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What is an empire and how do you know when you have one? Rome and the Greek States after 188 BC

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 January 2015

Arthur M. Eckstein
Arthur M. Eckstein*
Affiliation:
The University of Maryland, [email protected]
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Abstract

Interstate politics in the ancient Mediterranean was for centuries what political scientists term a multipolar anarchy – a world consisting of a plurality of independent states all contending with each other for survival and hegemony. The most successful of these was, of course, Rome. But did the tremendous victories of 196 and 188 BC over the Antigonid monarchy and then the Seleucid monarchy – which followed the defeat in 201 of the Carthaginian Republic in the West – mean that Rome established an empire in the eastern Mediterranean? That the Roman Republic established an empire in the Greek East from 188 BC is asserted by some scholars. I will argue differently here. The emergence of Rome as a true imperial metropole was haphazard and long-delayed. After the defeat of Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucids, Rome by 188 had certainly achieved what political scientists term ‘unipolarity’: in the Mediterranean state-system of states, the preponderance of power was now in the hands of a single entity. But does the emergence of even greater inter-state asymmetry of power equal the establishment of an ‘empire’? This is the complicated question I will address.

Type
Research Article
Information
Antichthon , Volume 47: Thematic Issue: Culture, Identity and Politics in the Ancient Mediterranean World , 2013 , pp. 173 - 190
Copyright
Copyright © Australasian Society for Classical Studies 2013

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References

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17 On the instabililty of unipolarity and hegemony, see esp. Wilkinson, D., ‘Unipolarity Without Hegemony’, International Studies Review 1 (1999) 142-72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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22 The Roman treaty of peace with the Aetolian League was unique, at the time and later, in containing a clause requiring the Aetolians henceforth to support ‘the dynasteia and arche of the Roman people’ (Polyb. 21.32.2). There was also a clause, traditional in treaties among Greek states, that the Aetolians would have the same friends and enemies as the major partner (Polyb. 21.32.4): on this quite traditional clause, see Gruen, E.S., The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984) 27-8Google Scholar; van Wees, H., Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (London 2004) 14 and n. 35Google Scholar. The special strictures on Aetolia arose from the fact that from the Roman point of view the League had not merely been an enemy state but a treacherous ally. The Roman treaty of alliance with the Achaean League was sworn c. 192: see Badian, “The Treaty between Rome and the Achaean League’, JRS 42 (1952) 76–80Google Scholar.

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27 Polyb. 3.4.2-3, cf. 1.1.5 and 6.2.3.

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32 Discussion in Wilkinson, ‘Unipolarity Without Hegemony’ (n. 16). On the proposed time-scale of the alleged ‘unipolar moment’, see Layne, C., The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca 2006) 264 n. 1Google Scholar, with references to earlier studies.

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36 The Waltzian theorist Layne, Charles, ‘Unipolar Illusion’ (n. 33) 7Google Scholar, predicted in 1993 that U.S. unipolarity would give way to multipolarity by 2010. Mastanduno, , ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment’ (n. 2) 88Google Scholar, warned that American attempts to exercise power unilaterally and arbitrarily could call forth balancing conduct; the quality of decision-making counts.

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47 On American military interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, and the nature of American hegemony in the region (but, even so, not empire, as political scientists define the term), see Lake, , ‘Authority and Hierarchy’ (n. 9) 57Google Scholar.

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50 For the goal of the unipolar power in such situations, see Kapstein, and Mastanduno, , Unipolar Politics (n. 15) 6–7Google Scholar.

51 To repeat: if unipolarity is inherently fragile because it calls forth counterbalancing (so Waltz), then this is a tremendous Roman political achievement. And even if unipolarity tends to be relatively stable, the Roman achievement is still significant, for the Romans made it work.

52 On the difficulties inherent in counterbalancing, see Mearsheimer, J.J.The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York 2001) 341-5Google Scholar; the essays in Kaufman, S.J., Little, R. and Wohlforth, W.C. (eds.), The Balance of Power in World History (London 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mowle, and Sacko, , Unipolar World (n. 31) 68Google Scholar. On the importance of local rivalries as an obstacle to counterbalancing: see Mearsheimer, loc. cit. 155-62; Wohlforth, , ‘U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World’ (n. 35) 107Google Scholar; Mowle and Sacko, loc. cit. 68.

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54 Discussions in Eckstein, Mediterraean Anarchy (n. 24) chaps 3-4, and Rome Enters the Greek East (n. 28) chaps 4-6.

55 The link of geographical proximity to counterbalancing: Walt, S., The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca 1987) 22-6Google Scholar; Wohlforth, ‘U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World’ (n. 35). See also briefly Lampela, A., Rome and the Ptolemies of Egypt: The Development of their Political Relations, 273-80 BC (Helsinki 1998) 114Google Scholar.

56 See Heather, P., The Fall of Rome: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians (London 2005) 25Google Scholar.

57 Discussion: Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East (n. 28) chap. 9.

58 See Liv. 39.25.11: procul enim abesse libertatis auctores Romanos; lateri adhaerere gravem dominum [i.e. Philip V of Macedon]. For Polybian derivation of this passage, see Nissen, H.Kritische Untersuchungen über den Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius (Berlin 1863) 222-3Google Scholar. Cf. also Liv. 35.25.11-12, and 39.36.10-11 (cum vos [Romani] procul estis…), both passages based on Polybian material (Nissen, loc. cit. 171 and 224).

59 Such freedom to decide whether to intervene in local issues is typical of unipolar power: see Waltz, , ‘Stractural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security 25 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the contrast with the great frequency of American military interventions, see above, pp. 176-7. One should add that American military interventions since 1990, in the period of American unipolarity, have not been rare.

60 On the impact of distance (especially overseas distance) in lessening the desires of the unipolar power for direct control, see Levy, J.S., ‘What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?’, in Paul, T.V., Wirtz, J.J. and Fortman, M. (eds), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford 2004) 42Google Scholar.

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62 On Eumenes' anti-Macedonian policy, see conveniently Hansen, E.V., The Attalids of Pergamum, 2nd edn (Ithaca NY 1971) 106-12Google Scholar.

63 On ‘expected value’ and balancing behavior, see Lieber, and Alexander, , ‘Waiting for Balancing’ (n. 37) 109-39Google Scholar. On attempts at balancing as always a ‘high-cost policy’ in any case, see Mowle, and Sacko, , Unipolar World (n. 31) 69–70Google Scholar.

64 Gell. 6.3.15-16 = Cato, Orations, frag. 164M. The Romans saw no contradiction between libertas and the natural respect of the weaker for the auctoritas of the powerful, and thus hierarchy in their view did not necessarily eliminate libertas : see the good discussion of Yoshimura, T., ‘Zum römischen Libertas-Begriff im der Aussenpolitik im zweiten Jahrhundert v.Chr’, AJAH 9(1984) 1–3Google Scholar.