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Mentalism, information, and consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2003

Richard A. Carlson
Richard A. Carlson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802-3106 [email protected] http://psych.la.psu.edu/faculty/carlson.htm
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Abstract

The target article addresses important empirical issues, but adopts a nonanalytic stance toward consciousness and presents the mentalistic view as a very radical position that rules out informational description of anything other than conscious mental states. A better mentalistic strategy is to show how the structure of some informational states is both constitutive of consciousness and necessary for psychological functions.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , June 2002 , pp. 333
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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