I know we need a system change rather than individual change, but you cannot have one without the other. If you look through history, all the big changes in society have been started by people at the grassroots level. No system change can come without pressure from large groups of individuals. (Greta Thunberg, Brilliant Minds Conference, Stockholm, June 13, 2019)
We agree wholeheartedly with Chater & Loewenstein (C&L) that the behavioral and brain sciences have focused far too heavily on the psychology and behavior of people as individuals, and that i-frame policy interventions have not lived up to the expectations of their devotees and those who they influenced. In large part this is because i-frame interventions are built on a limited understanding of human psychology that neglects the capacity for internalized group membership to shape and transform individuals’ cognition and behavior (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). However, by the same token, focusing on systemic, “big-picture” solutions alone will not in itself result in more effective public policy because this approach too fails to engage with these same group memberships and associated group dynamics. Accordingly, to overcome the impasse identified by C&L, we argue that behavioral scientists and policymakers need not just to resort to an s-frame, but in addition to develop and employ a g-frame – a group-level analysis that focuses on how cognition and behavior are shaped and transformed by membership in social groups.
The g-frame is informed by research in social psychology, in particular the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979; Turner et al., Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). This frame views human psychology as fundamentally social. In particular, in all social contexts, individuals’ perception, cognition, emotion, and behavior are shaped by their group memberships (Turner et al., Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). From this perspective, social change is produced by collective action in which individuals are empowered to enact change through their membership of social groups (Drury & Reicher, Reference Drury and Reicher2009). Moreover, from this perspective, the apparent “frailty” and “fallibility” of individuals can be understood as the consequence of an i-frame that privileges and fetishizes the study of people as isolated individuals rather than as social actors who function and progress as interacting collectives. Thus, although individual workers and tenants have limited capacity to improve their working and living conditions, the unions and associations they join have much more power to do so. Individually we kneel, together we stand.
Yet although s-frame interventions are more powerful than i-frame interventions in this regard, using top-down approaches to public policy without accounting for the psychology of group life also runs into problems. Three are particularly significant.
A major limitation of purely top-down interventions is that they fail to acknowledge that people generally only have power to enact systemic-level change to the extent that they already have power within the system – with the result that s-frame solutions typically reinforce the status quo by representing the interests of powerful groups such as ethnic majorities or corporations while marginalizing minority groups (e.g., Fekete, Reference Fekete2004; Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin, & St Clair, Reference Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin and St Clair2014; Merino-Pérez & Segura-Warnholtz, Reference Merino-Pérez, Segura-Warnholtz, Bray, Merino-Pérez and Barry2021). Ironically, this means that enthusiasm for “nudges” is ultimately driven and sustained by an s-frame underpinned by a g-frame. Indeed, like most social and political theorizing, the i-frame is typically a manifestation of a worldview that is shared and promulgated by people who act not as individuals but as a group (Mols, Haslam, Jetten, & Steffens, Reference Mols, Haslam, Jetten and Steffens2015). Moreover, it is this capacity to act as a group that gives them power (Turner, Reference Turner2005). Importantly, thought, it is the capacity for their opponents to do the same that allows them to resist and challenge that power and to imagine and drive social change (Haslam & Reicher, Reference Haslam and Reicher2012).
Relatedly, a second problem is that top-down s-frame interventions often exclude the very people they are meant to help. For example, a report into the Australian government's 2007 “emergency intervention” into Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory found that regulating the goods that people were allowed to buy led to members of those communities feeling disempowered and disengaged (O'Mara, Reference O'Mara2010). More generally, rather than recruiting people's energies, such policies can easily suppress them.
A third issue is that group-level factors affect whether systemic interventions gain traction. In particular, social identity-related dynamics determine whether, and how much, people support and engage with interventions (Mols et al., Reference Mols, Haslam, Jetten and Steffens2015). For example, resistance to COVID-19 lockdowns was driven in part by people's alienation from, and lack of trust in, government and an associated sense that these measures were illegitimate (Hornsey, Reference Hornsey, Jetten, Reicher, Haslam and Cruwys2020; Reicher & Stott, Reference Reicher and Stott2020). “Nothing about us without us” is not just a powerful rallying call, but also a template for (dis)engagement.
It follows from the previous points that a key way to develop the s-frame and increase its impact is to align it with a g-frame, so that the material and psychological dimensions of change buttress (rather than undermine) each other. Such an approach acknowledges the power of social systems to produce change but recognizes – and seeks to harness – the power of groups to deliver this. In the domain of mental health, for example, this suggests that rather than seeing depression, anxiety, and loneliness as individual-level cognitive problems, these conditions often have structural determinants that can best be tackled through collective efforts (Haslam, Jetten, Cruwys, Dingle, & Haslam, Reference Haslam, Jetten, Cruwys, Dingle and Haslam2018). Likewise, environmental research emphasizes the importance of collective efficacy beliefs in motivating collective action on climate change, and it also highlights the importance of interventions that build and mobilize change-focused groups and communities (Masson & Fritsche, Reference Masson and Fritsche2021).
In this way, as Greta Thunberg recognized, progress in social policy is ultimately driven and delivered not by an s-frame alone, but by an s-frame that is married with a g-frame which recognizes that structural progress is best realized through the mobilization of shared understandings and energies. Indeed, it is because C&L's review helps to develop this g-frame that we are so receptive to it.
I know we need a system change rather than individual change, but you cannot have one without the other. If you look through history, all the big changes in society have been started by people at the grassroots level. No system change can come without pressure from large groups of individuals. (Greta Thunberg, Brilliant Minds Conference, Stockholm, June 13, 2019)
We agree wholeheartedly with Chater & Loewenstein (C&L) that the behavioral and brain sciences have focused far too heavily on the psychology and behavior of people as individuals, and that i-frame policy interventions have not lived up to the expectations of their devotees and those who they influenced. In large part this is because i-frame interventions are built on a limited understanding of human psychology that neglects the capacity for internalized group membership to shape and transform individuals’ cognition and behavior (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). However, by the same token, focusing on systemic, “big-picture” solutions alone will not in itself result in more effective public policy because this approach too fails to engage with these same group memberships and associated group dynamics. Accordingly, to overcome the impasse identified by C&L, we argue that behavioral scientists and policymakers need not just to resort to an s-frame, but in addition to develop and employ a g-frame – a group-level analysis that focuses on how cognition and behavior are shaped and transformed by membership in social groups.
The g-frame is informed by research in social psychology, in particular the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979; Turner et al., Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). This frame views human psychology as fundamentally social. In particular, in all social contexts, individuals’ perception, cognition, emotion, and behavior are shaped by their group memberships (Turner et al., Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). From this perspective, social change is produced by collective action in which individuals are empowered to enact change through their membership of social groups (Drury & Reicher, Reference Drury and Reicher2009). Moreover, from this perspective, the apparent “frailty” and “fallibility” of individuals can be understood as the consequence of an i-frame that privileges and fetishizes the study of people as isolated individuals rather than as social actors who function and progress as interacting collectives. Thus, although individual workers and tenants have limited capacity to improve their working and living conditions, the unions and associations they join have much more power to do so. Individually we kneel, together we stand.
Yet although s-frame interventions are more powerful than i-frame interventions in this regard, using top-down approaches to public policy without accounting for the psychology of group life also runs into problems. Three are particularly significant.
A major limitation of purely top-down interventions is that they fail to acknowledge that people generally only have power to enact systemic-level change to the extent that they already have power within the system – with the result that s-frame solutions typically reinforce the status quo by representing the interests of powerful groups such as ethnic majorities or corporations while marginalizing minority groups (e.g., Fekete, Reference Fekete2004; Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin, & St Clair, Reference Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin and St Clair2014; Merino-Pérez & Segura-Warnholtz, Reference Merino-Pérez, Segura-Warnholtz, Bray, Merino-Pérez and Barry2021). Ironically, this means that enthusiasm for “nudges” is ultimately driven and sustained by an s-frame underpinned by a g-frame. Indeed, like most social and political theorizing, the i-frame is typically a manifestation of a worldview that is shared and promulgated by people who act not as individuals but as a group (Mols, Haslam, Jetten, & Steffens, Reference Mols, Haslam, Jetten and Steffens2015). Moreover, it is this capacity to act as a group that gives them power (Turner, Reference Turner2005). Importantly, thought, it is the capacity for their opponents to do the same that allows them to resist and challenge that power and to imagine and drive social change (Haslam & Reicher, Reference Haslam and Reicher2012).
Relatedly, a second problem is that top-down s-frame interventions often exclude the very people they are meant to help. For example, a report into the Australian government's 2007 “emergency intervention” into Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory found that regulating the goods that people were allowed to buy led to members of those communities feeling disempowered and disengaged (O'Mara, Reference O'Mara2010). More generally, rather than recruiting people's energies, such policies can easily suppress them.
A third issue is that group-level factors affect whether systemic interventions gain traction. In particular, social identity-related dynamics determine whether, and how much, people support and engage with interventions (Mols et al., Reference Mols, Haslam, Jetten and Steffens2015). For example, resistance to COVID-19 lockdowns was driven in part by people's alienation from, and lack of trust in, government and an associated sense that these measures were illegitimate (Hornsey, Reference Hornsey, Jetten, Reicher, Haslam and Cruwys2020; Reicher & Stott, Reference Reicher and Stott2020). “Nothing about us without us” is not just a powerful rallying call, but also a template for (dis)engagement.
It follows from the previous points that a key way to develop the s-frame and increase its impact is to align it with a g-frame, so that the material and psychological dimensions of change buttress (rather than undermine) each other. Such an approach acknowledges the power of social systems to produce change but recognizes – and seeks to harness – the power of groups to deliver this. In the domain of mental health, for example, this suggests that rather than seeing depression, anxiety, and loneliness as individual-level cognitive problems, these conditions often have structural determinants that can best be tackled through collective efforts (Haslam, Jetten, Cruwys, Dingle, & Haslam, Reference Haslam, Jetten, Cruwys, Dingle and Haslam2018). Likewise, environmental research emphasizes the importance of collective efficacy beliefs in motivating collective action on climate change, and it also highlights the importance of interventions that build and mobilize change-focused groups and communities (Masson & Fritsche, Reference Masson and Fritsche2021).
In this way, as Greta Thunberg recognized, progress in social policy is ultimately driven and delivered not by an s-frame alone, but by an s-frame that is married with a g-frame which recognizes that structural progress is best realized through the mobilization of shared understandings and energies. Indeed, it is because C&L's review helps to develop this g-frame that we are so receptive to it.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interest
None.