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Individuals are abstractions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1999

James R. Hurford
James R. Hurford
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9LL, Scotland, United [email protected] www.ling.ed.ac.uk/~jim/
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Abstract

Barsalou's move to a perceptual basis for cognition is welcome. His scheme contrasts with classical logical schemes in many ways, including its implications for the status of individuals. Barsalou deals mainly with perceived individuals, omitting discussion of cognized individuals. It is argued that the individuality of cognized individuals is an abstraction, which conforms in its manner of formation to other cognitive abstractions which Barsalou discusses, such as truth and disjunction.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , August 1999 , pp. 620 - 621
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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