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Social perception and “spectator theories” of other minds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2013

Søren Overgaard  and
Joel Krueger
Søren Overgaard
Affiliation:
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark. [email protected]://cfs.ku.dk/staff/profil/?id=259148
Joel Krueger
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4RJ, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

We resist Schilbach et al.'s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second-person approach from the social perception view.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 434 - 435
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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