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Fictional emotions and emotional reactions to social robots as depictions of social agents
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2023
Abstract
Following the depiction theory by Clark and Fischer we would expect people interacting with robots to experience fictional emotions akin to those toward films or novels. However, some people's emotional reactions toward robots display the motivational force typical to non-fictional emotions. We discuss this incongruity and offer two suggestions on how to explain it while maintaining the depiction theory.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Social robots as depictions of social agents
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Author response
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