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Is factuality a matter of content?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Gregory Currie
Gregory Currie
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia 5001 [email protected] coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/PhilosophyHome.html
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Abstract

Dienes & Perner argue that there is a hierarchy of forms of implicit knowledge. One level of their hierarchy involves factuality, where it may be merely implicit that the state of affairs is supposed to be a real one rather than something imagined or fictional. I argue that the factual or fictional status of a thought or utterance cannot be a matter of concept, implicit or explicit.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 763
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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