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The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Samuel Bowles ,
Robert Boyd ,
Sarah Mathew  and
Peter J. Richerson
Samuel Bowles
Affiliation:
Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501. [email protected]://www.santafe.edu/~bowles
Robert Boyd
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of California–Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095. [email protected]://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/[email protected]://smathew.bol.ucla.edu/Site/Home.html
Sarah Mathew
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of California–Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095. [email protected]://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/[email protected]://smathew.bol.ucla.edu/Site/Home.html
Peter J. Richerson
Affiliation:
Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California–Davis, Davis CA 95616. [email protected]://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/Richerson/Richerson.htm
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Abstract

Experiments are not models of cooperation; instead, they demonstrate the presence of the ethical and other-regarding predispositions that often motivate cooperation and the punishment of free-riders. Experimental behavior predicts subjects' cooperation in the field. Ethnographic studies in small-scale societies without formal coercive institutions demonstrate that disciplining defectors is both essential to cooperation and often costly to the punisher.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 20 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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