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Stability, Coalitions and Schisms in Proportional Representation Systems*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

M. L. Balinski  and
H. P. Young
M. L. Balinski
Affiliation:
School of Organization and Management, Yale Universityand International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
H. P. Young
Affiliation:
Graduate School of the City Universityof New York and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
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Abstract

Methods to allocate seats in proportional representation systems are investigated in terms of underlying common-sense properties. Important among these are concepts of stability, coalition encouragement and schism encouragement. In addition, a new concept of uniformity is introduced which seems inherent in the very idea of the word “method, ” and it is shown that this concept is essentially equivalent to a previously investigated property called consistency. These and other criteria are shown to uniquely determine certain methods. In particular, the Jefferson method (incorrectly credited to d'Hondt) and the Quota method are given characterizations which commend them as the principal candidates for use in PR systems.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 72 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 848 - 858
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

*

This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant MPS 75–07414 with the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York.

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