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Modest and immodest neural codes: Can there be modest codes?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Rosa Cao Open the ORCID record for Rosa Cao [Opens in a new window]  and
Charles Rathkopf
Rosa Cao
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, [email protected]://philosophy.stanford.edu/people/rosa-cao
Charles Rathkopf
Affiliation:
Institute for Neuroscience and Medicine, Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, 52425Jülich, Germany. [email protected]://charlesrathkopf.net/
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Abstract

We argue that Brette's arguments, or some variation on them, work only against the immodest codes imputed by neuroscientists to the signals they study; they do not tell against “modest” codes, which may be learned by neurons themselves. Still, caution is warranted: modest neural codes likely lead to only modest explanatory gains.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e221
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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