Although candidates are very concerned about garnering prenomination group endorsements, there is virtually no research on the effects of such endorsements at the presidential level. In 1984, teachers', women's, and labor groups all endorsed Mondale for the Democratic nomination. Using a survey of Democratic caucus participants, we examine the effects of these endorsements on both candidate support and prenomination activity for the endorsed candidate. We find substantial effects of labor and teachers' group endorsements on the candidate choice of their members, but virtually no effect of women's groups. Labor union membership also had the greatest impact on campaign activity for Mondale.

In his article, “Union Organization in Advanced Industrial Democracies” in the June 1989 issue of the Review, Michael Wallerstein advocated a model to account for cross-national differences in trade union organization rates. He argued that the size of the labor force provided the most important determinant of variation in union density. In this controversy, John Stephens takes issue with the operationalization of a key variable in Wallerstein's model—industrial infrastructure. Stephens reanalyzes the data using an alternative measure of this variable. His reanalysis supports his claim that in fact, the two variables yield results that are statistically indistinguishable. Wallerstein responds.

Governments of the Left and Right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue. Their propensity to do so, however, is constrained by their desire for reelection. We argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy, particularly the labor movement. We hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance. In countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements, leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment. Conversely, in countries with weak labor movements, rightist governments can pursue their partisan-preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes. Performance will be poorer in other cases. These hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984.

The problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism. The former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation. The latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict. Existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states' preferences. Using a simple game-theoretic model, this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states' behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially the states' concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states. Many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model.

The recent Oregon v.Smith decision's shifting of the burden in free exercise cases from legislatures to minority religious claims has brought fierce opposition, most conspicuously from leading nonpreferentialist Richard J. Neuhaus, who sees in it the foundation of majority tyranny. Against Smith, Neuhaus employs Madison's “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” which is universally read to argue that the superiority of religion to politics proscribes majoritarian hegemony over religious practices. I contend that the Memorial's appeals are better understood as rhetoric than as reflecting Madison's true view. I find Madison hostile not only to religious establishments but also to religion itself. This hostility was the basis of his rejection of the nonpreferentialists' utility-based argument for government support of religion. In this light, I uncover a curious historical irony: the nonpreferentialist Neuhaus seeks today to protect religion from hostility by adhering to a position that was originally animated, in key respects, by hostility both to religion and to its nonpreferential support.

Two related issues have developed in the scale analysis of voting in the U. S. Congress. One is methodological; it concerns the appropriate dimensionalizing model. The other is more substantive, entailing interpretation of the extent to which voting dimensions carry an ideological component. Kenneth Koford contributed to consideration of these issues in his research note, “Dimensions in Congressional Voting,” in the September 1989 issue of this Review. In this controversy, his claims are challenged vigorously by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. In turn, Koford defends his argument that “much roll call voting in Congress does not fit a single dimension.”

The argument is presented for defining party identification by the root question, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?” With this definitional base, the partisan balance between Democrats and Republicans between 1952 and 1980 shows no evidence of realignment outside the South, belying the implications of the Markus-Converse and Fiorina analyses that suggest volatility in response to short-term influences. It also appears that the correlation between party identification and voter choices for president are very constant over time in the South as well as outside the South. Party line voting by party identifiers varies by region and party but did not decrease between 1952 and 1988.

Research on interest group litigation has provoked a reevaluation of the conventional wisdom about the study of pressure group activity and judicial politics. Nevertheless, the notion that interest groups are intrepid litigators that rarely lose to nongroup adversaries persists unchallenged and unscathed. We seek to determine if groups are, in fact, as invincible as the literature suggests. Several findings emerge that may undermine conventional wisdom about the relative efficacy of group-sponsored litigation. Most important is that groups are no more likely than nongroups to win, at least in U.S. District Courts. Based on this and other results, we draw a number of conclusions about interest group litigation and the direction into which future study might head.

In her article on “Freedom, Recognition, and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory,” published in the December 1989 issue of this Review, Nancy J. Hirschmann argued that a feminist methodology could breathe new and useful life into liberal political theory, relieving it of its structural sexism. In this Controversy, Richard C. Sinopoli takes issue with key claims made by Hirschmann. In turn, Hirschmann elaborates her case.

How should policy innovations undertaken by states be modeled? Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry presented an event history analysis of the determinants of lottery adoptions by state governments in the June 1990 issue of this Review. Howard Front argues that the way Berry and Berry tested for interaction among variables is invalid on the grounds that what they take to be empirical results are only artifacts of the model specification. In response, the Berrys elaborate their original model and add alternative specifications.

To what extent and in what respects does the political thought of Michel Foucault reflect the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas? In the September 1990 issue of this Review, Leslie Paul Thiele firmly asserted Nietzschean roots for Foucault's thought. In this Controversy, Thiele's claims are disputed by J. Scott Johnson. Johnson argues that Foucault's theory is rooted as much in Marx as in Nietzsche and that Foucault himself refuted Thiele's interpretation. In his response, Thiele takes issue with Johnson's critique.

I propose an alternative index to operationalize the variable number and size of parties in a party system. To support it, I present a critical overview of the two most common indices, Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of parties and Kesselman and Wildgen's hyperfractionalization, showing the causes of their weakness. Then I explain the computational logic of my alternative, “number of parties,” and compare it with the other two, using hypothetical cases. After that, I contrast the Laakso-Taagepera index with mine, using data from actual elections between 1945 and 1981. I conclude that my index outperforms the other two as an operationalization of the variable number and size of parties.