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Temporal updating, behavioral learning, and the phenomenology of time-consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Genevieve Hayman  and
Bryce Huebner Open the ORCID record for Bryce Huebner [Opens in a new window]
Genevieve Hayman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC20057. [email protected]@Georgetown.edubrycehuebner.weebly.com
Bryce Huebner
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC20057. [email protected]@Georgetown.edubrycehuebner.weebly.com
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Abstract

Hoerl & McCormack claim that the temporal updating system only represents the world as present. This generates puzzles regarding the phenomenology of temporal experience. We argue that recent models of reinforcement learning suggest that temporal updating must have a minimal temporal structure; and we suggest that this helps to clarify what it means to experience the world as temporally structured.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e254
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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