Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 January 2020
We fully support dissociating the subjective experience from the memory contents in recognition memory, as Bastin et al. posit in the target article. However, having two generic memory modules with qualitatively different functions is not mandatory and is in fact inconsistent with experimental evidence. We propose that quantitative differences in the properties of the memory modules can account for the apparent dissociation of recollection and familiarity along anatomical lines.
Target article
An integrative memory model of recollection and familiarity to understand memory deficits
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Author response
Interactions with the integrative memory model