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The perils of a science of intentional change
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 August 2014
Abstract
The attempt to construct an applied science of social change raises certain concerns, both theoretical and ethical. The theoretical concerns relate to the feasibility of predicting human behavior with sufficient reliability to ground a science that aspires to the management of social processes. The ethical concerns relate to the moral hazards involved in the modification of human social arrangements, given the unreliability of predicting human action.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014
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The perils of a science of intentional change
Related commentaries (1)
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