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Organizing Groups for Collective Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1986

Robyn M. Dawes ,
John M. Orbell ,
Randy T. Simmons  and
Alphons J. C. Van De Kragt
Robyn M. Dawes
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
John M. Orbell
Affiliation:
University of Oregon and Utah State University
Randy T. Simmons
Affiliation:
Utah State University
Alphons J. C. Van De Kragt
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
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Abstract

How can the beneficiaries of collective action be persuaded to contribute the resources (time, energy, money) necessary for the effort to succeed? Rational and selfish players will recognize they can free ride on the successful contributions of others. If the effort is not successful, they will lose a contribution—and be “suckered.” Other than relying on altruism, organizers of the group effort can modify incentives so that players are more prepared to contribute. Laboratory experiments offer one way of assessing the effectiveness of various such modifications; we conducted such tests to see how well contributing is promoted by (1) assuring contributors that they will not lose if the group effort fails (a “money-back guarantee”) and (2) enforcing contributions if it succeeds (“fair share”). We expect the latter to be more successful because it is “stable,” unlike the former, whose success can be undermined by expectations of that success. Three experimental replications demonstrate that the money-back guarantee is no more successful than a standard dilemma, but fair-share requirements increase contributing significantly over that base. Analysis of subjects' expectations about others' behavior offers some support to the hypothesized process undermining the money-back guarantee, but motivational factors must also be taken into account for a full explanation.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 80 , Issue 4 , December 1986 , pp. 1171 - 1185
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1986

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