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Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2004

EDWARD D. MANSFIELD ,
HELEN V. MILNER  and
B. PETER ROSENDORFF
EDWARD D. MANSFIELD
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
HELEN V. MILNER
Affiliation:
Columbia University
B. PETER ROSENDORFF
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
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Abstract

Our earlier article established that pairs of democracies trade more freely than country-pairs composed of a democracy and an autocracy (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000). Xinyuan Dai (2002) incorrectly asserts that our conclusion depends on the preferences of the decision makers who formulate trade policy. We show that Dai fails to accurately replicate our model, and hence erroneously claims that the new equilibria she deduces are consistent with it. In addition, we demonstrate that in altering one of our assumptions, Dai offers a model that is less realistic as well as inconsistent with the substantive literature on international bargaining. Finally, we question the robustness of her approach. Due to these problems of replication, realism, and robustness, we conclude that Dai's model is of limited utility.

Type
FORUM
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 96 , Issue 1 , March 2002 , pp. 167 - 169
Copyright
© 2002 by the American Political Science Association

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References

Dai Xinyuan 2002 Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference Revisited American Political Science Review 96 1 159 65Google Scholar
Iida Keisuke 1993 When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty Journal of Conflict Resolution 34 3 403 26Google Scholar
Mansfield Edward D. Milner Helen V. Rosendorff B. Peter 2000 Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade American Political Science Review 94 2 305 22Google Scholar
Mo Jongryn 1995 Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games American Political Science Review 89 4 914 24Google Scholar
Putnam Robert 1988 Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two–Level Games International Organization 42 3 427 60Google Scholar
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