Similarity and the coordination of ownership

Abstract

We discuss and expand Boyer's idea of ownership coordination. Interpersonal similarity, we suggest, can moderate the attainment of coordination: Perceived similarity predicts coordination costs, whereas actual similarity dictates coordination success and the severity of illusory assumptions regarding a shared understanding of ownership. The example of similarity highlights the complexity of the social projection process uncritically assumed behind ownership coordination.

In this commentary, we reflect on Boyer's idea of the coordination of ownership. His model of coordination presupposes a shared understanding between parties to establish what belongs to whom. Ownership, like any other social norm that is agreed upon among individuals, requires a minimum of social projection. Social projection is the psychological process through which an individual expects behaviors or attitudes of others to be similar to their own. This process is the central force driving networks of mutual understanding of shared responsibilities and rights. However, the author's idea of coordination appears to be largely uncritical of the complexity of such projection processes. We seek to elucidate this complexity by noting the moderating role of perceived and actual similarity between individuals for projection processes. We focus on the consequences of different degrees of both types of similarity on the coordination of ownership.

Mental models of a goal or objective accurately shared between members are critical for any effective team coordination (e.g., Fisher, Bell, Dierdorff, & Belohlav, 2012). Since ownership coordination is presumably a specific case of team coordination, the impact of similarity on the non-communicative and automatic processes of the latter are seamlessly transferable to the former. We argue that perceived similarity moderates the efficiency and speed with which networks of mutual agreement are coordinated by regulating the likelihood of conflict between individuals’ different norms. To illustrate with the author's example of collaboratively owned fisheries, originally introduced by Ostrom (1990): The establishment of community fisheries – that is, ponds and tools to be used for cleaning, fishing, and preparing the catch – requires agreeing on and recording responsibilities and rights that are shared among the involved parties. This process relies on communication between the parties. In cases of high similarity, mutual understanding of responsibilities and rights is abundant and communication can be restricted to a minimum. The result is resource- and time-efficient coordination. In contrast, low perceived similarity induces parties to be more cautious in defining their duties. As a result, coordination takes on a different character: Each party's property rights (e.g., using the pond and a certain set of fishing gear) and responsibilities (e.g., cleaning pond and gear) have to be defined and discussed in detail.

Among other scenarios, the above insight is important for groups of individuals considering shared ownership and for lead coordinators responsible for organizing ownership. That is, considering perceived similarity in ownership coordination is particularly relevant in instances of new group formations (e.g., establishing a new co-owned fishery) and reformations (e.g., adding new parties to an existing fishery agreement). The perceived similarity between individuals determines the to-be-expected cost of the planned coordination and should therefore be carefully considered. Beyond the fisheries example, situations of new or re-formation are becoming increasingly common with the expansion of the digital space where new people meet by the minute.

Actual interindividual similarity can further complicate the scenarios outlined above. In a functional case, actual dissimilarities between parties lead to an emerging ownership network either being stopped in its early tracks of realization or limited to basic pillars of ownership. That is, either initial coordinators will decide to let go of the idea of co-owned fisheries or the parties involved will agree on a low-level ownership structure – for example, only coordinating the times of individual and collaborative fishing at the pond among contributors, and foregoing more complex agreements (e.g., tool use and renewal). These cases are most likely when the low level of actual similarity matches with the interindividually shared perception of similarity. However, let us turn to more problematic scenarios: Low similarity is particularly dysfunctional when it deviates substantially from the level of similarity perceived by individuals in the network. In this case, the low actual similarity between individuals can substantially mislead ownership coordination so that the resulting network and its associated co-owned property and responsibilities are only apparently shared: Contributor A might understand the use of the co-owned pond and the fulfilment of related duties (e.g., cleaning the fishing gear) as alternating between the parties on a weekly basis. In contrast, contributor B might see pond and related responsibilities as being shared permanently. The incorrectly perceived similarity in understanding property rights and responsibilities leads to ingroup conflicts that can escalate to substantial consequences (e.g., dissolution of the joint ownership of the fishery).

In conclusion, we welcome Boyer's presentation of an intriguing and novel framework for the coordination of ownership. However, we argue that he underestimates the complexity of the projection process to be assumed behind every mutual understanding of what belongs to whom. We highlighted this complexity by illustrating the impact interindividual similarity has on the coordination of ownership. Perceived similarity among parties is a central variable to consider in predicting the costs (in terms of resources and time) of coordinating the target ownership. In addition, if actual similarity is low, the coordination of ownership fails when matched with low perceived similarity. Assuming high perceived and low actual similarity, individuals form a network that stands on the false assumption that an understanding of property and responsibilities is mutually shared. While the former outcome is only disappointing, the latter is what leads to many of the existing intragroup conflicts we observe in companies, politics, or sports, and have illustrated here with the example of fisheries. This commentary is to demonstrate that the coordination of ownership cannot be assumed uncritically. Instead, studying its social projection process should be a central effort of the emerging research agenda on ownership.