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Understanding the role of mirror neurons in action understanding will require more than a domain-general account

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Alia Martin  and
Laurie R. Santos
Alia Martin
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520. [email protected]@yale.eduwww.psychology.yale.edu
Laurie R. Santos
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520. [email protected]@yale.eduwww.psychology.yale.edu
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Abstract

Cook et al. propose that mirror neurons emerge developmentally through a domain-general associative mechanism. We argue that experience-sensitivity does not rule out an adaptive or genetic argument for mirror neuron function, and that current evidence suggests that mirror neurons are more specialized than the authors' account would predict. We propose that future work integrate behavioral and neurophysiological techniques used with primates to examine the proposed functions of mirror neurons in action understanding.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 211
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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