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Knowledge before belief in the history of philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Jessica Moss Open the ORCID record for Jessica Moss [Opens in a new window]
Jessica Moss*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY10003, USA. [email protected]://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/jessica-moss.html
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Abstract

I add support to Phillips et al.'s thesis that representations of knowledge are more basic than representations of belief through a historical account of the development of philosophical theories of knowledge and belief. On the basis of Aristotle's criticisms of his Presocratic predecessors, I argue that Western philosophy developed theories of knowledge long before it developed theories of belief.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e162
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Lee, M. (2005). Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199262225.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moss, J., & Schwab, W. (2019). The birth of belief. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 57(1), 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2019.0000.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar