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World War I and “Continental Solidarity”*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

Emily S. Rosenberg
Emily S. Rosenberg*
Affiliation:
Macalester College, Saint Paul, Minnesota
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Students of the hemispheric system have generally neglected the era of World War I, probably because no major inter-American conferences were held between 1910 and 1923. Yet the disparate reactions to the European conflict represented a crisis of “continental solidarity”; World War I gave rise to a potentially important challenge to United States leadership and helped shape future patterns of hemispheric relations. The war called forth two rival blocs—United States-Brazil and Mexico-Argentina. These blocs differed over more than war policy. Their rivalry reflected an inter-American power struggle, each side invoking “continental solidarity” to gain support from other American nations. The impact of World War I upon the inter-American system and, in particular, the Argentine attempt to convene a Latin American congress need fuller examination.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Americas , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , January 1975 , pp. 313 - 334
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1975

Footnotes

*

This article was completed with the assistance of a dissertation fellowship from the American Association of University Women. The author would like to thank David F. Trask and Franklin W. C. Knight, both of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, for reading earlier drafts of this work.

References

1 The only complete study of Latin American policies during the war is Martin, Percy, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925).Google Scholar Most of the subsequent works on the subject have relied heavily upon Martin’s influential book. See Bailey, Thomas, The Policy of the United States toward the Neutrals, 1917–1918 (Baltimore, 1942), 305–39;Google Scholar Callcott, Wilfrid Hardy, The Western Hemisphere: Its Influence on United States Policies to the End of World War II (Austin, 1968);Google Scholar Connell-Smith, Gordon , The Inter-American System (New York, 1966), 53–59;Google Scholar Mecham, J. Lloyd, The United States and Inter-American Security (Austin, 1961), 77–87;Google Scholar Whitaker, Arthur P., The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Cornell, 1954), 109–28.Google Scholar Martin and most later writers adopt an artificial country-by-country organization and implicitly or explicitly define “continental solidarity” as a Latin American acceptance of United States policy. Mecham, for example, labels Argentine and Mexican attempts to effect unified policies “pseudo-cooperative proposals of the noncooperators.” (p. 85). In addition, scholars have left largely untapped the wealth of material on inter-American politics contained in the complete files of the United States Department of State.

2 For Mexican policy see Link, Arthur S., Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914–1915 (Princeton, 1960), 480–94;Google Scholar and Fabela, Isidro, Historia Diplomática de la Revolución Mexicana (2 vols., Mexico, 1958–59), II, 125–34.Google Scholar On the Pan-American Pact see Callcott, Wilfrid Hardy, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890–1920 (Baltimore, 1942), 322–330 Google Scholar and United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920 (2 vols., Washington, 1939), II, 472–500.

3 Fabela, , Historia Diplomática, 125–34;Google Scholar Lansing Papers, II, 477,482.

4 The court decided that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between the United States and Nicaragua violated the rights of other Central American states. Callcott, , The Caribbean Policy, 388–90.Google Scholar

5 Martin, , Latin America and the War, 20–24;Google Scholar Mecham, , The United States and Inter-American Security, 77–80.Google Scholar The efforts of Latin American governments may be followed in greater detail in National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and Its Termination, 1914-1929, Microcopy 367, 763.72112/356, 399, 433, 438, 477, 494, 502, 503, 554, 571, 585, 638, 683, 1180, 1229, 1538, 1578, 1624; 763.72119/35½C, 35½e. La Nación, Jan. 24, 1917, 763.72119/518. (Hereafter, microfilmed State Department records will be cited as NADS with appropriate microcopy, file, and document numbers.)

6 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, 1862- ), 1917, Sup. 1,108.

7 Ibid., 1917, Sup. I, 221–38; Lansing Papers, I, 593–94. The Dominican Republic was under United States military rule and thus had no independent policy at all.

8 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 222-24, 236-37. Box 110 of the seldom used Papers of Lester Woolsey, Solicitor for the State Department, (Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.) contains five diaries kept by Robert Lansing which relate exclusively to Latin American affairs. See the diary dated February-April, 1917, for information on the war policy of each country. The Guatemala-Honduras boundary dispute may be followed in Foreign Relations, 1917,760 800.

9 Ibid., 1917, Sup. I, 243–44; Ibid., 1917, 302–43; Ibid., 1918, 233–38; Baker, Ray Stannard, ed., Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (8 vols., Garden City, N. Y., 1927–39), VIII, 13; NADS M–367, 763.72/3977.Google Scholar

10 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 222, 251-52; La Prensa (Buenos Aires), especially Feb. 7, 1917, 8. Burns, E. Bradford, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York, 1966), passim.Google Scholar

11 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 222; NADS M-367, 763.72/5478; La Prensa, Feb., 1917, carried a daily column, “El Opinión en Sud América,” which covered opinion regarding the war in the newspapers of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

12 The text of the Mexican note and all answers to it are in Mexico, Secretaría de Re-laciones Exteriores, La Labor Internacional de la Revolución Constitucionalista de México (Mexico, 1918),431–56.

13 NADS M-367, 763.72/5166; Cronon, E. David, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of josephus Daniels, 1913–1921 (Lincoln, Neb., 1963), 111.Google Scholar See also Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 241–42.

14 La Prensa, Feb. 15, 1917, 9; Feb. 17, 1917, 7 (Chile); Feb. 27, 1917, 9 (Brazil); Labor Internacional, 438–39 (Bolivia).

15 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 233. On the bond dispute see ibid., 1917,732–47.

16 Labor Internacional, 442–43. Reports on how the issue of the treaty affected Colombian war policy may be found in Foreign Relations, 1917, 292–300.

17 Labor Internacional, 439 40. La Nación (Chile), Feb. 28,1917, summarized in La Prensa, Mar. 1,1917,9 reported the aims of the conference.

18 La Prensa, Feb. 5, 1917, 4; La Nación (Argentina), Feb. 4, 1917 in NADS M-367, 763.72/3546; La Razón, Feb. 5, 1917 in 763.72/3576½; La Época (governmental organ), no date, in New York Times, Feb. 9,1917,4.

19 NADS M-367, 763.72/8444. See also Julius Lay’s handwritten remark on 763.72/5164.

20 Lansing Papers, I,246.

21 Lansing, Robert, The War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (New York, 1935), 310–16;Google Scholar Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. 1,238–39,67.

22 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 240–42; NADS M-367,763.72119/525,662.

23 Lansing, , War Memoirs, 313–14;Google Scholar Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 245–48 (Cuba and Panama); NADS M-367, 763.72/3773, 3801, 3971, 3952, 6772, 7781 (Guatemala); 763.72119/ 592, 763.72/5016 (Honduras); Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 278–79, 289–90 (Nicaragua); ibid., 276, 279, 301 (Haiti). Costa Rica did not break relations immediately but intimated that recognition by the United States would result in such a step. Recognition was not forthcoming, and Tinoco finally severed relations in September, 1917, still hoping for United States approval. Ibid., 287, 329; ibid., 1917, 321–22. Ibid., 1917, Sup. I, 252–53 (Brazil and Bolivia).

24 During the latter half of April, La Prensa carried a column called “Asuntos Internacionales” which daily reported conferences concerning the congress between Argentine officials and various ministers from Latin American countries. The details of these meetings are not reported, but their frequency indicates that Yrigoyen was vigorously pushing his project. NADS M-367 763.72/4934, and La Razón, April 26, 1917, enclosed in 763. 72119/628 shed some light on the purpose of the congress.

25 NADS M-367,763.72119/525.

26 Chilean opinion, official and unofficial, may be conveniently followed through re-prints of editorials and interviews contained in La Prensa, especially Mar. 7, 1917, 10; Mar. 9, 1917, 9; Mar. 19, 1917, 8; April 23, 1917, 7; April 25, 1917, 9. Revealing editorials from various Chilean newspapers are also enclosed or summarized in NADS M-367, 763.72/3810, 3923, 4561, 4714. See also Pike, Fredrick B., Chile and the United States, 1880–1962: The Emergence of Chile’s Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy (Notre Dame, Ind., 1963), 155–57.Google Scholar

27 National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between the United States and Chile, 1910–1929, Microcopy 489, 711.25/25.

28 La Nación, April 21, 1917, quoted in La Prensa, April 23, 1917, 7.

29 NADS M-367, 763.72119/608 (Brazil), 613 (Chile), 622 (Bolivia). The text of the invitation is translated in 763.72119/619.

30 NADS M-367,763.72119/609,619.

31 NADS M-367, 763.72119/595,587½,608.

32 NADS M-367, 763.72119/608; Jornal do Comercio, May 20, 1917, contained in 763. 72/5703.

33 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 297. See also Carey, James C., Peru and the United States, 1900–1962 (Notre Dame, Ind., 1964), 31.Google Scholar

34 The only Latin American nations which have published correspondence regarding the congress are Mexico, in Labor internacional, and Argentina (see footnote 49). State Department files, however, contain fairly complete reports of each country’s attitude and even contain the texts of much of the correspondence. This summary of each country’s position is derived from NADS M-367, 763.72119/606, 607, 608, 615, 625, 662, 667, 671, 676; Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 317–18; and Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Decimal File, 1910–1929 (National Archives, Washington, D. C), 710.11/ 336. (Hereafter, non-microfilmed State Department documents will be cited as NA, RG 59, and appropriate file and document numbers.) El Salvador was an informal ally of Mexico and was hostile to the United States partly because it felt that the Bryan-Chamorro treaty had violated its rights in the Bay of Fonseca. Martin, , Latin America and the War, 510;Google Scholar NADS M-367, 763.72/3576. Colombia is the only country whose position during May and June is not clear. Colombia, Anales Diplomáticos Consulares de Colombia … Tomo VII (1916–1923) (Bogota, 1957), 176 reports that after April, 1917, Colombia could not “practically second” a congress. Martin, , Latin America and the War, 424,Google Scholar cites this document as proof that Colombia did not support Argentina, and most historians have followed Martin. The State Department, however, received many rumors that the Colombian minister in Buenos Aires was actively urging the congress, and Peterson, Harold, Argentina and the United States, 1810–1960 (New York, 1964), 333,Google Scholar who relied upon State Department sources, accordingly reported that Colombia energetically supported the initiative. The report in the Anales, written after Yrigoyen’s attempts had clearly failed, may not be quite accurate; or the minister may have been encouraging the congress on his own, without instructions from his government.

35 Brasil, Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, Guerra da Europa: Documentos Diplomáticos, Attitude do Brasil, 1914–1917 (Rio de Janeiro, 1917), 51–55.

36 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 200, 301-02; NADS M-367, 763.72/3577; NA, RG 59, 710.11/336. The grounds for revoking neutrality was that no American country at war with states of another continent would be treated as a belligerent. See Etchevest, Felix, Doctrina Brum (Montevideo, 1919).Google Scholar In October, 1917, Uruguay threatened to accept Argentina’s renewed hints regarding a congress unless the United States successfully persuaded European governments to give up their rights of extraterritoriality in Uruguay. The United States supported Uruguay to forestall its association with Argentina, the European nations acquiesced to the treaties, and Uruguay broke relations with Germany. Foreign Relations, 1918, Sup. I, 316-17, 333-34,337-39, 341; NADS M-367,763.72119/875-877.

37 For general opinion in Peru see NADS M-367, 763.72/6055, 6129, 6250 and especially National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Peru, 1910 1929, Microcopy 746, 823.002/39, 43. For Chilean opinion at this time see NADS M-367,763.72/4982, 5782d, 6094.

38 For different interpretations of this episode see Peterson, , Argentina and the United States, 310–11Google Scholar, and Yrigoyen, Hipólito, Pueblo y Gobierno (ed. by Instituto Yrigoyeneano, 12 vols., Buenos Aires, 1956), VIII, 146.Google Scholar

39 La Prensa, July 1, 1917, 5; July 12, 1917, 8; Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 308; Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations of Mexico, September 1, 1917, in National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910–1929, Microcopy 274,812.032/26.

40 NADS M-367,763.72/6653,8634.

41 Lansing, War Memoirs, 328; Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I,322–23.

42 Yrigoyen, , Pueblo y Gobierno, 9, 105–09.Google Scholar

43 Mable Stimson to Mrs. R. L. Ashhurst, Sept. 17, 1917, Papers of Frederic Jesup Stimson (Massachusetts Historical Society,Boston).

44 Smith, Peter, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and Change (New York, 1969)Google Scholar argues that Yrigoyen’s economic policies show little discontinuity from the agrarian-based policies of his conservative predecessors, but Smith’s emphasis on continuity cannot be extended to the realm of foreign policy. Conservatives generally favored the Allies, and Yrigoyen sided with the neutralistas, who consisted primarily of the more radical gaucho wing of his party and the Socialists. Contemporary observers recognized little continuity between the old elite and the Yrigoyen administration and often commented on the great split between them. NA, RG 59, 710.11/385; NADS M-367, 763. 72119/2687; Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I 328, 330; article by Hidalgo, Ernesto in El Universal (Mexico), June 26, 1918.Google Scholar

45 NADS M-367,763.72119/732, 878,975; 763.72/7096,8468.

46 NADS M-367, 763.72119/878; 763.72111/6779. Neither State Department records nor the Papers of Leland Harrison, the Department's code expert, (Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.) reveal the contents of this coded message, although all telegrams sent between Argentina and Mexico were censored as they came through Panama and forwarded to Harrison.

47 NADS M-367, 763.72/7990; 763.72119/875.

48 Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 356, 364, 365, 383.

49 Yrigoyen, , Pueblo y Gobierno, 8, 32–55.Google Scholar The lengthy note of refusal from Colombia is the only document on the congress, except for the texts of the invitations, which has been published in an Argentine documents collection.

50 NADS M-367,763.72/6736,7435½; Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 383–84.

51 NADS M-367,763.72119/944.

52 NADS M-367, 763.72119/951,1062,1094.

53 In September, 1917, after a cabinet crisis, Peru had issued an ultimatum requiring Germany to meet demands regarding the Lorton sinking. When Germany refused, Peru severed relations on October 4. Peru, Ruptura de Relaciones Diplomáticas con el Gobierno Imperial de Alemania (Lima, 1918), 50–123, in NADS M-367, 763.72/12538.

54 On the Peruvian plan see NADS M-367, 763.72/12538; 763.72119/942, 944, 955, 963, 973,994,1005.

55 Foreign Relations, 1918, Sup. I, 364.

56 NADS M-367, 763.72119/949, 952; Foreign Relations, 1917, Sup. I, 381–82, 388–89. The United States ambassador to Argentina believed that the United States should agree to attend the Argentine congress. He felt sure that an eminent delegate from the United States could lead all nations into a declaration of war. He also believed that a refusal would embitter Argentina against the United States but that an acceptance, by allowing Yrigoyen to save face, would gain his gratitude and friendship. Draft of unaddressed, undated letter in folder “1917,” Stimson Papers.

57 New York Times, Dec. 21, 1917, 1–2. The telegrams purportedly exposed a “deal” in which, after sinking the Argentine ship Toro, Germany publicly agreed to sink no more Argentine vessels within the blockaded zone (so that Yrigoyen could claim a great diplomatic victory) while Yrigoyen secretly promised to allow no more ships to sail. The interpretation that Yrigoyen compromised Argentina’s neutrality by making this secret deal with Germany was first written by State Department official Leland Harrison and published in the Times along with the telegrams. Harrison, whose routine job involved censorship of mail and code-breaking, would probably not have been adverse to “news management.” Yet his version, appearing in Martin, Latin America and the War, and in all later studies, has never been questioned by historians. The Yrigoyen administration, when confronted with the telegrams and the charges of a secret deal, denied that Yrigoyen had ever made a secret promise and suggested that Luxburg's reports were the work of a madman. The truth of the incident needs to be researched, for the standard United States version raises unanswered questions. For example, after the United States had published the first set of Luxburg telegrams in September 1917, the Yrigoyen government itself seized from the telegraph offices all other messages sent by Luxburg and turned them over to the United States (Harrison) for decoding. Surely Yrigoyen would not have done this had he known the telegrams would divulge an embarrassing secret deal. All of the facts surrounding the Luxburg telegrams, including Luxburg’s reliability, should be scrutinized.

58 El Salvador never prepared nor sent a delegation.

59 NADS M-274, 812.50/46; Foreign Relations, 1918, 601; NADS M-367, 763.72119/ 1052. Allied intelligence reports also indicated that Cabrera may have hoped to arrange a loan from Germany through the Buenos Aires branch of the Banco Germania del Sur. NADS M-274, 812.51/420, 429b. For greater detail placing the Cabrera mission in the context of United States-Mexican negotiations see Emily S. Rosenberg, “World War I and the Growth of United States Predominance in Latin America” (Phi), diss., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1973 ).

60 El Universal, June 27, 1918, July 1, 1918; NADS M-367, 763.72119/1252; NA, RG 59, 710.1 l/357a. The “Carranza doctrine,” was, in part, a revival of the 1857 “Calvo doctrine,” which forbade diplomatic intervention on behalf of a foreigner for any purpose. The fear that this radical concept, already written into the Mexican Constitution of 1917, would spread to other Latin American nations prompted the Solicitor for the State Department to have a 123 page memo drawn up on “The Attitude of the United States toward the Carranza Doctrine.” Box 18, Lester Woolsey Papers. The apprehension of United States officials toward the Cabrera mission is well illustrated in Franklin Lane, Secretary of Interior, to Lansing, Dec. 15, 1917, and Dec. 20, 1917, vols. 32, 33, Papers of Robert Lansing (Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).

61 The wheat negotiations may be followed in National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910–1929, Microcopy 514, 835.6131/5 et seq.

62 NADS M-367,763.72119/1511.

63 Intercepted telegrams in NADS M-274, 812.00/21799b and in NADS M-367, 763. 72119/1478; National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Chile, Microcopy 487,825.852/1.

64 National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between the United States and Mexico, Microcopy 314, 711.12/136. The tranasctions between Mexico and Chile, however, did not go smoothly and augured badly for continued commercial relations. See NA, RG 59,612.253.

65 See the wheat negotiations in NADS M-514,835.6131/5 et seq.

66 Foreign Relations, 1918, 627–28; de Roux, María Eugenia López, “Relaciones Mexicano-Norteamericanas (1917–1918),” Historia Mexicana 14 (1965), 460–66.Google Scholar

67 National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States (New York, 1930),61 63.

68 NADS M-367, 763.72/9031,10402,11083.

69 Lansing, War Memoirs, 316.

70 NADS M-367,763.72/7338,8191.

71 See, for example, NA, RG 59, 710.11/377; NADS M-367. 763.72119/2604. Gelfand, Lawrence E., The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919 (New Haven, Conn., 1963), passim.Google Scholar

72 In the early twenties the State Department expressed anxiety at the effect of Mexican propaganda and, no doubt, tended to exaggerate its revolutionary character and its pervasive nature. See NADS M-274, 812.20210/orig. et seq.

73 Haring, Clarence, South America Looks at the United States (New York, 1928), 141–60.Google Scholar

74 Chile and Brazil had ratified the treaty; Argentina had not.