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Restrictive and dynamic conceptions of the unconscious: Perspectives from moral and developmental psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2014

Gordon P. D. Ingram  and
Karolina Prochownik
Gordon P. D. Ingram
Affiliation:
Bath Spa University, Newton Park, Newton St. Loe, Bath BA2 9BN, United Kingdom. [email protected]://sites.google.com/a/bathspa.ac.uk/gordon-ingram/
Karolina Prochownik
Affiliation:
Jagiellonian University, Kraków 31-005, Poland. [email protected]
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Abstract

Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) conceptualization of the unconscious is overly restrictive, compared to standard social psychological accounts. The dichotomy between distal and proximal cues is a weak point in their argument and does not circumvent the existence of unconscious influences on decision making. Evidence from moral and developmental psychology indicates that decision making results from a dynamic mixture of conscious and unconscious processes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 34 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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