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Odd bedfellows: how choice architecture can enhance autonomy and mitigate inequality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2019

KENDRA TULLY
KENDRA TULLY*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, CA, USA
*
*Correspondence to: Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, 1 Shields Avenue, Davis, CA95616, USA. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The concept and use of choice architecture in public policy arouses warranted suspicion among scholars and the general public. Liberal scholars fear that without limitations, the contemporary wave of nudge theory and policies threaten individual autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the use of choice architecture in particular policy areas can not only enhance individual autonomy, but also work to mitigate larger social inequalities. Research demonstrates that too much choice leads to ‘choice paralysis’, especially in instances where knowledge is low and stakes are high. By limiting and nudging choices in these contexts, individuals are likely to feel less overwhelmed and more in control. A stronger sense of control and additional resources elevates the experience of autonomy felt by vulnerable populations (those with low knowledge and resources). This paper offers a theoretically robust defense of choice architecture by examining the relationship between choice architecture and autonomy.

Type
Article
Information
Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , October 2022 , pp. 578 - 596
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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