Recent findings in evolutionary psychology explain how moral disciplining is connected to the need for collective action. Morals are strict in societies affected by war or perceived collective danger, but loose where peace and security prevail. This theory supplements the moral disciplining theory by providing an evolutionary explanation for the postulated link between puritanism and the need for cooperation.

Crespi & Badcock (C&B) convincingly argue that autism and schizophrenia are diametric malfunctions of the social brain, but their core imprinting hypothesis is less persuasive. Much of the evidence they cite is unrelated to their hypothesis, is selective, or is overstated; their hypothesis lacks a clearly explained mechanism; and it is unclear how their explanation fits in with known aspects of the disorders.

notwithstanding the many strengths of the dynamic developmental theory, there remain challenges to be overcome before it can be incorporated into a true causal model of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (adhd). these include the development of reliable measures of reinforcement delay gradients, the validation of shortened reinforcement delay as an endophenotype, and the integration of this pathway with other potential pathways.

This commentary questions the target articles inferences from a limited set of empirical data to support this model and conceptual scheme. Especially questionable is the attribution of internal representation properties to an assembly of cells in a discrete cortical module firing at a discrete attractor frequency. Alternative inferences are drawn from cortical cooling and cell-firing data that point to the internal representation as a broad and specific cortical network defined by cortico-cortical connectivity. Active memory, it is proposed, consists in the sustained activation of the component neuron populations of the network.

Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.

Our results on hippocampal long-term potentiation are considered in the context of Xia et al.'s hypothesis. Whereas the target article proposes presynaptic PKC involvement in adenylyl cyclase activation by phosphorylation of nenromodulin, we suggest an additional postsynaptic role involving RC3/nenrogranin. Finally, we examine the possibility that the adenylyl cyclase mutant mouse may display normal learning with a selective impairment of memory.

Rachlin's view of self-control as a sequence or chain of behaviors is contrasted with traditional behavioral analyses of self-control which emphasize a simplistic interpretation of the hyperbolic function relating small-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) reinforcers to specific behaviors. The validity of Rachlin's teleological analysis is examined in relation to the acquisition and steady-state performance of self-control behaviors. Central to an analysis of self-control is the functional difference between behavior under the control of SS and LL reinforcers, because SS-reinforced behavior is more complex due to temporal parameters.

The following questions are discussed: (1) Who determines the nature of “control variables”? (2) Is the “positional monopoly” healthy? (3) Does a descending command alter reflex threshold alone without eoncomitantly altering stiffness? (4) How does the CNS deal with history-dependent effects? (5) Should we abandon the idea that the CNS controls classical Newtonian variables such as muscle length?