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The Irony of Socrates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2015

E.L. Burge
E.L. Burge*
Affiliation:
Australian National University
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Extract

‘Socratic irony’ is a familiar enough phrase. In the words of the Concise Oxford Dictionary it means the ‘simulation of ignorance as [a] means of confuting [one’s] adversary’ in argument. It is named after the philosopher Socrates, who was notorious for his use of the device as a means of discomforting his opponents without exposing himself to the risk of being shown to be wrong. Examples of Socratic irony abound in the early dialogues of Plato: the locus classicus for this unpopular trait is a disgusted outburst of Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic. Socrates has just explained why neither he nor Polemarchus has given a satisfactory account of justice— ‘You see, we have not the ability as I believe’—when Thrasymachus realizes the familiar trick being played on him.

Type
Research Article
Information
Antichthon , Volume 3 , 1969 , pp. 5 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1969

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References

1 S.v. ‘irony’.

2 Rep. 337 a.

3 The translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

4 Burnet, J.Plato’s Phaedo (Oxford, 1911), p. 55, n. 5.Google Scholar

5 Hare, R.M.The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952), pp. 111–16.Google Scholar

6 Ibid., p. 122.

7 Cf. Aristophanes, Clouds 449, where here occurring for the first time in the extant literature, is in a clearly derogatory context.

8 The passages in Xenophon most illustrative of the behaviour usually called ironical are: Mem. i 1.6; i 1.9; i 1.19; i 4.1; iii 9.6; iv 2.1; iv 4.9–10.

9 Symp. 216 e, 218 d.

10 Ibid. 216 e:

11 Ibid. 222 a: â

12 Ibid. 216 d:

13 It is striking that although Alcibiades contrasts Socrates’ outward love of handsome youths with his inner temperance, he does not contrast his outward ignorance with an inner knowledge. For the time being this aspect is simply ignored. When it recurs, as ‘a point missed at the beginning’ (221 d–e), we hear not of Socrates’ knowledge but of his power of argument and its deep ethical purport. Alcibiades is thus not prepared to say anything to support the view of Socratic irony espoused by Thrasymachus.

14 Second edition (Oxford, 1953), pp. 7–19.

15 Ninth edition (Oxford, 1940), s.v. ‘dissimulation, i.e. ignorance purposely affected to provoke or confound an antagonist, a mode of argument used by Socrates against the Sophists’.

16 Op. cit., 7.

17 As I show later, the methods used in conducting an elenchus could never produce a proof in the strict sense. At best, a proposition could remain unrefuted.

18 Soph. 230 a: a formulation which, in context, unites the two Socratic positions, ‘no one errs willingly’ and ‘virtue is knowledge’.

19 Robinson’s use of the word ‘victim’ is surprising, coming from one who has himself freed many from needless confusion and error. Is he himself being ironical, but without giving us the data (in a written work) to correct the impression gained from taking him literally ?

20 Gorg. 509 a. This decisive objection to Robinson’s view was brought to my attention by Professor Gregory Vlastos.

21 This is, of course, self-sacrifice from the point of view of his critics. For Socrates himself, duty and desire coincided, and goodness of soul brought the only true rewards. Cf. Xen. Mem. i 6.2–10.

22 Xenophanes ap. H. Diels, rev. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker5 (Berlin, 1934), B18: ‘The gods have not revealed all things to man from the beginning; but in course of time men, by seeking, find out what is better.’ B34: ‘As for certain truth, no man has known it, nor will any man know it—whether about the gods or about all the things of which I speak. Even if by chance he should succeed in saying what is finally true, he would not know it himself. All is but a tissue of seeming.’

For the distinction between divine knowledge and human opinion in Xenophanes see Snell, B.The Discovery of the Mind (Harvard, 1953),Google Scholar Chapter 7; and Popper, K.R.Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1963) pp. 151–3,Google Scholar 236–7.

23 This is a dominant theme in the Euthyphro, esp. 4 b, 15 d.

24 Cf. the reason for rejecting the claims of the poets: (Apol. 22 b).

25 This is most explicit in the discussion of the difference between and in Meno 96–8. Here the differentia is the presence of (98 a), ‘a working out of the reason why’. This is equated with the exemplified by the slave-boy’s solution of a geometrical problem. In non-mythological terms this is equivalent to a full theoretical justification or demonstration of the proposition elicited by Socrates’ skilful questioning. Without this, the boy still has at best only right opinion (85 c). If it be urged that this Platonic passage cannot be used as evidence for the Socratic criteria of knowledge, I reply that Plato is here concerned to show how a method like that of geometry can yield knowledge which meets Socrates’ high standards, as well as to reject the view that knowledge is a necessary condition for right action.

26 Popper, K.R.The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959),Google Scholar esp. pp. 32–3, 106–11, 251–69; and Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1963), esp. pp. 33–59.

27 Cf. Vlastos, G. ed., Plato’s Protagoras (New York, 1956), pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

28 Mano 71 b. Cf. Ibid., 86 e, 87 b ; Symp. 201 d.

29 Prot. 360 d. This observation is due to Professor Vlastos. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv 4.10.

30 In a seminar given as visiting Professorial Fellow at the Australian National University in 1963.

31 Cf. Popper, K.Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 231–48.Google Scholar

32 E.g. Meno 84 b. This dialogue provides many examples.

33 Charm. 163 d, Crat. 384 b.

34 Prot. 334 c–d.

35 Meno 71 c. Thompson’s note ad loc, ‘Plato has no doubt preserved a trick of the historic Socrates for inveigling his interlocutor into the wiles of his elenchus’, anticipates Robinson, op. cit. Cf. Phaedrus 263 d.

36 Crat. 384 a.

37 Prot. 336 d:

38 Mem. i 2.32–8.

39 Popper, K.The Open Society and its Enemies,2 Vol. 1 (London, 1952), pp. 248–53.Google Scholar

40 Meno84

41 Ibid., 86 a–b:

42 Op. cit., p. 84.

43 Clouds 137.

44 Symp. 175 e.

45. Phdr. 230 a; 234 e; 235 c:

In 236 b Socrates makes fun of his own making fun.

46 Crat. 391 a.

47 Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H. editors, Plato, the Collected Dialogues (New York, 1964), p. 1086.Google Scholar