The concept and use of choice architecture in public policy arouses warranted suspicion among scholars and the general public. Liberal scholars fear that without limitations, the contemporary wave of nudge theory and policies threaten individual autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the use of choice architecture in particular policy areas can not only enhance individual autonomy, but also work to mitigate larger social inequalities. Research demonstrates that too much choice leads to ‘choice paralysis’, especially in instances where knowledge is low and stakes are high. By limiting and nudging choices in these contexts, individuals are likely to feel less overwhelmed and more in control. A stronger sense of control and additional resources elevates the experience of autonomy felt by vulnerable populations (those with low knowledge and resources). This paper offers a theoretically robust defense of choice architecture by examining the relationship between choice architecture and autonomy.

Behavioural science has been effectively used by policy makers in various domains, from health to savings. However, interventions that behavioural scientists typically employ to change behaviour have been at the centre of an ethical debate, given that they include elements of paternalism that have implications for people's freedom of choice. In the present article, we argue that this ethical debate could be resolved in the future through implementation and advancement of new technologies. We propose that several technologies which are currently available and are rapidly evolving (i.e., virtual and augmented reality, social robotics, gamification, self-quantification, and behavioural informatics) have a potential to be integrated with various behavioural interventions in a non-paternalistic way. More specifically, people would decide themselves which behaviours they want to change and select the technologies they want to use for this purpose, and the role of policy makers would be to develop transparent behavioural interventions for these technologies. In that sense, behavioural science would move from libertarian paternalism to liberalism, given that people would freely choose how they want to change, and policy makers would create technological interventions that make this change possible.

Whether nudges succeed in promoting pro-environmental behavior strongly depends on their public acceptance. Prior literature shows that the framing of nudges, i.e., whether they address the individual (personal framing) or the society (societal framing), is one critical factor in determining nudging acceptance. Since a personal framing highlights the costs individuals have to bear to comply, we hypothesize that people accept nudges more when addressing the general public rather than themselves personally. We expect the framing effect to be stronger for nudges that elicit high-effort behavior than low-effort behavior. Results of multilevel linear regression analyses in two online experiments (nStudy 1 = 294, nobs = 4,410; nStudy 2 = 565, nobs = 11,300) reveal an opposite pattern: People accept nudges more when personally (vs societally) framed. As predicted, nudges receive higher support when the promoted behavior is perceived as low effort. Exploratory path analysis in Study 2 shows that the perceived effectiveness of the nudge mediates the positive relation between personal framing and nudging acceptance. This project provides novel insights on facilitators and barriers in nudging acceptance and their implications for policy-making.

Behavioral economics research has helped with understanding charitable behavior and has shown that charities can encourage donations by carefully designing their pledges. However, there is still scope to extend current research on who gives, what drives the decision to donate and at what levels, especially when behavioral insights are applied in context. In cooperation with a major Italian charity for cancer research, this study implements a natural direct mail field experiment, with over 150,000 letters sent to donors. By exploring the behavioral responses to different donation anchors, evidence was found that, within the given framework, including donation menus significantly increased the average amount donated without affecting the likelihood of donation. Furthermore, introducing additional explanations of how to make a payment significantly increased overall returns. Lastly, individual heterogeneity (high- and low-frequency donors, as well as senior and junior donors) had a direct effect on donations.

Some of the challenges in Sanders et al. (2018, this issue) can be aptly illustrated by means of charity nudges; that is, nudges designed to increase charitable donations. These nudges raise many ethical questions. First, Oxfam's triptychs with suggested donations are designed to increase giving. If successful, do our actions match ex ante or ex post preferences? Does this make a difference to the autonomy of the donor? Second, the Behavioural Insights Team conducted experiments using social networks to nudge people to give more. Do these appeals steer clear of exploiting power relations? Do they respect boundaries of privacy? Third, in an online campaign by Kiva, donors are asked to contribute directly to personalised initiatives. In many cases, the initiative has already been funded and donor money is funnelled to a new cause. Is such a ‘pre-disbursal’ arrangement truthful and true to purpose as a social business model?

This study examines how moral intuitions toward debt relief vary depending on whether a debt contract involves one country borrowing from another country or an individual borrowing from a bank. Participants respond to a vignette describing a basic debt dispute between a debtor and a lender. A judge in charge of settling the dispute decides to allow debt relief and participants express how fair they find the decision. Treatments vary (1) the debt context (international or person-bank), (2) the responsibility of lenders and debtors (whether their situations stem from bad luck or poor choices) and (3) whether a lender's profit motive is made salient. Results show that, across both international and person-bank debt, debt relief is perceived as being fairer when debtors are unlucky and when lenders are careless; profit salience, however, does not affect the perceived fairness of debt relief in either debt context. Results, when integrated with those from an initial related study, also point to anti-bank sentiment increasing the perceived fairness of debt relief when an individual borrows from a bank and to a consistent across-context ranking of the perceived fairness of debt relief in the scenario.

Nudges – light-touch interventions aimed to help people achieve socially desirable outcomes – can take place without individuals being aware of them. It would seem to be ethically superior to tell individuals that they are being nudged, encouraging them to be aware of the reasons for the official interest in their behaviours. Aided by internal reflection, individuals may make informed choices whether to go along with officially-preferred options or not. In general, this paper adopts this line of argument, justifying self-awareness from the liberal belief in autonomy of the person. However, awareness and/or reflection are not always necessarily ethically superior to passivity, as in cases where manipulation is also present with information provision, when there is framing of deliberative exercises, and where there is harm done to others due to reflectively-driven actions. Most of the time self-awareness is to be preferred, but not always.

Encouraging consumers to switch to lower-rate mortgages is important both for the individual consumer's finances and for functioning competitive markets, but switching rates are low. Given the complexity of mortgages, one potential regulatory intervention that may increase switching rates is to provide independent advice on how to select good mortgage products and how to navigate the switching process. Working with a government consumer protection agency, we conducted an experiment with mortgage-holders to test whether such advice alters perceptions of switching. The experiment tested how the attributes of the offer, perceptions about the switching process, individual feelings of competence and comprehension of the product affect willingness to switch to better offers, both before and after reading the official advice. The advice made consumers more sensitive to interest rate decreases, especially over longer terms. It also increased consumers’ confidence in their ability to select good offers. Overall, the findings imply that advice from policy-makers can change perceptions and increase switching rates. Moreover, the experiment demonstrates how lab studies can contribute to behaviourally informed policy development.

We provide experimental evidence for the existence of “rent stigma,” a preference for owning goods or real estate to renting them. In one experiment, anonymous respondents preferred owning a car or house to renting them, even though the transaction was constructed to be identical in each case in terms of economic payoffs and risk. In a second experiment, a survey of law students who were asked how much they would pay to own rather than rent a laptop found similar results. However, we found little or no evidence for our hypotheses that rent stigma would decline in conditions in which the advantages of renting were made salient. The existence of rent stigma raises concerns that the framing of a transaction in terms of purchasing rather than rent may be used to manipulate consumers.

Modern consumers typically face complex goods and services. In the interest of customer protection, these companies are asked to disclose information about the products and consumers are typically required to indicate their understanding of the information provided. In truth, consumers seldom consult, even less understand the information provided. I present here the state of evidence about how commercial disclosure actually works (or rather does not work) with consumers characterized with human limitations in information processing. I discuss ways to improve disclosure regulation to improve customer protection.

Parochialism, by which we mean in-group preferences and out-group prejudice, has the potential to influence public policy. In-group preferences and out-group prejudice can lead individuals to evaluate a policy based on how that policy affects the groups they belong to rather than on the basis of their ideological priors or the impact of that policy on society at large. Unchecked, parochialism likely leads to problematic policies and perverse social outcomes. While the evidence suggests that this bias can be mitigated if issues are framed in ways that encourage reflection as opposed to unreflective immediate responses, policy makers face incentives to leverage parochialism rather than combat it. The solution may instead require limiting policy makers and our ability to make decisions for others and promoting an institutional environment that encourages our interacting with diverse others rather than insularity. Stated another way, limited government and open society may be the path beyond our parochialism.

Evolutionary explanations for behavioral findings are often both fascinating and plausible. But even so, they do not establish that people are acting rationally, that they are not making mistakes, or that their decisions are promoting their welfare. For example, present bias, optimistic overconfidence, and use of the availability heuristic can produce terrible mistakes and serious welfare losses, and this is so even if they have evolutionary foundations. There might well be evolutionary explanations for certain kinds of in-group favoritism, and also for certain male attitudes and actions toward women, and also for human mistreatment of and cruelty toward nonhuman animals. But those explanations would not justify anything at all. It is not clear that in Darwinia (a nation in which departures from perfect rationality have an evolutionary explanation), policymakers should behave very differently from Durkheimian policymakers (a nation in which departures from perfect rationality have a cultural explanation).

Self-control failure occurs when an individual experiences a conflict between immediate desires and longer-term goals, recognises psychological forces that hinder goal-directed action, tries to resist them but fails in the attempt. Behavioural economists often invoke assumptions about self-control failure to justify proposals for policy interventions. These arguments require workable methods for eliciting individuals’ goals and for verifying occurrences of self-control failure, but developing such methods confronts two problems. First, it is not clear that individuals’ goals are context-independent. Second, facing an actual conflict between a desire and a self-acknowledged goal, a person may consciously choose not to resist the desire, thinking that spontaneity is more important than self-control. We address these issues through an online survey that elicited individuals’ self-reported judgements about the relative importance of self-control and spontaneity in conflicts between enjoyment and health-related goals. To test for context-sensitivity, the judgement-elicitation questions were preceded by a memory recall task which directed participants’ attention either to the enjoyment of acting on desires or to the satisfaction of achieving goals. We found little evidence of context-sensitivity. In both treatments, however, judgements that favoured spontaneity were expressed with roughly the same frequency and strength as judgments that favoured self-control.

Do small wording differences in message-based behavioral interventions have outsized effects on behavior? An influential initial study, examining this question in the domain of political behavior using two small-scale field experiments, argues that subtle linguistic cues in voter mobilization messages describing someone as a voter (noun) instead of one who votes (verb) dramatically increases turnout rates by activating a person's social identity as a voter. Two subsequent large-scale replication field experiments challenged this claim, finding no effect even in electorally competitive settings. However, these experiments may not have reproduced the psychological context needed to motivate behavioral change because they did not occur in highly competitive and highly salient electoral contexts. Addressing this major criticism, we conduct a large-scale, preregistered replication field experiment in the 2016 presidential election. We find no evidence that noun wording increases turnout compared to verb wording in this highly salient electoral context, even in competitive states.

The value of a statistical life (VSL) monetizes the expected loss in wellbeing associated with the risk of death. The utility loss resulting from a fatality is central to the empirical framework for estimating the VSL. The VSL trajectory over the life cycle exhibits an inverted-U shape, following a trajectory similar to that of lifetime patterns of consumption. The U-shaped pattern displayed by happiness measures over the life cycle is the opposite of the inverted-U shape pattern displayed by the VSL. It is consequently inappropriate to use happiness measures as ordinal ranking substitutes for the VSL for the purposes of estimating the benefits of mortality risk reduction. Compared to ordinal wellbeing scales, the VSL also offers a variety of additional capabilities by providing a cardinal index of the unit benefits for changes in mortality risks.

The Happiness Movement is moving from research to action; this contribution discusses some public policy issues that emerge in this process. The paper also states that the Happiness Movement proposes a new notion of development and a new narrative of social progress. The contribution argues that wellbeing is a goal of governments, but also, fundamentally, a goal of societies.

The economic model for scaling described by Al-Ubaydli and colleagues offers recommendations to policymakers who make decisions about whether or not to implement evidence-based programs. The core economic model does not currently acknowledge the broader context of policy decision-making and therefore may fail to achieve its objectives. The model focuses primarily on the generation and use of available research in the decision on whether to scale a program. Research studying the use of evidence in policymaking points to a complex set of factors beyond just the strength of the evidence such as leadership, relationships, timing and financial resources that contribute to decisions to scale a program. Second, there is already a robust evidence-based policy movement at the federal, state and local levels. The economic model should leverage this movement rather than providing recommendations that might stall or redirect the movement. The economic model can push the field to strengthen the available evidence while providing recommendations on selecting models to scale within the currently available evidence. This commentary finishes with suggestions for moving forward.

This paper offers an interpretation of the behavioural evidence that casts doubt over whether people always have preferences or, if they do, that they are stable. If people do not have preferences in this sense, then the usual policy evaluation standard of preference satisfaction cannot be used in these cases. The paper then develops, to fill this gap, a Millian policy framework where policy is judged by whether it advances what Mill understands by individual liberty in On Liberty. This yields many recognisable policies but offers a different evaluative standard for them. It also yields some policy innovations: e.g. a basic income and a flat tax.