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A flexible strategy for warring duopolists
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Abstract
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The behaviour of duopolists is considered within a framework that allows for flexibility of the adopted strategy against the rival. In a difficult external climate, a firm may concentrate on its own profit, whereas in a more favourable external climate, it may adopt a more aggressive attitude towards the rival. The strategy considered in this paper permits this flexible approach. The market functions are kept general to allow the widest interpretation of the results.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © Australian Mathematical Society 1988
References
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