Two principal problems were analyzed in the study: (1) the impact of malapportionment on party voting, and (2) the influence of constituency on legislative partisanship. The California Senate was used as a test case because it was generally considered to deviate from the pattern of party voting found in other two-party states, and because it was the most poorly apportioned upper chamber in the nation. It was found that the proportion of party votes in the Senate increased significantly after reapportionment, and gross malapportionment may have inhibited a trend toward more party voting. It was also found that there was a much stronger association between political and socioeconomic constituency variables and an index of partisan voting following elections in reapportioned districts.

The analysis presented here is an effort to elaborate the patron-client model of association, developed largely by anthropologists, and to demonstrate its applicability to political action in Southeast Asia. Inasmuch as patron-client structures are not unique to Southeast Asia but are much in evidence, particularly in Latin America, in Africa, and in less developed portions of Europe, the analysis may possibly have more general value for understanding politics in preindustrial societies. After defining the nature of patron-client ties and distinguishing them from other social ties, the paper discriminates among patron-client ties to establish the most important dimensions of variation, examines both the survival and transformations in patron-client links in Southeast Asia since colonialism and the impact of major social changes such as the growth of markets, the expanded role of the state, and the creation of local regimes. Finally, the paper shows how patron-client bonds interact with electoral politics to create distributive pressures which, in turn, often lead to inflationary fiscal policies and vulnerability of regimes to losses of revenue.

Much that is characteristic of contemporary anarchist thought can be found in the writings of the founder of that tradition, William Godwin. He is ambivalent on the value of technology and modernity, nostalgic at one moment and progressive another. He extols individual autonomy while preaching community solidarity. Above all he shares with modern anarchism an elitist disdain for ordinary men and women, which in the case of Godwin leads to an unresolved tension between theoretical radicalism and practical conservatism. His anarchist doctrine repudiates all forms of coercion, law, and government. It eschews cooperation of all kind as deleterious to individual development. At the same time it posits an ideal order characterized by a high degree of informal coercion practiced by zealous neighborly inspection. But Godwin was a less than eager friend of reform and agitation during the years of Pitt's repression of radical movements in England. This was clear even in the pages of Political Justice, but all the more obvious in his feud in 1795–96 with John Thelwall and the London Corresponding Society, the leading radical activists. This paper outlines Godwin's anarchism and points out the implications of his dispute with Thelwall. In addition it shows the extent to which Godwin has given anarchism certain of its enduring qualities.

People have three ways of responding to neighborhood problems: leaving (exit), political action (voice), and doing nothing (passivity). The model assumes: 1. Voice is more likely to ameliorate neighborhood problems than exit or passivity; exit, in fact, can make things worse, 2. Rational behavior on the part of residents, coupled with constraints that limit options: status, race, the responsiveness of government and the nature of the problems. Survey data on one city are combined with census data differentiating neighborhood types. Voice is characteristic of suburban areas among high and low status whites; exit is characteristic of white urban areas. Among ghetto blacks—whose exit options are severely constrained—voice is most characteristic. Problems faced by blacks and whites living in the city are similar, while their adaptations are different.

This paper examines two neglected conditions of the linkage process between public opinion and public policy, in an effort to evaluate an explanation, other than voter apathy and ignorance, of why the linkage appears to be so weak. These conditions are: (1) Opposing candidates for the same elective office must differ in their issue-related attitudes. (2) The winners' subsequent behavior vis-à-vis public policy must be consonant with their pre-election issue-related attitudes.

By the use of data collected before the 1966 House election, the amount of choice, or issue-related differences between candidates for the same House seat, is examined in all 435 Congressional districts. Sufficient differences were found in three policy areas—foreign affairs, civil rights, and domestic welfare—to imply that the electorate was given the opportunity to determine the direction of public policy.

Adding data collected on the roll-call behavior of the 435 winners allowed us to examine the second condition. Although in some cases there were substantial differences between pre-election attitude and postelection roll-call behavior on the same issue, this is clearly the exception rather than the rule. As a generalization, the second condition appears to be true.

It is commonly held that Congress has made only inconsequential changes in the President's requests for defense appropriations. Scholarly studies of the budgetary process, notably the work of Fenno and Wildavsky, do not include defense spending in their analyses. For nondefense spending they find that Congress has primarily a fiscal rather than programmatic orientation toward appropriations.

House and Senate changes in the President's defense appropriations requests were analyzed for the fiscal years 1960 through 1970. It was found that small Congressional changes in total defense spending obscured more substantial activity in particular budget categories. The concentration of Congressional activity in two of these categories—Procurement and R&D—indicates that Congress has had a significant programmatic orientation toward defense spending. Changes in the level of Congressional activity across time confirm this hypothesis.

Efforts to measure the relative influence of the House and Senate proved inconclusive. The Senate dominated the conference committee, but the Senate's influence was concentrated in the least important budget categories. The House made most of the changes in the President's budget requests, but very few of such changes were appealed by the Defense Department to the Senate.

This article provides a partial test of the rational-technical model and of the patronage model of political mobility in the Soviet Communist Party. Two major hypotheses are examined: 1) the greater the number of patron client ties acquired by regional Party secretaries, the greater the probability of their upward mobility, and 2) the better the economic performance of the regions for which secretaries are responsible, the greater the probability of their upward mobility. Multiple regression analysis indicates only very weak support for these hypotheses for the 1955–1968 period in the RSFSR. Considerably greater support for the hypotheses is found when the following variables are controlled: level of economic development, political regime, and Party cohort. Changes in the level of policy conflict within the central elite are found to account for much of the variation over time in the explanatory power of the two models.

While significant progress has been made in establishing a legal barrier to the further spread of nuclear weapons, some important nations are withholding approval of this Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Political factors are very significant, but agreement is made even more difficult by persistent ambiguities in technological forecasts of “how far we or they are from the bomb.” The time-lag for any crash weapon programs will not remain as extended as one might hope, because civilian technology itself is drawing states ever closer to de facto military capabilities. Yet the length of this time-lag may be crucial to the maintenance of peace if political crises emerge. Since scientists offer widely varying estimates on such time-lags, a graphical formulation is offered to reduce ambiguity. In the end, the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards under the NPT may depend more on their symbolic and political impact than on their technology.

Office-holders periodically face the problem of choosing among a set of career alternatives, and these alternatives customarily include the choice of dropping out of political life, or seeking reelection, or of choosing to seek higher office. This paper assumes that officeholders behave according to a rational calculus in making such choices, and that the main elements involved in the choice process include the probabilities and values attached by the candidate to his alternatives, and the investments required to obtain these alternatives. Political ambition, or the desire to seek higher office, is shown to develop as a product of the investments that politicians make in their political careers, and the investments are shown to be associated with the structural characteristics of community size and electoral competitiveness. The subjects of the research are 435 city councilmen from 89 cities of the San Francisco Bay Region, and the data include information derived from interviews with the councilmen and aggregate election data collected on each city.

Certain institutional changes in the advanced industrial societies are said to be leading toward postindustrial, if not postmodern, forms of sociopolitical organization. Scientific and technological developments are usually seen as the generating forces of such change, a major dimension of which is thought to be a growing pre-occupation with goods and services which are produced and/or purchased communally.

There exists a parallel phenomenon in the modern interstate system, namely, a growing incidence of joint production and joint regulation by states, much of it in scientific and technological fields. Factors both leading to and limiting such joint activities, and some consequences of different kinds of collective decision making and administrative arrangements for the interstate system, are here explored.

It is an explicit aim of this inquiry, in addition, to avoid the evolutionary or functionalist assumptions informing much of the contemporary study of international organization. Instead, I argue that the processes of international organization are generated by how and why states choose from among alternate modes of performing tasks, both national and international, under varying conditions of possibilities and constraints. The bulk of the article develops and illustrates permutations of this basic posture.

The analysis suggests a number of future modifications of the modern interstate system, and of the modern state as an actor in that system. But these modifications share little with the kinds of international arrangements and structures past theories have led us to expect.

David E. Butler and Donald E. Stokes have collected the best available data about the political effects of intergenerational social mobility in Britain, but they are wrong in their conclusion that “social mobility can make only a small contribution to the fact that more than a quarter of British electors fail to vote in accord with their class.” They have defined social mobility too narrowly. My reanalysis of their data shows that over a third of those Britons who do not support the predominant party of their class are intergenerationally mobile. The upwardly mobile constitute 12 per cent of the Labour party electorate, and 75 per cent of the middle-class Labourites.

Although the term “ideology” is ubiquitous in modern political discourse, it is used in diverse and usually ambiguous ways which limit its value as an analytical concept. The main ambiguity arises from the fact that, as most writers use it, the concept of ideology does not provide criteria for distinguishing ideological thought from nonideological thought. Lacking this power to make concrete discriminations, the concept fails to achieve empirical relevance. This paper attempts to remedy that deficiency and save the concept of ideology for the explanation of politics.

The problem of conceptualization is approached by viewing ideology primarily as a cultural phenomenon. As such, it is argued, ideology has characteristics that distinguish it from other symbol systems. Of special importance in this regard is the identification of basic differentia between ideology on the one hand, and myth and Utopia (with which ideology is often confused) on the other. The features of ideology identified in this comparative analysis are then discussed in fuller detail with a view to understanding (1) the significance of ideology in politics, and (2) the way in which the concept of ideology can help us to understand politics, insofar as politics involves ideology.

During the last 60 years, the proportion of careerists (congressmen elected ten or more times) has risen from 2.8 per cent to 20.0 per cent. The greatest increase occurred in the mid-1950s. The proportion of Southern Democrats numbered among the careerists has consistently been disproportionately large, with the number of Northern Democrats increasing, while Republican careerists have become relatively fewer. Fluctuations in the number of senior congressmen is not strongly influenced by national electoral patterns.

The most frequent cause of careerists' leaving the House has been retirement. During the last decade the incidence of defeats in primaries and general elections has increased; the greater susceptibility of careerists to rejection by the electorate coincides with reapportionment and the involvement of new groups in the electorate interested in new issues.

Averroës is primarily known for his numerous commentaries on Aristotle, yet his most explicitly political writing was presented in the form of a commentary on Plato's Republic. Consequently, the major dispute in scholarly literature has been whether he was more of a Platonist or an Aristotelian, a dispute of concern only because it reflects the important political question of what Averroës thought about the relation between theory and practice. This essay seeks to answer that question by studying the numerous editions and translations of his writings made available by contemporary scholarship. His commentaries on the logical arts concerned with public speech and common opinion are first examined, and the teaching set forth there is then contrasted with the kind of ideas Averroës expounded in his explicitly public works.

In the commentaries on the logical arts, Averroës stretched Aristotle's arguments in order to suggest that unexamined opinion was an insufficient guide for the practical arts dependent on such opinion. Although Averroës did not claim that such arts could be guided only by theoretical knowledge, he did insist that they could be best used only by those aware of the limits of opinion. This opening for the guidance of philosophy was carried further in the public writings where the need for philosophy to direct sound practice was defended against religiously motivated attacks on philosophy. Thus, the correct understanding of Averroës's views about the relation between theory and practice is closely related to an appreciation of his views about the role peculiar to philosophy and philosophers in his own religious community.

In legislative systems a bill is commonly considered and reported by an appropriate committee before it is considered on the floor of the house. Since motions on the floor frequently relate to such bills, it is often apposite to refer to a motion's relevant committee. This article presents a mathematical model of the relationship between the relevant committee's divisions on the floor and a motion's probability of passing. Let x be the proportion of the relevant committee voting yea on the floor, z be the proportion of the relevant committee voting nay on the floor, and y be the proportion of the relevant committee neither voting yea nor voting nay on the floor, then a motion's probability of passing is (x2 + y2)/(x2 + y2 + z2). The fit between theory and observation is quite good: six hundred eleven roll calls from the 90th and 91st Congresses have been analyzed; 0.628 of the motions actually passed; and 0.613 of the motions were expected to pass.

Observers of city politics have often stated that political leadership—usually mayoral leadership—is a crucial ingredient in a city's ability to deal with its problems. And studies of successful leaders in urban systems have led to the formulation of a model of the “political entrepreneur” who is adept at accumulating political resources and pyramiding them to gain increased influence. Based on four years of observation of politics in Oakland, California, this study suggests that successful mayoral leadership and resource-pyramiding may be limited by governmental structure, the personality of the mayor, and the nature of the political system.

In Oakland, fragmented institutional authority and the council-manager form of government have created obstacles for elected officials. A privately oriented, “nonpolitical” mayor has avoided publicity and has tended to underutilize, rather than pyramid, his resources. Finally, in an amorphous political system characterized by a lack of group and party activity, a mayor is denied both information and support. By examining the ways in which the performance of Oakland's mayor diverges from a model of political leadership, we can identify some of the factors that support or limit such leadership.