his achievements. Moreover, his importance cannot be completely separated from that of Kepler and the horde of other writers who furnished more than a mere background for the display of Tycho's brilliance. Here, as always, there is the danger of assigning to one man innovations that were, so to speak, in the air.

Paul Weindling's paper, ‘Science and Sedition,’ which covers the period 1795–1819, appears to be a critical response to my own short note on ‘London science and the Seditious Meetings Act of 1817’. As several misconceptions are fairly formally iterated in Mr Weindling's treatment, I would like to take the opportunity of clarifying the issues, adding some further detail, and answering the one or two points of substance which have been raised with respect to my initial note. In an effort to save the valuable space of the Journal and avoid undue repetition, my reply takes the form of distinct but hopefully cumulative points, and remains centred upon the legislation of 1817, although I do permit myself some comments on the years 1817–20 as a coherent period.