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Philip II of Macedon and the Boeotian Alliance*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2015

D. H. Kelly
D. H. Kelly*
Affiliation:
Australian National University
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Extract

In the history of Philip II’s conquest of Greece the part played by Boeotia must weigh heavily. Recently the view has been urged that in 346 B.C. Philip intended to bring Boeotia low by breaking the predominance of Thebes within the Boeotian federal state but was prevented from having his way by the successful scheming of his opponents in Athens, who persuaded their countrymen to frustrate Philip’s plans by withholding their co-operation, so that Philip was compelled to treat Thebes favourably. As a corollary to this view it is thought that Demosthenes, the foremost of Philip’s opponents at Athens, aspired from the time of the Peace of Philokrates on, if not earlier, after an alliance between Athens and Boeotia as the only realistic way of resisting Philip. At the same time Philip is believed to have preferred, if only he could have had his own way, to have Athens as some kind of partner and to make Thebes alone his enemy. Rebuttal of this view of Philip’s policy in 346 has been prompt and telling and no more may need to be said about it now that G.T. Griffith’s magisterial account of Macedonia has shown, amidst so much else, how Philip’s relations with Greek states are to be understood in the light of Philip’s own changing views of his interests.

Type
Research Article
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Antichthon , Volume 14 , 1980 , pp. 64 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © Australasian Society for Classical Studies 1980

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References

1 Philip’s alleged Theban plan: Markle, M.M., ‘The Strategy of Philip in 346’, CQ 24 (1914),253–8;CrossRefGoogle ScholarEllis, J.R.,Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London 1976), 11–12,Google Scholar 107, 114–15, 118–19, 200 (hereafter Philip). Demosthenes’ Theban hopes: Ellis, Philip 122, 188, 292 n. 50; cf. Pickard-Cambridge, A.W., Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom 384–322 B. C. (New York & London 1914), 174,Google Scholar 273–4, 329, 346, 376 (hereafter Dem.); Markle, CQ 24 (1974), 255 n. 1; 259.

2 Cawkwell, G.L., Philip of Macedon (London 1978), 108–13,Google Scholar128–31 (hereafter Philip), and ‘The Peace of Philocrates Again’, CQ 28 (1978), 93–104 at 98–104.

3 Hammond, N.G.L. & Griffith, G.T.,A History of Macedonia 2 (Oxford 1979),Google Scholar esp. 345 n. 1 (against Markle) (hereafter HM 2).

4 Grote, G., History of Greece ( London 1888), 11. 436–7Google Scholar ( hereafter HG) is still valuable. Holm, A., Geschichte Griechenlands (Berlin 1891),3. 308Google Scholar (hereafter GG) saw that in 339 Boeotia reacted against Philip to win back lost ground but little was done to refine this position till Griffith, HM 2. See, for example, Bury, J.B. & Meiggs, R., History of Greece4 (London 1975),439Google Scholar (hereafter HG); Pickard-Cambridge,Bem. 374–5 & CAH 6. 259; Beloch, K.J., Griechische Geschichte (Strasburg etc 1922), 3. 1,Google Scholar 559, 561, 564; Laistner, M.L.W., History of the Greek World from 479 to 323 B.C. (London 1936);Google ScholarWiist, F.R., Philip II von Makedonien und Griechenland (Munich 1938), 38,Google Scholar 58, 64, 91–2, 157 (hereafter Philip);Cloché, P., Thèbes de Béotie(Namur 1952), 184–5Google Scholar (hereafter Thèbes); Sordi, M., La lega tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno (Rome 1958), 273,Google Scholar 295–6 (hereafter LT);Hammond, N.G.L., History ofGreece2 (Oxford 1967),556Google Scholar (hereafter HG); Adcock, F.E. & Mosley, D.J., Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (London 1975), 96Google Scholar (hereafter Diplomacy); Sealey, R., History of the Greek City States (Berkeley 1976), 489Google Scholar (hereafter HGCS); Ellis, Philip 192–3; Cawkweil, Philip 144. Mosley, D.J., ‘Athens’ Alliance with Thebes’, Historia 20 (1971), 508–10,Google Scholar deals only with the Athenian side of the bargain. Griffith, HM 2. 332–4, 343–6, 454–7, 487 n. 1, 498–9, 551–2,554, 586–91, is illuminating, putting the whole matter in a nutshell (457): ‘… the war had altered (the Boeotians’) whole situation in a way which British readers at least will understand …’.

5 Von Stern, E., Geschichte des spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie (Dorpat 1884), 245–6Google Scholar (hereafter GH); Holm, GG 3. 141; Bury & Meiggs, HG 382–3; Beloch, GG 1. 1. 16,3. 1. 208–10; M. Cary, CAH 6. 102; Westlake, H.D., Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. (London 1935), 120,Google Scholar 160 (hereafter Thessaly); Cloché, Thèbes 11, 137, 163–4; Carrata Thomes, F., Egemonia beotica e potenza marittima nella politica di Epaminonda (Turin 1952), 9,Google Scholar 41–2 (hereafter Egemonia); Walbank, F.W., Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford 1957), 725;Google ScholarFortina, M.,Epaminonda (Turin 1958), 108–10Google Scholar; Jaeger, W., Demosthenes: the Origin and Growth of his Policy (Berkeley 1938), 46,Google Scholar 113; Bengtson, H., Griechische Geschichte4 (Munich 1969), 2856Google Scholar (hereafter GG); Hammond, HG 510–11; Adcock, & Mosley, , Diplomacy 79,86–7.Google ScholarDeiebecque, E., Essai surla vie de Xenophon (Paris 1957), 434Google Scholar, even ascribed this view to Xenophon: see however Xen. HG 7. 5. 27 (and n. 6 below).

6 Ellis, Philip 102, 115; Davies, J.K., Democracy in Classical Greece (London 1978), 215Google Scholar (hereafter DG); Mosse, C.,Le monde grec et l’Orient (Paris 1975), 2.Google Scholar 38; Griffith, HM 2 (n. 4 above). Shrimpton, G.S., ‘The Theban Hegemony’, Phoenix 25 (1971), 310–18,CrossRefGoogle Scholar argued that this was the contemporary view and that Kallisthenes and Ephoros were responsible for the later notion of this hegemony ending in 362, a view which he too ascribes (313) to Xenophon (see n. 5 above); his argument rests largely on a misunderstanding of Ephoros’s arrangement of his material by books and on the assumption that, in plagiarizing Kallisthenes, Ephoros swallowed his pro-Boeotian bias whole. This argument is not encumbered by the citing of Ephoros F 119, on the unfitness of Boeotia for hegemony. On the question of when the ‘Theban hegemony’ ended, Shrimpton (313 n. 18) takes refuge in citing Beloch, GG 3. 1. 246, which is on the outbreak of the Sacred War. On Ephoros and Kallisthenes’ views of Boeotia see Carrata Thomes, Egemonia 8, 10.

7 Sealey,HGCS 436, disregarding Diod. Sic. 15. 94. 3, 16. 39. 2–7, and more or less agreeing in error with Paus. 4. 28. 1, 8. 28. 2.

8 Busolt, G. & Swoboda, H., Griechische Staatskunde (Munich 1926), 2.Google Scholar 1426 (hereafter GS); Cary, CAH 6. 84; Adcock, & Mosley, , Diplomacy 79, 86–7;Google Scholar Bengtson, GG 279; Sealey, HGCS 438. Even Hammond, N.G.L., Studies in Greek History (Oxford 1973), 525Google Scholar (hereafter Studies) writes of a ‘Central Greek Confederacy’ or ‘League’ (contrast notes 14, 29 below).

9 See, for example, on the making and breaking of alliances: Thuc. 1. 31–44; 3. 9–14; Xen. HG 3. 5. 7–16,5. 2. 11–23,6. 5. 33–49,7. 1. 1–14. Demosthenes’ Olynthiacs (1–3) and For the Megalopolitans ( 16) are also cases in point. Little is to be found on the emotive persuasion habitual in city-state diplomacy in Adcock & Mosley, Diplomacy 181–2 or Mosley, D.J., Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (Wiesbaden 1973)Google Scholar and ‘On Greek enemies becoming allies’, Ane. Soc. 5 (1974), 43–50.

10 Contrast Plut. Dem. 18. 2–3 (Theopompos,FGrH 115 F 328) with Dem. 18. 212–14, 238–44.

11 Pammenes is the closest to an exception in the military field. See, however, Cawkweil, G.L., ‘Epaminondas and Thebes’, CQ 22 (1972), 274.Google Scholar Von Stern, GH 245–6, Carrata Thomes, Egemonie 40 n. 4, Fortina, Epaminonda 108–10, express the common view.

12 On hegemonia see Ehrenberg, V., The Greek State2 (London 1969), 111–20.Google Scholar (H. Triepel, Die Hegemonie2 [1943] has not been available to me.) On imperialism see Finley, M.I., ‘Empire in the Greco-Roman World’, G&R 25 (1978), 1–15,Google Scholar and Garnsey, P.D.A. & Whittaker, C.R., Imperialism in the Ancient World (Cambridge 1978), 1–6.Google Scholar There is also the problem of English usage, ‘league’ being applied indiscriminately to both federal states and to alliances: e.g. Westlake, Thessaly 120, 140; Sealey, HGCS 404–5, 491; Ellis, Philip 86, 103, 140.

13 ‘The Common Peace of 366/5’, CQ 11 (1961), 80–6, and Xenophon, History of My Times (tr. R. Warner, Harmondsworth 1979), 385n; qualified in CQ 22 (1972), 269 n. 3. Against this Peace, Ryder, T.T.B., Koine Eirene (Oxford 1965), 137–9Google Scholar & ‘The Supposed Common Peace of 366/5’, CQ 7 (1957), 199–205.

14 Brief but helpful accounts in Busolt & Swoboda, GS 2. 1425–6; Beloch, GG 3. 1. 171–2; Hammond, HG 500–1, 510. The old notion that the Boeotian hegemony had something to do with the Delphic Amphictyony (Grote,HG 10. 182–3; Von Stern, GH 153, 164) has been revived and over-refined by Sordi, M., ‘La fondation du collège des Naopes et le renouveau politique de l’Amphictionie au IVe siècle’, BCH 81 (1957), 38–75 at 48–54;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLT236–9. On Pelopidas: Bersanetti, G.M., ‘Pelopida’, Athenaeum 21 (1949), 43–101Google Scholar (p. 88 brings out the stock word ‘effimera’); on Epameinondas: Fortina, , Epaminonda esp. 40 n. 5; Cawkweil, CQ 22 (1972), 254–78.Google Scholar Cloché, Thèbes 137–64, esp. 139 and 152–3, leaves out of account the character of the Boeotian alliance. Roy, J.,‘Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370–362 B.C.’, Historia 20 (1971), 569–99,Google Scholar assumes that there were only bilateral alliances between Boeotia and its allies (see n. 18 below).

15 Marshall, F.H., The Second Athenian Confederacy (Cambridge 1905), 54 n. 3Google Scholar, (herafter SAC); Busolt & Swoboda, GS 2. 1426.

16 Hammond, N.G.L., Studies 329, 339–45Google Scholar referring to, besides the ‘First Athenian Alliance’, the ‘Second Athenian Alliance’ and the ‘Spartan Alliance’. Cf. Culham, P., ‘The Delian League: Bicameral or Unicameral?’, American Journ. A.H. 3 (1978), 27–31Google Scholar

17 Hammond, HG 500.

18 Tod, M.N., Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford 1948) 2. no. 160Google Scholar (hereafter GHI). This text still cannot be dated more precisely than to 355–46 B.C.: see Roesch, P., Thespies et la confédération béotienne (Paris 1965), 79Google Scholar (hereafter Thespies). It is not discussed by Roy, , Historia 20 (1971), 594–9,Google Scholar ‘Appendix II: Alliances’ (n. 14 above).

19 Even if the syndoi of the Delian League(Thuc. 1. 96. 2–97. 1;3. 10. 5,11. 4)were not defunct as early as is commonly thought (see Jones, A.H.M., ‘Two Synods of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues’, Pr. Camb. Philol. Soc. 2/3 [1952–3], 43–6;CrossRefGoogle Scholarde Ste Croix, G.E.M., Origins of the Peloponnesian War [London 1972], 303–7Google Scholar [hereafter OPW]) they were of rapidly diminishing consequence before their final disappearance.

20 On the use of these terms, increasingly widespread in the Hellenistic period in both federal and interstate bodies, see Holleaux, M., Etudes d’Epigraphie et d’Histoire grecques 1 (Paris 1936, repr. 1968), 291–8,Google Scholar and for Boeotia, Roesch, Thespies 128–9. For their range of application in the fourth century B.C. see, e.g., in addition to LSJ s.v. συνέδριον: Aeschin. 2. 32; 3. 117, 122 (Delphic Amphiktyony); Isoc. 15. 38; Din. 1. 66 67, 85, 86, 87, 104, 112; 3. 7.

21 IG 22. 467, lines 8–12. On the Greek alliance of 323 B.C. see Schmitt, H.H., Die Staatsvertràge des Altertums (Munich 1969), 3. no. 413Google Scholar (hereafter SvA).

22 Xen.HG7. 1.43,2. 1 1, 3. 4&9, 4. 36–9;Tod,GHI2. 152,156,cp. Aeschin. 1. 107–8. That the Boeotian alliance was fundamentally a defensive pact has been inferred from the Phokians’ refusal to join the Peloponnesian campaign in 362 B.C. on the ground that their treaty bound them only to defence of Thebes against attack (Xen. HG 7. 5. 4): Busolt & Swoboda, GS 2. 1426; Hammond, HG 500. If so, Alexandres of Pherai should not be included, as he is by Westlake, Thessaly 151; Tod, GHI 2. 146; Bersstnetti, , Athenaeum 27 (1949), 82,Google Scholar since Alexandres’ alliance bound him ‘to follow the Boeotians wherever they might lead and order’ (Pel. 35. 3). For this kind of alliance see Sordi, M., ‘La pace di Atene del 371/70’,RFIC 29 (1951), 34–64, at 57–60;Google Scholar de Ste. Croix, OPW 298–303. It is not easy to see what lay behind the Phokian claim at Xen. HG 7. 5. 4. For tendentious claims about what alliances could mean, see, e.g., Thuc. 3. 10. 3; Xen. HG 2. 4. 30; 3. 5. 5, and, in general, de Ste. Croix, OPW 118–20.

23 Cf. Westlake, H.D., ‘The Sources of Plutarch’s Pelopidas’, CQ 33 (1939), 11–22.Google Scholar

24 Bicameral alliance: Marshall, SAC 54 n. 3; Busolt & Swoboda, GS 2. 1426; Hammond, HG 500. Davies, DG 218, sees in the passage ‘some steps towards the integration’ of poleis and comments: ‘We are not very far from Athenian-style hegemony’.

25 Historia 20(1971), 598.

26 Tod, GHI 2 no. 123, lines 59–61; no. 192, lines 10–13. On Chios’ relationship to Alexander see Badian, E., ‘Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia’, Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Ehrenberg, V., ed. Badian, E.(Oxford 1966), 37–69.Google Scholar

27 In only three of the many relevant passages in Against Aristocrates (23. 16,35,52) does Demosthenes state explicitly that the proposal was for anyone who killed Charidemos to be αγώγιμος έκ των συμμάχων; cf. 108, 142.

28 Diod. Sic. 15. 28. 2–5,29. 7–8 (Second Athenian Confederacy); 20. 2,25. 1–28. 1, 33. 2–3,34. 2,37. 1,38. 2–39,50. 2–57. 1,62. 3–66. 1,68. 2–5,76. 3,78. 4,81, 82. 5–88. Cf. 31. 1–2 on the reorganized Spartan alliance.

29 Nepos, Epam. & Pel.; Plut. Pel. (see above): Paus. 9. 13–15 etc. Revealingly, as far as modern writers are concerned, Hammond, HG 510, inasmuch as he takes an interest in the Boeotian alliance, rates highly Epameinondas’ panhellenic statesmanship, whereas Cary, CAH 6. 102 is typical of those who ignore this matter in assessing Epameinondas, saying that he had no solution to the problems of particularism (cf. 88, 103).

30 On the dating of Demosthenes’ speeches, see Sealey, R., ‘Dionysius of Halicarnassus and some Demosthenic Dates’, REG 88 (1955), 77–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31 What later became of Sikyon is not known. It was represented on the naopoioi at Delphi in spring 353: P. de la Coste-Messalière, ‘Les Naopes à Delphes au IVe Siècle’, Mélanges Helléniques offerts a George Daux (Paris 1974), 199–211, esp. Tableau I, facing p. 206. The difficulties in drawing conclusions from the naopoioi lists were well stated by Wüst, Philip 81–5.

32 Megara was represented on the naopoioi in spring and autumn 353: de la Coste-Messalière, ibid.

33 Brunt, P.A., ‘Euboea in the Time of Philip II’, CQ 19 (1969), 245–65, at 264–5;CrossRefGoogle Scholar against Cawkweil, , ‘Demosthenes’ Policy after the Peace of Philocrates. II’, CQ 13 (1963), 200–13, at 203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See further in favour of Philip’s involvement, Griffith, HM 2. 497–9.

34 Diod. Sic. 15. 57. 1, where Αιτωλούς is regarded as corrupt by Beloch, GG 3. 1. 157 n. 2 & 171 n. 2, and Busolt & Swoboda, GS 2. 1426 n. 1.

35 F. Jacoby, FGrH 3 Suppl. 1, 332–3 (on Philochoros, 328 F 56) argues that Philip sent two embassies to Thebes in 339, the first before he seized Elateia, which offered to hand over Nikaia to the Epiknemidian Lokrians, the second which was opposed to Demosthenes and his colleagues. Jacoby seems to follow a risky procedure in inferring two embassies from the different wording of the Philochoros citations in Dion. Hal. and Didymos. He states (p. 333) that the second embassy was sent to invite the ‘entry of the Boeotian League into alliance with Philip’. Yet to assume that Boeotia was not already in alliance with Philip is on the way to reviving U. Kahrstedt’s thesis that Boeotia (along with Athens and Persia) was hostile to Philip after 346: Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden 5 und des 4. Jahrhunderts (Berlin 1910), 142–52.

36 On the sequel to this see Bosworth, A.B., ‘Early Relations between Aetolia and Macedon’, AJAH 1 (1976), 164–81.Google Scholar

37 Dem. 48. 24, 48, with Hypothesis 4. Cf. Griffith, HM 2. 507–8.

38 The dating is disputed: Cawkweil, G.L., ‘Demosthenes’ Policy after the Peace of Philocrates’, CQ 13 (1963), 210–13;Google ScholarBrunt, P.A., ‘Euboea in the Time of Philip II’, CQ 19 (1969), 255–9;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCawkwell, , ‘Euboea in the Late 340’s’, Phoenix 32 (1978), 55–6;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Griffith, HM 2. 549 n. 3.

39 Cf. Ellis, Philip 119–24,148 (with the pleasant invitation on p. 124 to assume that the Macedonian troops in Phokis were there to ‘limit the excesses of the Amphiktyons’, the reader being left to supply evidence on the chivalrous tendencies of Macedonian soldiers.

40 Wüst, Philip 64; Ellis, Philip 148 (with a convenient summary of the evidence on Phokian reparations, 123).

41 See Griffith HM 2. 592–3.

42 De la Coste-Messalière, art. cit. (n. 31 above).

43 IG 22 148; SvA 2. 311; Hammond, Studies 513 n. 2.

44 Pickard-Cambridge, CAH 6. 256, 258; Cloché, Thébes 190–1; Sealey,HGC5 485–8, and ‘Philip II. und Athen, 344/3 und 339’, Historia 27 (1978), 295–316, at 315–6; Griffith, HM 2. 587–8. On the contrary Amphissa has also been thought to have been acting in Philip’s interest: Wüst, Philip 149–50; Ellis, Philip 187–9.1 doubt if anything more than plausibility can be arrived at in this complex affair known only through conflicting special pleading: Aeschin. 3. 113–29; Dem. 18. 145–55.

45 On the chronology of the Third Sacred War see Hammond, Studies 486–533; Sealey, HGCS 463–8.

46 Ellis, Philip 121, 143, 190, 270 n. 124, 271 n. 142.

47 Sordi, LT 340 n. 7.

48 Boeotian alliance with Alexandros: SvA 2. 288. The alliance of Boeotia and the free Thessalians of the360s is not in SvA 2. It is attested by Diod. Sic. 15. 67. 3–4,71. 2–6, 75. 2, 80; Plut. Pel. 26. 2–3,27. 1,29. 2,31. 1–3,35. 2. On the re-establishment in 369 of a Thessalian federal state, which is the precondition of this alliance, see Westlake, Thessaly 134–5; Sordi, LT 203–4.

49 Westlake, Thessaly 152–3, thought that the Thessalian alliance with Athens made Alexandras draw closer to Boeotia; cf. Hammond, Studies 525. Sordi, LT 237–8,269, does not discuss this point.

50 Griffith, , ‘Philip of Macedon’s Early Interventions in Thessaly (358–352 B.C.)’, CQ 20 (1970), 67–80, and HM2. 220–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The cases put forward by Sordi, LT 348–5 4, and C. Ehrhardt, , ‘Two notes on Philip of Macedon’s first Intervention in Thessaly’, CQ 17 (1967), 296–301,CrossRefGoogle Scholar do not consider the matter of relations at the time between Thessaly and Boeotia

51 Griffith, CQ 20 (1970), 73; cf. HM 2. 229–30, 267.

52 Griffith, HM 2. 266 n. 4, argues for this date for Philip’s alliance with Boeotia (SvA 2. 327), disposing of objections to this early dating from rumours in Athens in 351 that Philip was going to overthrow Thebes (Dem. 4. 48), but not dealing with the explicit testimony of Diod. Sic. 16. 58. 2–3 that Boeotia did not appeal to Philip for help in the Sacred War until late 347/early 346. I take Paus. 10. 2. 5 to mean not that Philip actually made an alliance with Boeotia in 354–352 but that in 352 he fought on the side of Boeotia’s ally Thessaly against Boeotia’s enemy Phokis. This is at least compatible withJustin8. 2. 1 (on which see Griffith, CQ 20 [1970], 74; Eliis, Philip 259 n. 76).

53 Judeich, W., Kleinasiatische Studien (Marburg 1892), 211;Google Scholar P. Cloché, Etude chronologique sur la troisième guerre sacrée (Paris 1915), 81–2, 91–2; Carrata Thomes, Egemonia 43; Hammond, Studies 523; Griffith, CQ 20 ( 1970), 74 n. 1 ; HM 2. 265 n. 2; Ellis, Philip 258 n. 67. Nothing in the sources (Diod. Sic. 16. 31. 3–5; Paus. 10. 2. 4) supports Beloch’s view (GG 3. 2. 269) that the victory of Neon opened up Thermopylae.

54 16. 59. 2; cf. Dem. 19. 138–41, 318; 18. 19 (all tendentious to a degree but even so not in conflict with Diodorus’ dating).

55 SeeDem.5. 20–3; 6. 14; 18. 211; 19. 62-3, 318–21. There was no unity of purpose apparent between the Thessalian and Boeotian ambassadors accompanying Philip on the way south in 346; Aeschin. 2. 136 (though ibid. 140 mentions Thessalian support of Boeotia’s requests just before the collapse of Phokis, in a context not likely to inspire confidence, despite Justin 8. 4. 4–5).

56 On these disturbances see Westlake, Thessalv 182–5,191–3, 199–200; Sordi, LT 262–7, 275–93; Griffith, HM 2. 285–95, 523–44.

57 Dem. 5.5 with schol, 9.57; Aeschin. 3.85–8 with schol.; Plut. Phoc. 12–14; Cawkweil, CQ 13(1963), 129; Brunt, CQ 19(1969), 249–50; Cawkwell,‘Euboea in the late 340’s’, Phoenix 32 (1978), 42–67.

58 Dem. 19. 22, 326, denied by Aeschin. 2. 120.

59 Cawkweil, ,‘The Defence of Olynthus’, CQ 12(1962), 122–40, at 138;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Brunt, CQ 19 (1969), 249 n. 3, 250–1; Cawkweil, Phoenix 32 (1978), 47–9. Cawkwell does not consider Boeotia’s relationship or lack of one with Euboia at this time; Brunt states that Boeotia had been pushed out.

60 Griffith, apud Brunt, CQ 19 (1969), 261; cf. HM 2. 547–8.

6l Isoc. 5. 53; Ps.-Dem. 1.6; Diod. Sic. 15. 79. 1; Marshall, SAC 97, 104; Accame, S., La lega Ateniese (Rome 1941), 179 n. 3;Google Scholar Carrata Thomes, Egemonia 39–43.

62 ThusSandys, J.E., Demosthenes : On the Peace etc. (London 1900), ad loc.;Google Scholar Wüst, Philip 124 η. 5. Cf. SvA 2. 318.

63 Diod. Sic. 15. 79.1 has Chios and Rhodes as well as Byzantion ally with Boeotia in 364. In 346 these first two states were reputedly negotiating with Philip (Theopompos, FGrH 115 F 164) but in 340/39 they joined in the defence of Byzantion (Diod. Sic. 16. 77. 2). There is no sign of any link between Rhodes and Chios and Boeotia after 364 in all of this.

64 Xen. HG 7. 1. 33–40; Dem. 19. 137; T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene 81–2; SvA 2. 282.

65 On the dating, Wüst, Philip 59–63; Cawkweil, CQ 13 (1963), 121–6.

66 Thus consistently with his view of Philip’s aims, Ellis, Philip 278 n. 94, 286 n. 75, argues against this alliance. Wüst, Philip 91, 95, 97–8, in accepting the alliance, tortuously explains it as compatible with Philip’s panhellenic policy because of his lack of serious commitment to the alliance. Griffith, HM 2. 485–6, presents a decisive case against Cawkwell’s dating of this alliance to351 (CQ 13 [1963], 128), and a strong case against any date in 343–341.

67 With the necessary qualifications finely put by Griffith, HM 2. 567–70. Whatever the state then or earlier of Philip’s long-term thinking about a war against Persia (ibid. 458–63, 484–9, 519–22), such considerations pose no obstacle to setting Philip’s alliance with Persia then, given his penchant for using an alliance to disarm the suspicions of a future enemy (consider in this regard SvA 2. nos. 298, 300, 308, 318, 327, 329, and also the peace-treaties, ibid. nos. 301, 319).