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Evolutionary foundations of knowledge and belief attribution in nonhuman primates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Fumihiro Kano Open the ORCID record for Fumihiro Kano [Opens in a new window]  and
Josep Call Open the ORCID record for Josep Call [Opens in a new window]
Fumihiro Kano
Affiliation:
Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Universitätsstraße 10, 78464, Konstanz, Germany Max-Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Am Obstberg 1, 78315, Radolfzell am Bodensee, Germany Kumamoto Sanctuary, Wildlife Research Center, Kyoto University, Otao 990, Misumi, Uki, Kumamoto, Japan
Josep Call
Affiliation:
School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, KY16 9AJSt Andrews, UK
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Abstract

Recent findings from anticipatory-looking false-belief tests have shown that nonhuman great apes and macaques anticipate that an agent will go to the location where the agent falsely believed an object to be. Phillips et al.'s claim that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief should thus be reconsidered. We propose that both knowledge and belief attributions are evolutionary old.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e158
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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