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Metacognition is prior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Justin J. Couchman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY [email protected]@[email protected]
Mariana V. C. Coutinho
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY [email protected]@[email protected]
Michael J. Beran
Affiliation:
Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA [email protected]
J. David Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY [email protected]@[email protected]

Abstract

We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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