Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 October 2022
Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirely ad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers,” “that is not mine.” This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free of ad hoc stipulations.
Target article
Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model
Related commentaries (31)
A cooperative–competitive perspective of ownership necessitates an understanding of ownership disagreements
A developmental perspective on the minimalist model: The case of respect for ownership
Autonomy, the moral circle, and the limits of ownership
Beyond personal ownership: Examining the complexities of ownership in culture
Boyer's minimal model should also represent multiple ownership without collective agency
Computational theories should be made with natural language instead of meaningless code
Development, history, and a minimalist model of ownership psychology
Hold it! Where do we put the body?
How the minimalist model of ownership psychology can aid in explaining moral behaviors under resource constraints
Invested effort and our open-ended sense of ownership
No single notion of cooperation explains when we respect ownership
Not by intuitions alone: Institutions shape our ownership behaviour
On intuitive versus institutional accounts of ownership
Ownership and willingness to compete for resources
Ownership as a component of the extended self
Ownership as an extension of self: An alternative to a minimalist model
Ownership is (likely to be) a moral foundation
Ownership language informs ownership psychology
Ownership psychology and group size
Ownership psychology as a “cognitive cell” adaptation: A minimalist model of microbial goods theory
Primordial feeling of possession in development
Psychological ownership: Actors' and observers' perspectives
Reciprocal contracts – not competitive acquisition – explain the moral psychology of ownership
Similarity and the coordination of ownership
The curious origins of ownership
The evolutionary psychology of ownership is rooted in the Lockean liberal principle of self-ownership
The missing link? How do non-human primates fit in the minimalist model of ownership?
The origins of property law
The recursive nature of ownership intuitions
What do infants need an ownership concept for? Frugal possession concepts can adequately support early reasoning about distributive dilemmas
When it comes to taxes, ownership intuitions abide by the law
Author response
Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences