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An Approach to a Science of Administration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Edwin O. Stene
Edwin O. Stene
Affiliation:
University of Kansas
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Extract

Writers on public administration place much emphasis upon the possibilities and importance of discovering and applying scientific principles in their field of study. But very few of them have ventured to state the basic premises upon which they seek to build that science. Many of those whose writings imply that major principles have been discovered announce, not premises, but conclusions, which, regardless of their practical merits, can hardly be called anything but opinions. On the other hand, several scholars seek to escape from errors of commission by avoiding the use of such scientific terms as “principles” or “efficiency.” If they go beyond descriptive analyses to advocate particular plans of organization or methods of procedure, they use terms which denote value judgments, thereby admitting by implication that they are expressing mere opinions. In a few published discourses, basic premises are stated and reasoning is developed therefrom. However, most of those premises—or “principles”—are referred to by name only, such as “the principle of leadership”; they are not stated in terms of precise causal relations which can be verified or which can serve adequately as bases for further reasoning.

It may be regarded as unwise to venture a statement of what one considers the basic premises upon which a science of administration may be built. But every body of theory is built upon fundamental assumptions, either expressed or implied. Moreover, a body of theory is complete, and has scientific value, only when the premises are sufficiently clear to permit objective scrutiny and verification. Erroneous hypotheses, stated precisely, may be more scientific than vague or unexpressed assumptions; for only the former will lend themselves to verification. In other words, trial and error is an essential part of scientific method.

Type
Public Administration
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 34 , Issue 6 , December 1940 , pp. 1124 - 1137
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1940

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References

1 For a distinction between “principles” and “opinions,” see White, L. D., “The Meaning of Principles of Public Administration,” in White, , Gaus, , and Dimock, , Frontiers of Public Administration (1936)Google Scholar, Chap. 2. For statements announcing important “principles” of public administration, see Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management (1937), p. 3; Walker, Harvey, Public Administration (1937), pp. 61–62Google Scholar; Buck, A. E., Reorganization of State Administration in the United States (1938), p. 14.Google Scholar Buck uses the term “standards,” but his standards of administration are apparently derived from what he and others regard as scientific tests of experience. In a criticism of the “prevailing theories” advocated by Buck, Willoughby, and others, Charles S. Hyneman cites several other writings which support the view that those theories are mere opinions—or worse. Hyneman, Charles, “Administrative Reorganization,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 62–75 (Feb., 1939).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 In his recently published Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1939), L. D. White carefully avoids the use of the term “principles” and of other terms which might suggest that he is stating “scientific laws”; but he makes frequent use of another type of positive statement, such as “good administration requires” (p. 46), “it is also desirable” (p. 79), and “the interests of good administration suggest” (p. 570). Of course the social scientist cannot disregard human concepts of value, because the very purpose of social organizations is to satisfy human wants, and no organization can function long if its activities produce general dissatisfaction. But the student must seek to measure public value judgments objectively, by taking his standards from official statements of policy and by observing human behavior which may serve as evidence of general and public concepts of value. The “social efficiency” to which Millspaugh and Hyneman refer (see Hyneman, op. cit., pp. 66–67), like Dr. White's “good,” may be used scientifically if it can be observed and measured objectively. But it is doubtful whether political scientists are fully agreed on the values which they set forth, and therefore the conclusions drawn from such general concepts of value must be classed as opinions.

3 Papers on the Science of Administration (1937), edited by Gulick, Luther and Urwick, L.Google Scholar, perhaps contains the best collection of articles representing an attempt to develop a rational scientific approach to the study. But one searches almost in vain for the statement of a “principle” in precise terms or in terms of causal relationship.

4 Gulick, and Urwick, (eds.), Papers on the Science of Administration, p. 194.Google Scholar

5 Cf. Field, Oliver P., Research in Administrative Law (1937)Google Scholar; White, L. D., Research in Public Personnel Administration (1939).Google Scholar All of the publications of the Committee on Public Administration, Social Science Research Council, are reports of empirical studies. Perhaps the emphasis is justified by the definition of “research”; but see Willoughby, W. F., “A Program for Research in Political Science,” in this Review, Vol. 27, pp. 1–23 (1933).Google Scholar

6 Most textbooks, and many other treatises on the subject, start by defining administration. However, the writer has found no definition which presents a clear demarcation between administration and other types of cooperative activity, and he doubts whether the concept will lend itself to precise definition. Since administration is a type of organization, the elements of the latter are also elements of the former.

7 Gulick, and Urwick, (eds.), Papers on the Science of Administration, pp. 91–92.Google Scholar

8 Barnard, Chester I., Functions of the Executive (Harvard Univ. Press, 1938), p. 73.Google Scholar The presence or absence of a joint purpose is the principal basis on which Barnard distinguishes between formal and informal organization. Op. cit., Chap. 9.

9 Some authorities define organization as the arrangement of personnel for the accomplishment of a purpose. Cf. Gaus, , White, , and Dimock, , The Frontiers of Public Administration (1936), pp. 66–67Google Scholar, and White, L. D., Introduction to the Study of Administration (1939), p. 37.Google Scholar While the arrangement of personnel is essential, and while that is the center of attention in organization charts and plans, the definition is suggestive of preparation rather than of action. No organization actually exists except in so far as there is concerted activity.

10 This is apparently what Mr. Gulick has in mind when he says that “in the science of administration, whether public or private, the basic ‘good’ is efficiency.” Gulick and Urwick, op. cit., p. 192. The idea is basic in all discourses on public administration—even among those who object to the emphasis placed upon “efficiency in operation.” Difficulties and disagreements arise in the attempt to determine the relative importance of different kinds of human sacrifice.

11 These factors cannot be isolated. As the later discussion will indicate, coordination is largely a consequence of individual efficiency, and individual accomplishment is also dependent upon coordination. The factors may be considered separately, however, in the sense that price, demand, and supply are considered separately by the economists.

12 The result of coördination is efficiency of the organization. The result of man power, individual accomplishment, and coordination is effectiveness of the organization.

13 Mooney defines “principle” as a characteristic which is universal. By his definition, coördination is a principle of organization because it is characteristic of all organizations. Having adopted that definition, he is content merely to name “principles” without explaining them in terms of causal relationship. The present article is based on the proposition that coordination, while essential to all organization, is a variable which tends to produce like variations in the effectiveness of an organization.

14 In all axioms and propositions, the phrase “tends to vary” is used—instead of the unrealistic “other things being equal”—to allow for factors that would produce contrary tendencies.

15 Gulick and Urwick, op. cit., p. 91.

16 To many persons the term “routine” implies the absence of individual initiative and imagination. However, an analogy may serve to illustrate the difference. A violinist who devotes his entire attention to matters of technical proficiency (the routine of playing his instrument) never becomes a great artist; but neither is it possible for the musician to give his attention to the creative phases of his art until he has mastered the technical problems so thoroughly that he need not think about the details of his finger or arm movements. The routine must be mastered before the violinist becomes a musician. In an organization, the conscious attention is the attention of leaders, and the routine has been established when the organization carries on without conscious attention of leaders. The “dead level of mediocrity and routine” of which P. W. Melton speaks (“Administration in a Federal Government Bureau,” in this Review, Vol. 33, pp. 835, 840) apparently arises because the executive devotes his attention to matters that should be routine and habitual; not because recurring functions have become routine.

17 L. Urwick apparently has somewhat the same idea in mind when he points out that “in organization there is a tendency to compensation, comparable to the tendency found in the human organism.” Gulick and Urwick, op. cit., p. 84.

18 The term “leadership” is used here in a limited and non-personal sense. Types of leadership or personal characteristics of leaders are not considered in this article.

19 Gulick and Urwick, op. cit., p. 9. Dimock, Marshall, Modem Politics and Administration (1937), p. 270.Google Scholar For views approving the idea, see also White, L. D., Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1939), p. 51Google Scholar; Buck, A. E., The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States (1938), pp. 17–19.Google Scholar

20 The reader should recall that while coordination promotes efficiency, it is only one of the factors which determine the effectiveness of an organization. (Cf. note 12, supra.) This axiom does not lead to the conclusion that several small and independent organizations are more efficient than one large organization. If the same task is to be performed, integration does not increase the number of persons involved.

21 Not every appeal requires immediate decision; but an administrator must have time to make decisions which are called for immediately, and to recognize the order in which questions ought to be decided and the information to be obtained and persons to be consulted before an order is issued.

22 Under a spoils system, it is often necessary to retain an intermediate officer for some time after a change of party control, because his technical knowledge is indispensable pending the time when the new employees learn their tasks. When such an officer is flanked above and below by members of the new party, he usually exercises no authority; and the practice of passing over his office in departmental communication may become so habitual that his successor also exercises very little influence. The practice of jumping lines of authority (breaking the official channels of communication) is especially common when a busy director functions under a not-so-busy permanent board or commission.

23 Further clarification of the nature and causes of red tape, the merits of various systems of field organization, and the merits and demerits of the board type of administrative control are only a few of the problems that might be analyzed on the basis of the proposition drawn from this discussion of “lines of communication.”

24 Gulick and Urwick, op. cit., pp. 93–94.

25 Cf. Chester I. Barnard, Functions of the Executive, Chap. 14, for further definition and illustrations of the “strategic factor.”

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