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Is the unconscious, if it exists, a superior decision maker?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2014

Hilde M. Huizenga ,
Anna C. K. van Duijvenvoorde ,
Don van Ravenzwaaij ,
Ruud Wetzels  and
Brenda R. J. Jansen
Hilde M. Huizenga
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected]://home.medewerker.uva.nl/h.m.huizenga/ Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, 1018XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected]://home.medewerker.uva.nl/b.r.j.jansen/
Anna C. K. van Duijvenvoorde
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected]://home.medewerker.uva.nl/h.m.huizenga/ Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, 2333AK Leiden, The Netherlands. [email protected]://home.medewerker.uva.nl/a.c.k.vanduijvenvoorde
Don van Ravenzwaaij
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan NSW 2308, Australia. [email protected]://www.donvanravenzwaaij.com
Ruud Wetzels
Affiliation:
Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, 1098XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected] Spinoza Centre for Neuroimaging, 1018WS Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Brenda R. J. Jansen
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected]://home.medewerker.uva.nl/h.m.huizenga/ Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, 1018XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email protected]://home.medewerker.uva.nl/b.r.j.jansen/
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Abstract

Newell & Shanks (N&S) show that there is no convincing evidence that processes assumed to be unconscious and superior are indeed unconscious. We take their argument one step further by showing that there is also no convincing evidence that these processes are superior. We review alternative paradigms that may provide more convincing tests of the superiority of (presumed) unconscious processes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 32 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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