Every science has roots that antedate acceptance as a
discipline. Neglecting these intimations, there is a consensus that
population genetics became a recognised science about 1920, and that
it split into two branches about 1960. One branch is concerned with
historical processes, uniting genetics with anthropology and (in other
species) with paleontology and taxonomy. The other branch is concerned
with inheritance in contemporary populations, uniting genetics with
epidemiology, medicine, psychology, and (in other species) with
agriculture. Anthony Edwards (1995) identified this dichotomy as
‘differential-equation biology’ vs
‘statistical biology’. The distinction becomes fastidious
when current gene frequencies are taken as indirect evidence for
selection by disease in the remote past: such inference from a unique
event is more characteristic of evolutionary genetics but concerns all
population geneticists. From time to time interest groups are formed
around twins, behaviour, demography, or quantitative traits, but they
are generally recognised as aspects of genetic epidemiology. If the
young science is in jeopardy, it is not by fission but by exclusion
of studies that are only indirectly related to disease, which
provides a focus but does not specify the contents. I will argue that
every aspect of population genetics that is not primarily concerned
with evolution is part of genetic epidemiology, and that the field
must suffer if it is not inclusive. As with all human activity
progress is punctuated, often cyclical, and therefore suggests the
real and apparent movement of celestial bodies for which the language
of astronomy is appropriate.