This paper looks at the risks faced by financial institutions, and how they can be modelled and managed. I compare the way in which each of the risks affects different types of financial institution and look for similarities (and differences) across industries. Finally, I consider what makes a good risk management system.

Although two papers on industrial assurance by K. J. Britt (T.F.A.21, 265 and 26, 200) have been submitted to the Faculty of Actuaries in recent years there have been no similar discussions of this business at Institute sessional meetings. In addition, papers by G. W. E. Allaway (J.S.S.13, 1) and by K. F. Gardner (J.S.S.13, 22) have been published by the Students' Society, but in none of these papers have the particular problems of collecting friendly societies been fully considered. The industrial assurance funds of societies represent approximately one-fifth of all such funds in this country, and this paper is therefore intended to be complementary to those above-mentioned, to introduce current actuarial problems of collecting friendly societies, and to provide a vehicle for general discussion of industrial assurance.

1. It seems to be a common misconception outside the actuarial profession that those within that illustrious body are mysteriously able to peer into their crystal balls and come up with prophetic answers about the future progress of pension funds, insurance companies and other allied matters. The appearance of an actuarial report with its air of finality and disclosure of a definite surplus, deficiency, bonus declaration or whatever it may be, only endorses the impression that the actuary is reporting on the unique and unquestionable answer to the problem in hand.

An office transacting life assurance relies for its results on the law of averages as revealed by investigation into past experience. Statistics are compiled in order that an estimate of future mortality may be obtained, and i f each assurance accepted were for the same amount, the office could, if it wished, retain for its own account all its business. In practice proposals are received for amounts ranging from the smallest sum for which the company will issue a policy up to hundreds of thousands of pounds, and clearly as the bulk of the business is for small sums assured an office might experience violent fluctuations in financial results if it retained the whole of the large proposals, even if the mortality experience were according to expectations and consistent from year to year.

The level of benefits paid to members of occupational superannuation schemes will depend on the level of contributions made by the employer and employee, the investment earnings received by the accumulated assets and the expenses incurred in the management of the scheme. However, this third factor has been ignored by previous studies into occupational superannuation, even though higher expense levels will naturally cause reduced benefits for a given level of contributions and investment return. In this respect, cost efficiency within the superannuation industry is an important criterion in assessing the efficacy of employer-sponsored occupational superannuation.

It is not without some feeling of diffidence that a Paper on the results of an Investigation into the Mortality of Lives Assured with the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co., Ltd., conducted jointly by the Actuary, Mr. Douglas Forrest, F.F.A., and the author is submitted. The Journal is more or less barren of Papers relating to the Mortality of Native Indian Assured Lives, though the subject of Indian mortality has often been considered by members of this Institute. Reference might be made in this connection to the investigations of Messrs. S. C. Thomson (T.F.A., vol. i) and A. T. Winter (J.I.A., vol. xliii) on the subject of the Mortality of Indian Assured Lives, but these being based on scanty data, the results must always be accepted with caution. Mr. Arthur Hunter's contribution (J.I.A., vol. lvii) relating to the experience of the Lives Assured with the New York Life Insurance Company from 1885–1921, touches on several points of interest and sounds a strong note of pessimism as follows : “The Mortality among natives of India insured by “our Company has not improved in the later over the earlier “years of observation” and “it is difficult to conceive that the “great increase in knowledge and the improvements in “sanitation have not affected the health of the middle and the “upper classes of India in the same way as they have affected “other (tropical) countries (such as Cuba, Brazil, Chile and “Porto Rico), although possibly not to the same extent.”

Solvency II came into force on 1 January 2016 and included a transitional measure on technical provisions (“TMTP”) designed to help smooth in the capital impact of Solvency II over a 16-year period. The working party’s view is that the main intention of the TMTP is to mitigate the impact of the introduction of the risk margin, which significantly increases the technical provisions of firms, relative to their Solvency I Pillar 2 liabilities.

The majority of firms who hold a TMTP have now had at least one recalculation approved by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA); or are in the process of applying for a recalculation. Despite this large number of approved recalculations, there remains significant uncertainty in the industry around the approach and triggers for recalculation.

This paper considers aspects of TMTP recalculation for regulated UK life firms, for example practicalities of the calculation, asset and liability considerations, and communications/announcements.

In this paper, we outline the need for pragmatism when considering the approach to recalculation of a measure originally intended to serve as the bridge between two regimes. We call for an allowance for doing what is sensible in a principles-based regime balancing what might be more theoretically correct with what is practical and possible to support effective management of the business.

It might at first be thought that this paper is limited to the problems of those few who hope to establish a new office in a highly organized and competitive life assurance market. Yet all offices wishing to expand will be faced with problems of a similar nature. This is evident when contemplating a development overseas and was the subject of a paper to the Faculty in March 1960 by R. G. Mallett (T.F.A.26, 547).

Omitting from consideration the speculative and evanescent schemes which were the precursors of life assurance companies, and taking into account only the properly-constituted life offices, we find that up to 1 January 1837 the total number of such companies which had been established was 94, of which 20 had ceased to exist, leaving 74 then in operation. The average age of these 74 companies was 17¾ years. Not more than 18 of them had been 25 years in existence, while the remaining 56 had only attained an average age of 7 years. It at first strikes us as a very remarkable circumstance that only 20 offices out of a total of 102 had succumbed in the long period of 131 years, dating from 1706, when the Amicable was founded: but it has to be borne in mind that in 1837 the great majority of the offices had not attained an age sufficient to test their stability.