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Examining punishment at different explanatory levels

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Miguel dos Santos  and
Claus Wedekind
Miguel dos Santos
Affiliation:
Department of Ecology and Evolution, Biophore, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. [email protected]://www.unil.ch/dee/[email protected]://www.unil.ch/dee/page21538.html
Claus Wedekind
Affiliation:
Department of Ecology and Evolution, Biophore, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. [email protected]://www.unil.ch/dee/[email protected]://www.unil.ch/dee/page21538.html
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Abstract

Experimental studies on punishment have sometimes been over-interpreted not only for the reasons Guala lists, but also because of a frequent conflation of proximate and ultimate explanatory levels that Guala's review perpetuates. Moreover, for future analyses we may need a clearer classification of different kinds of punishment.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 23 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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